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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction  
The development and control of food standards is a role that has usually been taken on by 
national governments as part of their policies to protect consumers against market failures 
caused by information asymmetries (Akerlof, 1970; Nelson, 1970, Andersen, 1994). These 
standards were initially focused on controlling adulteration and misbranding (Gardner, 2003) 
through the definition of technical requirements for food products (Holleran et al, 1999). 
Later, the focus of food standards was expanded into food safety requirements and extrinsic 
information cues (Luning et al, 2002) and their enforcement regulations have also changed 
differently on regional and national levels (Hammoudi et al, 2009) and even the scheme 
governance for setting and controlling has been partially transferred to the private sector. The 
outbreak of food borne illness and food control scandals in the most important markets, like 
the BSE outbreak in Europe, the E.coli case in spinach in the USA or the detection of 
melamine in childrens’ milk produced in China have been responsible for sparking these 
changes in food legislation worldwide. In addition, the power of the media and some 
charismatic organizations have raised concerns in public opinion regarding food production 
processes and their impact on social and environmental issues. It has been said that 
governments have the advantage of being more effective in enforcing food standards since 
they can prosecute violators of national food legislation (McCluskey, 2007), but at the same 
time, they apparently lack flexibility in adjusting these standards against the rapid changes in 
consumer preferences, technology and market structure (McCluskey, 2007). In the short term, 
the disadvantages of the public sector and the mistrust earned from past scandals have 
prompted the initiative to share more of the responsibility with the private sector, thus giving 
leverage to the food industry to develop their own standards and schemes. This has caused the 
proliferation of many private standards, which are becoming or have already become the 
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As a matter of fact, there are several incentives for the private sector to set their own food 
standards and schemes. Firms have seen the adoption and implementation of food standards 
as an important strategy for acting with “due diligence” while reducing information 
asymmetries (Henson and Readon, 2005). This also to some extent secures their brand 
reputation (Fulponi, 2006) and either strengthens their market position or opens new 
opportunities for market access. In fact, the implementation of standard and quality assurance 
schemes have helped firms to avoid potential liability repercussions and to pre-empt 
mandatory public regulations (McCluskey and Winfree, 2009). Also in most cases it has 
helped them to maintain access to conventional and premium markets. These private 
assurance schemes have become an important element for building trust in business-to-
business (B2B) relationships, especially in the first transaction stages between new trading 
partners (Fritz, 2006). Private food standards have been established under different 
governance structures and associations. The standard setting organizations may vary from 
single retailer programmes (e.g. Tesco Nature), to producer associations (e.g. Assured Food 
Standards – Red Tractor); from third party trustworthy organizations like NGOs (e.g. Rain 
Forest Alliance) to business oriented certification bodies (e.g. USGAP-Primus labs); from 
different label programmes (e.g. FairTrade /Transfair) to base platforms of stakeholders 
coalitions (e.g. GFSI, GLOBALG.A.P., IFOAM). The proliferation of numerous quality 
programmes   has developed a new form of competition in the food industry, which actually 
has a narrow spectrum of differentiation in both standard content and control. In this scenario, 
credibility of schemes plays an important role; in this respect Tuncer (2001) suggested that 
credibility is needed to build a positive reputation of food standards and quality assurance 
schemes. He pointed out several “building blocks” that contributed to building up credibility 
for different food standards and that were used to add value and to allow them to differentiate 
from each other. In addition, some initial consensus about scheme credibility pillars has been 
established by stakeholder organizations like GFSI, GLOBALG.A.P IFOAM and ISEAL in 
both food safety and sustainability assurance. These organizations required the adoption of 
codes and/or benchmarking processes according to agreed principles between their 
stakeholders, being the most prominent requirements associated with standard setting process, 
third party certification rules, international accreditation codes and more stringent standard 
content.   
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Despite this harmonization effort in the industry, until now only private standards operating at 
the global level  have enrolled under these certification initiatives. This means that the general 
confusion generated by quality signals to local operators and consumers has still not been 
solved (Wood et al, 1998; Morris and Young, 2000) and a true consensus about credibility 
remains quite far from reality. On the other hand, this trend has been perceived to have a 
negative impact on international trade for developing countries and a risk of reducing access 
of small farmers to high value markets remains latent. The awareness that private standards 
may act as potential non-tariff barriers to trade has been signalled by several experts (Holleran 
et al, 1999; Martinez and Bañados, 2004; Jaffe and Henson, 2004; Anders and Caswell, 2007) 
and international organizations like the WTO SPS committee (UNCTAD, 2007a, b, 
UNCTAD 2008 a, b). 
 
1.1 Problem  
The impact of a non-tariff barrier to trade on developing countries will depend on how 
prepared each of these countries is (or how prepared they would be) to face stringent food 
regulations in the markets of destination and the proliferation of private certification scheme 
requirements by global customers. Also the impact on small farmers will depend on the 
amount of support given by local governments and private sectors to small-scale production 
systems. According Jaffe and Henson (2004), developing countries commonly lack adequate 
metrology and conformity assessment infrastructure. For example, local accreditation bodies 
are usually not authorized to deliver ISO/IEC 65 accreditation for third party product 
certification, which is an important credibility source for food safety assurance in many 
private schemes. This particular disadvantage makes developing countries dependant on the 
accreditation services existing in developed countries. In this way, accreditation of local 
certification providers may involve costly inputs and an influx of foreign providers becomes 
unavoidable. On the other hand, the reputation of the public sector of developing countries is 
not always positive among inhabitants of developed countries, since it is associated with weak 
law enforcement and opportunism of low production costs by private firms (Haucap et al., 
1997). Unfortunately, food quality assurance is no exception to this type of inference that 
carries biases in the quality information of developing countries’ products and prompt 
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Nevertheless, positive spillovers have occurred in developing countries due to the impact of 
new commercial requirements. Jaffe and Henson (2004) also argue about the catalystic effect 
of private standards, indicating “…some countries are using high quality standards to 
successfully reposition themselves in competitive global markets.” …. “and may provide 
power incentive for modernizing export supply chains as well as domestic food safety and 
agricultural health can benefit local population and domestic producers…”. Indeed, 
compliance to commercial requirements has strong repercussions on the public sector´s role 
and has accelerated the regulation process concerning food safety, environmental protection 
and labour rights. In Peru, for example,  the local government is due to approve a new food 
safety law, it recently created a Ministry of Environment, and the Labour Ministry has 
tightened up the inspections of private firms to assure compliance with labour regulations. 
 
Overall, developing countries seem to have a long learning curve ahead of them in order to 
really improve their national food standards setting process and quality assurance systems. 
Policies will consider reputation improvement and credibility building. In this respect, some 
countries like Mexico, China, Chile, Kenya and Thailand have developed good agricultural 
practice (GAP) assurance programs as a way of demonstrating commitment to complying 
with international requirements through their local policies. Most of these GAP schemes have 
achieved the recognition of GLOBALG.A.P’s stakeholders through the approval of its 
benchmarking process1. This is case of MEXICOGAP, CHILEGAP, CHINAGAP, and 
THAIGAP, whose benchmark achievement is expected to signal an improvement in the 
credibility of their programmes. However, the effect of this harmonization strategy on the 
credibility of their standards cannot as yet be measured and as yet there is no clear 
confirmation of industrial success in any of these. If we assume that national food standards 
are considered industrial products and/or consumer quality cues, then we can also assume that 
the disclosure of the country names as a prefix in their brands and quality labels could 
disclose country-of-origin effects that could act against their credibility efforts. As a matter of 
fact, it is yet not clear if most schemes are aware of all the existing credibility sources and 
their strategy might not have calculated the influence of country-of-origin on both consumer 
and industrial purchasing decisions (Bilkey and Nes, 1982), but they expect at least that the 
benchmark against GLOBALG.A.P. standards and/ or against GFSI code can act as a 
credibility cue that helps to resist any bias generated from demographic effects. 
 
                                                 
1
 Currently there are 20 national GAP schemes recognized by GLOBALG.A.P (www.globalgap.org) 
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However, the risk of credibility failure cannot only be associated specifically to national food 
standards from developing countries since in general all quality assurance schemes are 
susceptible to opportunistic behaviour (Albersmeier et al., 2009). Therefore, it is important to 
identify and take into consideration credibility sources for food standards that may be used as 
marketing cues for increasing the reputation and acceptance of all quality programs, 
especially those national food standards that may be susceptible to origin effects.  
 
Despite this, the structural, technical and marketing sources of credibility cues associated with 
food standards are still at an early stage and deserve analysis and evaluation of their effects on 
the acceptance of national and international food quality assurance and standards.  
 
1.2 Research design 
In this study we attempt to prove if national food standards are susceptible to country-of 
origin effects and at the same time explore how credibility cues may influence  stakeholder 
perceptions. From the literature review we classified three types of credibility sources: 
structural, technical and marketing sources, that together might have an effect on the 
credibility of food standards. In this study we consider structural sources to be those related to 
the type of standard governance policies, standard setting procedures (Tuncer, 2001). 
Technical sources are instead associated with the effectiveness of conformity assessment 
rules, i.e. their reliability in assuring quality and safety (Albersmeier et al., 2009); these are 
associated to audit performance (Jahn et. al, 2005; Anders et al., 2010), implementation 
success (Jahn and Spiller, 2005) as well as traceability and information completeness 
(Theuvsen, 2005). Finally, marketing sources are those cues that in one way or another are 
considered to affect the acceptance from producers and consumers’ perceptions towards food 
standards (Fearne et.al, 2001); sources in this group include marketing efforts (Nilsson et al., 
2004) and labelling reliability (Giannaka, 2002, Amstel et al., 2007), country-of-origin 
(Bilkey and Nes, 1982) and adoption of benchmarking strategies (Mazé et al.,2007)  like 
those offered by GFSI and GLOBALG.A.P. 
 
Since research on this topic is relatively scarce, I developed an experiment based on 
explorative factor analysis.  With this methodology I test whether food standards are 
susceptible to country-of-origin effects.  At the same time, based on marketing credibility 
source theory, I develop statements that are related to food standard credibility perceptions. 
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From the factor analysis, I expect to identify factors that may explain the perceptions of 
stakeholders towards national food standards. Finally, a linear regression analysis is applied to 
measure the effect of the different factors on the overall credibility of national food standards. 
For data collection, an online survey with 20 questions was prepared and distributed by mail 
to more than ten thousand contacts of FoodPLUS GmbH over a period of two weeks.  Only 
those questionnaires that were fully completed were considered for the analyses. The data 
collected was subject to univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis. The results are 
presented using tables and diagrams. 
 
1.3 Objectives 
The first objective of this experiment is to test the main hypothesis that “benchmarking 
signals have a positive influence on the credibility of national food standards in the presence 
of country-of-origin effects.”  The second objective is to attempt to design a structural model 
that identifies credibility sources associated with food standards and tests the effects of each 
of these against the overall credibility of different national standards. Finally, this research 
attempts to provide suggestions for standard owners by considering some aspects of 
credibility that may work in favour of improving their administration and acceptance in 
international food markets.   
  
1.4 Structure of the dissertation 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 covers the economics of food quality 
assurance standards by summarising the definition of food quality and the driving factors 
influencing the setting of food standards. In addition, this chapter describes the public sector 
policies used to tackle information asymmetries and how these influence the private sector in 
developing their own food standards and quality assurance schemes. Also in this section the 
discussion about standard harmonization is highlighted and linked to some strategies 
operating in the private sector. Chapter 3 describes what we consider to be the current sources 
of credibility for food standards, including structural, technical and marketing sources. 
Chapter 4 develops the research design for testing the main hypothesis. Chapter 5 presents the 
results of the online questionnaire and the different levels of data analysis i.e. univariate, 
bivariate and multivariate analyses. Chapter 6 discusses the outcomes and presents the 
conclusions of this investigation.  
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  Chapter 2 
2 Economics of Food Quality Assurance Standards  
2.1  Food Quality Information 
In the literature, there are several definitions which refer to the quality of products: “fitness of 
use” (Juran, 1990 mentioned by Luning et al., 2002), “the totality of features and 
characteristics of a product or service that bears on its ability to satisfy stated or implied 
needs” (American Society for Quality Control, mentioned by Kotler, 1997) or “achieving 
customer satisfaction by improving efficiency and effectiveness of the company” (ISO, 1998).  
Although these definitions could be considered ambiguous, they illustrate that quality has 
different dimensions that are definitively related to consumers’ perceptions and expectations 
about a particular product. As a matter of fact, the food quality techno-managerial approach 
explains that these dimensions are indeed the combination of different product attributes, 
related to technical aspects and factors that contribute to a “quality performance” defined by 
the consumer itself. Following this concept, the techno-managerial approach classifies food 
product attributes into two main groups: intrinsic attributes and extrinsic attributes (Luning 
et.al, 2002).  Intrinsic attributes are directly related to physical and sensory properties like 
taste, flavour, texture and appearance (i.e. size, colour, weight, etc.), or health aspects such as 
nutritional value and safety.  On the other hand, extrinsic attributes are associated to food 
production process characteristics like hygiene conditions, use of pesticides and antibiotics, 
organic systems; as well as to marketing values like price, brand name, packaging, labelling, 
shelf life etc. In addition, it would appear that quality dimensions become more complex over 
time since new factors appear and change consumer perceptions concerning food quality. To 
give a recent example, extent of public ethical awareness on environment impacts; social 
responsibility and climate change are influencing consumers purchasing decisions. These, of 
course, are also expanding the spectrum of food quality definition. The existence of so many 
combinations of attributes may imply that consumers require information about the products’ 
quality prior to purchase, but the complete account of attributes is generally not always 
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In the ideal market of perfect competition, welfare is obtained based on a price that has been 
reached through the balancing of supply and demand. This balance is achieved through 
various assumptions including perfect information and homogenous products. Nevertheless, 
these two conditions are not always present in reality (Centeno, 2008). In fresh food markets 
for example, it is almost impossible to maintain supplies of homogeneous quality products in 
general or within the same season. On the other hand, complete information about quality 
attributes cannot be always be disclosed completely. The presence of imperfect information 
about products appears in markets where information asymmetries exist (Akerlof, 1970). This 
concept implies markets where suppliers have more knowledge about the attributes of a 
product than buyers, giving them an advantage in the transaction of the products. This could 
cause those high quality products to be removed from the market by products of lesser 
quality. The risk of this displacement may also be associated with the type of product existing 
in the market: search goods, experience goods and credence goods (Nelson, 1970). Search 
goods are those products for which customers have most information about their quality 
before purchasing it. In the case of experience goods, customers can only judge product 
quality after purchasing the good. Credence goods are those products whose qualities are 
difficult to detect but buyers have great concern about while purchasing (Andersen, 1994). 
Food products have developed a large number of attributes (intrinsic or extrinsic) due to their 
longer life cycle (Andersen, 1994), which are related to the levels at which consumers could 
obtain information about them (Jahn et al., 2005). Freshness and appearance, for example, 
may be easily identified on searchable products; while taste and shelf life can only be 
appreciated on experience products after purchase. To obtain information about nutrition and 
hygiene, however, would be highly costly for the consumer since it would require a third-
party judgment from an expert or similar source. In such cases, a third party judgement would 
be necessary to deliver the information, through certification and/or information on the label. 
Furthermore, Potemkin products are those where attributes that involve processed oriented 
practices are hidden to both third parties and customers e.g. animal welfare, fair trade, etc. 
(Tietzel and Weber, 1991 mentioned by Jahn, 2005).  This type of product may contain higher 
information asymmetries than other credence goods and makes them even more costly to 
deliver the quality attributes. This causes these products to have a higher market value when 
attributes are communicated through reputation mechanisms like labelling or branding 
(Andersen, 1994) (see Figure 1).  
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In the case of food products, some quality information such as food safety may not only be 
imperfect but also symmetric (Antle, 1995). This means that not only buyers may lack 
information about food safety of the end product but food producers could also lack 
information to some extent. For example a producer might know about the pesticide used in 
the production process but not know if there is contamination of pesticide residue that will 
remain after selling the product to the buyer. Even if the producer has this information it is 
costly for this information to be carried with the product throughout the supply chain from 









Qualities, which are 
known before purchase
Qualities, which are 
known only after 
consumption
Qualities, which can be 
observed by the customers 
only to prohibitive costs, 
but buyers can rely on 
third-party judgements
Process-oriented qualities, 
which are hidden for third 
parties as well as to 
customers at the end of the 
product level




Figure 1: Typology of goods based on information economics (Jahn et al. 2005) 
 
determining the property of market equilibrium (Antle, 2001). Foods could turn into 
experience goods when consumers can identify certain toxic residues or microbiological 
pathogens that cause them an acute illness after eating the food. In this case, firms can 
differentiate and provide a higher quality product and could charge higher prices. When 
consumers are not able to associate illnesses with food intake (e.g. as in the case of cancer), 
they cannot differentiate low from high quality products and reputation mechanisms are not 
effective in revealing product safety. In this case there is a market failure in providing 
consumers with the opportunity to buy low safety risk products (Antle, 2001).  
 
As a consequence, the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric imperfect information 
has important implications for market equilibrium. Therefore the disclosure of quality 
information plays an important role in reducing costs of preventing dishonest trading in 
market (Antle, 2001). Food standards thus play an important role in securing product 
definition, to assure that hidden attributes are being covered, and to make products acceptable 
for the customers, especially those that could present high risks to public health.  Beside these 
explanations, there are other substantial factors that drive the development and evolution of 
Increasing information assymetry 
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food standards. The next section describes the main drivers that have influenced the 
establishment of public and private standards. 
 
2.2 Driving Factors for Setting Food Standards  
It has been little over a decade since several food scandals in Europe and the United States, 
have marked important episodes in the history of the international food industry.  During the 
late 1990’s in Europe, the outbreak of the “Mad Cow” disease (BSE) in the United Kingdom 
and the dioxin scandal in Belgium caused by contaminated animal feed were the first food 
scares that impacted the region, causing the loss of several million Euros in the meat industry 
(The Economist, 1998 mentioned by Lindgreen, 2003; Larsson et al, 2005). In the United 
States, the most serious food borne illness crisis was caused by Escherichia coli O157:H7 in 
fresh spinach, which appeared in 2006 when more than 250 infected people were registered 
(Grant et. al, 2008). Years later, two Salmonella crises occured in this country, one outbreak 
coming from jalapeno peppers which spread to more than 43 states and another more severe 
outbreak from alfalfa sprouts affecting more than 250 people in 14 states2. Also Asian 
countries had their own milestones of food safety crises that obliged governments to develop 
tighter regulations. In September 2001, BSE hit Japan and the scandal was followed by a 
series of labelling scandals when local companies labelled imported meat as locally produced 
in order to obtain government compensation during the BSE crisis (Clemens, 2003). In 2008 a 
new food crisis struck the Chinese diary industry when melamine was found in milk powder, 
affecting around 53,0000 babies (Byrne, 2008). This crisis appeared just a year after the 
Chinese government decided to take stricter measures on their food and drug safety 
regulation3. These food safety scandals had a huge negative impact on governments by 
challenging the credibility of their food control policies.  At the same time, it affected 
consumers’ behaviour and trust  not only in the crops that originated the food scares, but also 
in food products in general. In addition, there is an increasing awareness from the media and 
Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to consumers not only about food hazards but also 
on the social and environment impact generated from food production and manufacturing.  
 
                                                 
2
 Department of Health and Human Services. Centers for Disease and Control Prevention. 
(www.cdc.gov/salmonella/saintpaul/). 
3
 The Chinese government’s measures included the introduction of nationwide inspections and seting up a food 
recall system as a reaction to international pressure due to embarrassing episodes involving the exportation of 
contaminated pet food ingredients and toothpaste (source: The International Herald Tribune,  2007). 
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Especially in developed countries, NGOs have a strong influence in public opinion and their 
actions are also have a significantly influence on consumer food preferences. Since the 
outbreak of the food scandals, these organizations have increased their pressure both on the 
government and industry corporations to guarantee public health aspects related to food 
consumption. For example, the organization “Green Peace”4 has a strong local and 
international reputation and their campaigns associated to food consist of protesting against 
the impact of agriculture using Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) on biodiversity,  
and against pesticide residues in food. Their activities include monitoring chemical residues 
in fresh fruit and vegetables that are for sale in major supermarket chains. All evidence of 
exceedance or proof of illegal chemical use (e.g. DDT, Lidane, Metamidophos, etc.) in these 
products are publicly exposed, challenging the reputation of retailers. Another well-known 
and influential organization is the “World Wildlife Fund for Nature” (WWF)5. The campaigns 
of this NGO associated to food are focused on the impact of food production on the 
environment. They encourage food producers and manufacturers to implement better 
management practices in order to reduce ecological and social impact in both agriculture and 
aquaculture sectors. Their major concerns are related to chemical pollution, habitat loss, and 
degradation of conservation areas, climate change, water consumption and the poverty cycle. 
The way they intend to address these issues is by establishing round tables where open 
discussions can be held between experts, industry representatives and politicians. In this way, 
they attempt to influence the development of healthier agricultural systems by creating 
financial incentives that promote the use of more environmental services. The third important 
NGO that could be considered to have a significant impact on public perceptions is “Oxford 
Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM)”6. This organization focuses it’s campaigns on 
poverty alleviation, and their campaigns related to the food sector center on awareness of 
policies that might impact negatively the market access for small farmers. In this respect, they 
support awareness about the impact of food standards on the discrimination of small farmers 
selling their products in high valued markets.  
Together with NGOs, the media also has an important influence on changes in consumer 
attitudes against food by increasing the awareness of food borne illness and knowledge about 
the nature, quality and associated hazards. Articles about food nutritional attributes, safety 
and food crisis have flourished in popular magazines, tabloid press and radio, resulting in an 
increase in  public consciousness about food production as well as in the apprehension 
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concerning food quality. This could have changed consumers’ purchasing preferences, in fact, 
these have been extended from sensorial (e.g. taste, flavour, texture and appearance) and 
reliability preferences (e.g. weight contents, size variations, right composition) to search for 
health aspects (safety and nutritional value) and food production impacts on environmental 
and social aspects.  
 
Beside the awareness and information for consumers about food quality, other important 
drivers for the setting of food standards have been the introduction of new products into the 
market and the technological innovation in food production, processing and packing (WTO, 
2005).  These usually push governments to set new standards and specifications to avoid 
fraud, contamination and risk to public health. For example, the release of new food additives 
that are offered in manufactured products or the introduction of nanotechnology in food 
packaging might raise concerns about their security in public health and set implementation 
parameters. Next to food technology innovation and progress, chemical analysis has become 
important for determining the purity of food products and distinguishing safe from unsafe 
ones (WTO, 2005). The development of more efficient analytical tools and focused media 
information have increased the awareness of food safety among governments, industry and 
consumers. The development of scientific research has reduced levels of preservatives in 
products and prohibited substances in food, in this way supporting the compliance to 
standards. Last but not least, the globalization of commerce together with the consolidation of 
international distribution sectors and the integration of the food supply chains has also 
influenced the development of standards, particularly in the private sector (WTO 2005). 
Opening up to international trade extends the option of supplying a larger variety of products 
from new regions to the local market. Therefore, public and private sectors are looking to 
these foreign products to comply with the quality level demanded in local markets in order to 
assure consumer trust in imported goods. As a consequence, government negotiations about 
food standards are carried out on the international platforms of the WTO. Where there is a 
need for fast and flexible implementation, the private sector has to fill in the gap left by 
governments in order to assure not only compliance with public food standards but also to set 
their own standards to keep customer or consumer loyalty to their brands, companies and 
stores.  
 
The next section will explain the role of governments in establishing food standards to avoid 
market failures associated with imperfect information on food quality. It also describes the 
Angelo Enrique Benjamin Lazo Galdos 13 
interactions that caused the increase in private food standards and assurance schemes as a 
response to some of the driving factors already discussed. 
 
2.3 The Standardization of Food Products 
2.3.1 The Public Sector and Food Regulations 
Traditionally, national governments have been responsible for establishing food standards as 
part of their policies to protect consumers against dishonest trade practices of adulterated 
food, misbranding, low quality and safety of products (Mc Cluskey, 2007). These standards 
become mandatory or voluntary norms within the framework of national “Food Laws”. These 
norms or regulations were the earliest forms of government regulations for entrepreneur 
transactions, and their development has run in parallel with the growth of industrialization, 
urban population and public health problems. Nevertheless, standardization seemed to have 
started spontaneously well before government regulations were created. If we look into the 
human history, standardization  appeared naturally due to the need for communication and 
evolved into a conscious need for uniformity when ancient cultures established measurements 
for length and in the middle ages weight and quantity became important measures for 
transactions.  But only in modern times has the adulteration of food and the development of 
chemical research sparked the first food laws, and between the end of the nineteenth century 
and beginning of the twentieth century the public sector included food standards and food 
controls as part of their policies (Lasztity et. al, 2009). This was true primarily in 
industrialized countries where most national standard organizations were established in 
Europe during the 1920’s and when the U.S. enforced their famous Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act in 1938 (FDA, 2009a and 2009b). Later on, the rapid expansion of international trade 
after World War II motivated the establishment of international organizations like the 
International Standard Organization (ISO) in 1947 and with respect to food the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC) was created in 1958 by the Food Standards Programme of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) 
(Lasztity et. al, 2009). The CAC objective was to develop first international food standards 
with the aim of improving public health and food control as well as to harmonize food 
standards and facilitate trade worldwide (FAO/WHO, 2010). This code of standards is well 
known as the “Codex Alimentarius”. 
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The Codex Alimentarius has become the global reference code for consumers, food producers 
and processors, national food control agencies and for the international food trade. Codex 
guidelines cover phytosanitary plant and animal protection, food safety, food labelling and to 
some extent marketing of food products. These guidelines have been recommended as a 
reference for harmonization for national food regulations and standards by the two main 
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreement 
(SPS) as well by Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreements (FAO/WHO, 2010). The 
influence of the Codex Alimentarius on governments decisions for national food policies is 
very significant due to the fact that under the WTO platform, this international set of 
standards is based on both scientific and economic criteria (Henson and Caswell, 1999). The 
scientific criteria of Codex falls under the framework of risk analysis and its three-stage 
process that have been set by FAO and the WHO: risk assessment, risk management and risk 
communication. On the other hand, the economic criteria are related to the impact assessment 
of food regulations on the equilibrium between marginal costs and marginal benefits (Henson 
and Traill, 1993; Antle, 1999). Together both types of criteria shape the different forms and 
approaches that national food standards can take.  
 
We have already mentioned that public food standards (or norms) could be either mandatory 
or voluntarily enforced (WTO, 2005). Mandatory national food standards only allow products 
that are compliant to the standards onto the market, and in most cases restrict the supply to 
few product varieties; whereas voluntary standards let products not meeting the standards to 
also be supplied on the market, making it difficult to distinguish them from those meeting the 
standards. In the case of implementing voluntary standards, governments may have to make 
the additional decisions to complement the policy with either negative or positive labelling to 
support the identification of products by final consumers (WTO, 2005). Furthermore, national 
food standards could take the form of “ex post” regulations such as “Target Standards” which 
impose criminal liability to suppliers when selling pre-specified harmful products; or “ex 
ante” regulations like “Performance Standards” which require, for example, that products 
achieve a certain level of safety and suppliers are free to choose the methods to meet these 
conditions; and could also take the form of “Specification Standards” that include both 
product standards (e.g. percentage of fruits in marmalade) and process standards (e.g. 
pasteurization of milk) (Henson and Caswell, 1999). This variety of standard forms and 
approaches generates a multi-layered framework that often creates an increase in costs 
associated with compliance, restricts suppliers operations and hampers their efficiency and 
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innovation (WTO, 2005).  As a matter of fact, the organizational infrastructure of the 
standardization system plays an important role in improving or decreasing the effectiveness 
and efficiency of standard compliance.   
 
Organizational infrastructure of the standardization systems refers to the way governments 
administrate the standard setting process and their respective compliance assurance. These are 
managed by distributing responsibilities among public institutions that are related to the 
policy intendment to cover. The organization of the standardization system usually differs 
among countries and in most cases they experience several reforms and adjustments. To 
illustrate this better we share an interesting report presented by the United States Government 
Accountability office (GAO) to the congress of that country in 2005 (GAO, 2005). The aim of 
this document was to make a comparison of the United States’ food safety system against the 
consolidation initiatives and process that have been held in several other developed countries. 
The United States standardization system appears to have  multiple responsibility institutions 
that are ruled by the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 and it defines both the 
organizational structure and the responsibilities associated to their national food standard. 
This law empowers the main responsibility to two main organizations: the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (USDA). While the USDA is responsible for the safety and labelling of traditional 
food such as meats and poultry, the FDA is responsible for the safety and labelling of all other 
foods products and food additives including livestock feeds, veterinary drugs etc. 
Nevertheless, not all food standardization and control activities are the responsibility of these 
two institutions since the national food law also empowers another 15 agencies with specific 
responsibilities regarding food safety standards and control.  For example, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) shares the responsibility for regulating pesticides and determines 
the safety and effectiveness of chemicals that can be used as well, establishes the tolerance 
levels for residues on feed crops, for raw and processed foods. Another example can be found 
in the fishery sector, where the National Marine Fisheries Service within the Department of 
Commerce is responsible of carrying out inspections to ensure the safety and quality of 
commercial seafood. Similarly, the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) performs food 
quality assurance inspections that include food safety elements. Furthermore, the previous 
organizations coexist with principal federal agencies with independent food safety 
responsibilities and who operate under numerous federal statutes to ensure the safety and 
quality of the food supply in the United States. These laws give the agencies different 
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regulatory and enforcement authority, and about 70 interagency agreements aim to coordinate 
the combined food safety oversight responsibilities of the various agencies. The federal 
system is supplemented by each one of the states, which have their own statutes, regulations, 
and agencies for regulating and inspecting the safety and quality of food products (GAO, 
2005). 
 
However, although the GAO report (GAO, 2005) recognized that other developed countries 
used to have similar arrangements to the U.S. for managing and enforcing food standards, 
most of these countries have changed their organizational frameworks by consolidating the 
responsibilities into one single agency. For example, in Germany before the consolidation the 
Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Forestry and the Federal Ministry of Health shared 
the management of the food safety system. In addition, the sixteen federal states shared the 
implementation of the food legislation while other governmental agencies performed 
inspections. Nowadays, the responsibility of the food safety management relies on the Federal 
Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety, which is an agency branch of the Federal 
Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture. Its main responsibilities are to 
coordinate food safety surveillance at national level and formulate administrative rules to 
guide the implementation of national food legislation by the German Federal states, who 
remain responsible of the implementation of the food law and oversee the inspections 
performed by local governments. In addition, the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and 
Food Safety is the direct contact organization to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
and serves as a coordinator of the food and veterinary office audits for compliance with the 
European Union (EU) Food legislation N°178/2002 and for implementing in Germany the 
European Food Safety rapid alert system for consumer health protection and food safety 
(GAO, 2005). Similar consolidation reforms have been followed not only by the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and most EU member states, but also by non-European countries such as 
Canada and New Zealand. These reforms are expected to bring several benefits, which will 
likely exceed the costs by bringing qualititative improvement in the effectiveness 
andefficiency of the food safety system such as less overlaps of inspections, more clarity of 
the responsibilities and more consistent enforcement of food regulations (GAO, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the USDA argued against the GAO report because it was based on qualitative 
analysis, and could not quantify the effectiveness between both models. For sure the need for 
a quantitative comparison between the old and new food safety management system could be 
assured if the expected benefits of food safety improvements due to consolidation reforms 
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could now be quantified and become a benchmark for improvement. 
 
Along with the above institutional adjustments, food standards have also changed and most 
authors agree that these have become stronger and have been enforced more rapidly in 
developed countries than in developing countries. This is especially true in the area of food 
safety, where in response to public concerns, modern laws have become more precise in their 
application, more specific and complete in their content and are also taking into account 
situations that are beyond national borders (Lasztity et. al, 2009).  In European countries for 
example, there have been notorious regulatory reforms as a consequence of food scares and 
the integration policies of the European Union (EU). The EU food legislation framework is 
stipulated in the Council Regulation No178/2002, whose general principle is the so-called 
“farm to fork” approach. This regulation covers rules to ensure the protection of human life 
and health, and establishes strong responsibilities to food operators on food safety 
requirements and traceability and exercises harmonization of existing national requirements in 
order to ensure free movement of food and feed within the region. In addition to the EU Food 
Law N° 178/2002 a complementary package of comprehensive food safety legislation exists 
that has been adopted in the region, including regulation (EC) No. 852/2004 on the hygiene of 
foodstuffs; Regulation (EC) No. 882/2004 on official controls performed to ensure the 
verification of compliance with feed and food law and animal health and animal welfare rules; 
among others7 that became effective, largely on January 1, 2006 (Europa, 2010).   
 
Meanwhile, in the United States there have also been several amendments (around 26) to the 
national food law of 1938 since it was first established. At the same time, several other 
regulations have been established to complement the primary framework of the Act of 1938.  
The most curious ones are related to the new concept of “food defence”, where new laws have 
been established to combat new threats to public health. This is represented by the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 which aims to 
prevent contaminated food from being introduced into the country and authorizes, among 
other provisions, the registration of food processes and inspection of their records, detaining 
of adulterated food and the taking of a number of steps to ensure safety of imported foods 
                                                 
7 The EU legislative package also include Regulation (EC) No. 853/2004 on specific hygiene rules for food of 
animal origin; Regulation (EC) No. 854/2004 on specific rules for the organization of official controls on 
products of animal origin intended for human consumption; and Directive 2004/41/EC repealing certain 
directives concerning food hygiene and health conditions for the production and placing on the market of certain 
products of animal origin intended for human consumption and amending Council Directives 89/662/EEC and 
92/118/EEC and Council Decision 95/408/EC. 
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(FDA, 2009c). On the other hand, it is not easy to gather information about progress in food 
regulations and standards in developing countries. We can assume that they are quite well 
backed by the EU and U.S. regulations but at the same time, we can also assume that they are 
being reviewed and improved to adapt them to current international scenarios. Some 
indications of this can be obtained from the media, when for example China announced strong 
reforms on their internal food control system after the Melanin scandal in child milk powder. 
Also from personal experience in Peru, in 2008, the government launched the supreme decree 
about the rules for food safety law and currently there is a project for the revision of the new 
national food safety legislation.8 
 
These trends towards more stringent regulations set for a wider range of risks and quality 
attributes, as well as the rise in independent establishments of laws and standards in 
developed countries, have been taken by most developing countries as potential barriers for 
international trade in the export of food products (Unnevehr and Roberts, 2003). Despite  
countries making individual progress, we have recognized that some developing countries 
have followed similar courses in food standard development and structural organization to the 
developed world. However, other countries have demonstrated unsatisfactory food laws or 
laws that are barely applied. There is thus a wide variation in regulatory, technical and 
administrative capacities related to procedures of national food control systems involving 
monitoring and sampling, detection and analytical methods, and applications of standards and 
food safety requirements (Lasztity et. al, 2009). At the same time, the importance of 
conformity assessment systems that require testing and certification of both food management 
and products is increasing and the absence of accredited laboratories and/or internationally 
recognized systems for certification may also affect confidence in importing countries (Jeffe 
and Henson, 2004). In fact, there is the perception that within  international trade, there is a 
lack of provision of acceptable confidence to stakeholders in terms of monitoring and 
enforcement of food assurance. 
 
Overall, although we can recognize that public food regulations have advantages in setting 
mandatory standards with certainty and prosecuting violators under criminal laws, most of the 
time they are restricted to the given available scientific evidence and the prevailing level of 
acceptable risk (McCluskey 2007), which consequently makes them  “lack flexibility and to 
                                                 
8 
Carlos Caballero, SENASA director. Presentation held at the 5th International Asparagus Congress. 10-12 
November 2010. Lima-Peru  
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quickly adapt to changes of dynamic consumer preferences which are not guided by science 
but by their own expectations and fears”9. In this respect, private quality assurance standards 
are playing an important role providing flexibility and adoption of consumers’ demands, and 
filling the gaps where food laws are not enough to improve confidence among business 
agents. The private standards approach has made them become a decisive practice within the 
food supply chain and have even become a “de facto” requirement for international food trade 
(Fulponi, 2006; Henson and Readon, 2005). The next section will describe the nature of 
private standards and how they have turned into a key element for the food industry. 
 
2.3.2 The Reaction of the Food Industry: Private Standards and Assurance 
Schemes 
Along with the changes in public food regulations, the private sector has quickly taken the 
role of addressing the concerns of consumers, resulting in the proliferation of private 
standards and other forms of supply chain governance (Jafee and Henson, 2004). Private 
standards take over the public regulations and private requirements and codes of compliance 
that are controlled either through second or third party audits. Private organizations such as 
retailers, certification bodies, NGO groups etc. are responsible for setting and administrating 
these standards and assurance systems. There are several incentives that influence food 
companies to establish and adopt private standards. Firstly, as mentioned before, companies 
have an interest in immediately attending variations of consumers’ perceptions and concerns 
about quality and food safety (Fearne et al., 2001), especially when these interests correspond 
to their own interests (WTO, 2005). At the retail level for example, there is higher pressure to 
fulfil their consumers’ and shareholders’ expectations, similar to multinationals that are 
present in international financial markets and are thus more susceptible in terms of reputation 
and the delivery of quarterly returns (Fulponi, 2006).  However, reputation is not only a 
concern for retailers. This is also true for food producers, manufacturers and any agent of the 
supply chain who has an interest in keeping their customers and maintaining their position in 
high value markets. Private standards have been considered to help maintain costs under 
control and to accomplish a good reputation for many suppliers (Asfaw et al., 2009) although 
these may be beyond food technical qualities such as labour and/or environmental ethics. 
These achievements are assured through certifications that are communicated in a business-to-
business manner, and in some cases certified products are identified with quality labels which 
                                                 
9  Dick Boer, CEO Albert Heijn speach during the CIES conference held in Amsterdam in February 2008 
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act as a marketing tools for product differentiation purposes (Golan et. Al 2001, Jahn et al, 
2005). 
 
Secondly, operators have incentives for setting food standards in the supply as either a 
mechanism to increase market share by delivering higher or more dependable quality or as a 
mechanism to protect current market share from competitors (Salop and Scheffman, 1983). 
Firms can benefit strategically from food standards in situations where costs of compliance 
differ according to efficiency in compliance, which in turn relates to factors such as firm size, 
existing standards of operation, and cost structure. This creates opportunities to obtain first 
mover advantage, to enhance competitiveness in the market or build barriers to entry or 
mobility (Anders and Caswell, 2007). On the other hand, liability measures in some countries 
have pushed food operators to take precautions like the adoption of private standards to 
reduce the risk of legal prosecution for being found responsible for negative market impacts 
associated with outbreaks of food borne illness. In the UK for example, bankruptcy risks are 
higher for small companies. For large operators who supply own branded products, being 
accused of product failure would generate great losses in their incomes. In the US, the costs of 
liability settlements are typically large but may be offset by insurance coverage. The impacts 
of loss of reputation and market sales are stronger in countries like the UK rather than in the 
US where these have an additional cost rather than a central effect (Henson and Caswell, 
1999). 
 
We have seen that the flexibility to adapt to consumers’ expectations and the direct impact in 
enhancing reputation and competitive advantages increases the establishment and 
implementation of private standards by firms. Nevertheless, private standards (as do public 
standards) affect the organization and strategy of firms as well as the organization and 
governance of the food supply chain (Fulponi, 2006, Hammoudi et al., 2009).  In particular 
private standards have reinforced vertical integration by centralizing quality in the operations 
of the food supply chain (Morris and Young, 2000). Although this might be seen as a positive 
cooperative action, it has also resulted in conflicts between food supply agents over who 
controls the definition of quality for food (Morris and Young, 2000). This has generated 
competition among agents seeking economic advantages and at times has even confronted 
buyers with suppliers. In Europe for example, retailers use their buying power to manage 
vertical relationships with their suppliers, imposing upon them specific compliance with 
process standards, which are sometimes higher than those required by law (Henson and 
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Readon 2005; Fulponi, 2006). These requirements are assured either through their own 
controls or by demanding different third party certifications of those standards that have 
reached credibility in their markets and/or supply chain.  
 
In response to this force, and in order not to lose market access, suppliers have satisfied these 
demands by building and/or adjusting their quality management systems to the specifications 
of their customers. However, the introduction and implementation of new standards carries 
additional costs. Most private standards generate costs of compliance to conformity 
assessment services, usually offered by third party certification bodies, that are perceived to 
involve high costly processes (Garcia-Martinez et al., 2004). For example, standards will 
require self-assessments prior to the certification body audit. Both internal and external 
controls include, in most cases, a high degree of bureaucracy preparation and assessment of 
records (Theuvsen, 2003). Furthermore, all indicate that food suppliers could also be subject 
to multiple audits from different private assurance schemes. In pre and post farm gate 
scenarios, they are subject not only to third controls and/or second party evaluations by their 
customers, but also official controls from the public sector to assure the compliance of 
regulations. This is even more problematic for farmers who operate integrated production 
systems with multiple crops and /or livestock, and with different customers demanding 
different certifications (Mazé, A. 2007). Production costs may also be affected when running 
different lines of products at the same time (e.g. both certified and not certified products). 
Variable costs may change, for instance when it would be significantly more expensive to 
produce certified products than non-certified products and may increase fixed costs when 
producers need to make additional investments in infrastructure and re-organization (WTO, 
2005).   
 
Like with public standards, the proliferation and stringency of private food standards have 
raised concerns in local and international markets where in some cases private standard 
certifications have become a “de facto” requirement for accessing high value markets 
(Fulponi, 2006). As a matter of fact, these standards could be perceived as potential barriers to 
trade for small producers, especially those in developing countries (UNCTAD, 2007a, 2007b, 
2008a and 2008b) because most of the time they present disadvantages related to the lack of 
technical and administrative structures required for compliance and guarantee the safety of 
food exports (Unnevehr, 2000; Jaffee and Henson, 2004). Furthermore, differences in 
standards and certification systems may also contribute to their acting as major non-tariff 
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barriers to trade (Martinez and Bañados, 2004) but could also generate additional competitive 
disadvantages if costs of compliance associated with private standards have a negative impact 
on food companies and producers (Henson and Caswell, 1999); for example, if the 
expenditure of production does not change considerably when implementing private standards 
(Asfaw et al. 2009) or when there is no price differentiation of a product regardless of whether 
it is certified or not. However, the standards-as-catalystic perspective (Jaffee and Henson, 
2004) indicates that some countries use these standards to reposition themselves in the food 
markets through the modernization of their local supply chains and providing a more 
sustainable basis and profitable trade in the long term. In addition, domestic markets may 
benefit from positive spillovers for phytosanitary and safety aspects. Still, this dichotomy 
perception about food standards does not consider the influence of the credibility of 
compliance  (when considering the advantages and disadvantages of private standards, it is 
good to know their nature and purpose ). 
 
2.4 Characteristics of Private Food Standards  
According to the WTO (2005), the International Organization for standardization (ISO) has 
published around 14,900 standards and Perinorm (a consortium of European standard 
organizations) have a database of around 650,000 standards in 21 countries, many of which 
have been set by the private sector. Furthermore, the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission (JRC) made an inventory in 2006, recording 386 private food standards in 
existance within the EU25. These private food standards have different information 
dimensions that have been grouped by the JRC in two main criteria: “qualitative” and 
“technical” information (JRC, 2005). While the qualitative information gathers the 
dimensions associated to the scope and governance of the private standards, i.e. geographical, 
communication target, supply chain level and proposer typology, the technical information 
collects specific objectives or requirements that are typical for each private food standard that 
includes dimensions like standard objective, market objective, assessment objective and 
certification objective. The territorial scale of the enforcement defines the geographical 
dimension of private food standards, which could be regional, national or international. From 
the perspective of the communication targets, private food standards labels or trademarks 
could  either focus on Business-to-Business communication (B2B) among food supply 
operators, or reach the point of sale through Business-to-Consumer communication (B2C). 
The proposer typology dimension refers to the type of standard setting organization i.e. could 
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be either public institutions, producer/processor organizations, retailers, certification bodies, 
NGOs or multi-stakeholder organizations, also considered as “supply chain partnership 
organizations” (Moeller, 2007). The supply chain level aspect of private standards is focused 
on the extension of their implementation within the food supply chain. In that sense, private 
food standards could cover the pre-farm gate stage (primary the production sector), post-farm 
gate stage (industry sector), transportation, trade and distribution (retail or food service). 
There are cases where private food standards could cover more than one stage of the supply 
chain like German QS10 system or the American SQF11 system.  On the other hand, the 
technical dimension associated to the standard objective describe the type of requirements or 
quality attributes which are covered by the private food standard (JRC, 2005) e.g. safety, 
environmental protection, corporate quality and animal welfare. In addition, the market 
objective dimension refers to the type of market that the private food standards are setting 
their requirements for, these markets could be conventional food markets, organic markets or 
fair trade markets. Concerning the assessment objective, these refer to the ex post and ex ante 
control dimensions, e.g. performance standards or process standards (Antle, 1995). In relation 
to the certification objective, private food standards could either focus on product 












     
 
Figure 2: Historical development of private standards (Jahn et al., 2004 modified) 
Moreover, another criteria type (also mentioned in the literature) is what Caswell et al. (1998) 
called “meta-systems”.  Meta-systems are strategies that affect a broad range of product 
                                                 
10
 Qualität und Sicherheit. http://www.q-s.de 
11
  Safe Quality Food. http://www.sqfi.com/ 
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attributes and due to their general nature are often applied in many different industries many 
different firms within the supply chain. These could be mandatory, voluntary or quasi-
voluntary standards and at the same time could have a public or private nature. The most 
representative private standards are the ISO/IEC standards12, in particular ISO 9000 series. 
This introduced the concept of third party certification in the 1990s, which mostly have 
voluntary adoption and have spread widely in many industries, also as a means to achieve 
business benefits. However, the ISO 9000 series failed to meet the requirements of all 
industries, especially in the food sector. Here, the differentiation and specifications of new 
private standards and audit systems expanded rapidly (See Figure 2). The level of 
differentiation not only consists of a variation of voluntary systems but also the establishment 
of quasi-voluntary meta-systems (Caswell et al., 1998). These type of meta-systems have 
reached a privileged position where they are required by a large proportion of the market 
actors and become a ‘de facto’ (Fulponi, 2006) required standard for food operations and 
procedures.  Perhaps, GLOBALG.A.P13, BRC Global Standards14 and the International 
Featured Standards (IFS)15 could be considered as examples of this group of private standards.  
 
In general, private standards are identified by their most distinguished dimension, which in 
many cases is the standard setting organization (also known as “the standard owner”), whose 
responsibility is to administrate the development and implementation of the quality 
requirements and the assurance control procedures. Still, there are cases where there is a 
combined participation between  public and private sectors. For example, organic standards 
and protected designation of origin standards (PDO) have been established by national 
governments, but these have delegated the inspections to private certification bodies (WTO, 
2005). Another example could be the case of “Mexico Calidad Suprema”, a national quality 
and safety standard whose governance and administration responsibilities are distributed 
between public and private institutions16. Purely private standards are mainly found in the 
retail and supply sectors. Especially in Europe, retailers are competing to differentiate 
themselves by promoting their own private standard and assurance scheme. This is the case of  
“Tesco Nurture” (previously known as Tesco Nature’s Choice), Marks & Spencer’s “Field to 
Fork”, Carrefour’ “Filière Qualité”, etc.  On the other hand, there are private organizations 
that develop food quality schemes for national producer associations. These are usually 
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promoted through a B2C label to differentiate their local quality of products from products of 
other origins.  Examples of this type of programmes are: the Assured Produce17 scheme of the 
UK, the QS system of Germany, Agri Confiance18 of France, the IKB19 Standard of The 
Netherlands, etc.  All these private standards mainly belong to agriculture and livestock 
sectors. In the fishery sector the most representative private standard is the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC), which is an ecolabel that assures responsible fishing and 
conservation of open sea fish species. In recent years, the increased importance of the 
aquaculture alternative has also attracted private standards to get involved in the assurance of 
safety, environment and the social aspect. In this sector standards such as GLOBALG.A.P. , 
BAP20 and AquaGAP21 are expanding and competing for stakeholders’ acceptance. . 
 
Even though the literature indicates that there is a consistent growth in the number of private 
food standard bodies, there is unfortunately no concrete data that can demonstrate their 
growth in terms of the numbers of certified firms for each private food standard. Most related 
information can be obtained from annual publications or flyers, and other marketing tools that 
private standards have used to promote their progress over the years. For example 
GLOBALG.A.P indicate that they have reached 102,300 certified producers for the fruit and 
vegetable market in more than 100 countries22, BRC claim that they have around 10,000 sites 
certified in 60 different countries23, IFS claims 12,000 suppliers certified in 80 countries24 and 
similarly, FLO says that they have 865 producer organizations certified in 60 countries which 
includes approximately 1 million beneficiaries25.  Both the increase and the expansion of 
private standards brought some concerns because of the lack of current specific legislation 
that addresses rules or requirements for these organizations. In fact, this could have led in 
some cases to non-transparent and complex structures of compliance and control (Jahn et al., 
2004), and if we add to this the eminent duplication and overlapping of requirements among 
private standards and between private and public controls, then the situation become even 
more catastrophic. Nevertheless, harmonization of standards has been discussed for many 
years within the public sector and it is now being considered how to introduce this into private 
standards as well. 
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2.5 Harmonization of Food Standards 
Despite of the attributes associated with food standards in reducing information asymmetries, 
preventing negative externalities (e.g. environmental impacts) and market failures (WTO, 
2005), the rapid increase of stricter requirements, the difference of assurance controls and 
production technologies, the proliferation of private standards and their related 
implementation costs are all seen as significant threats that could inhibit national and 
international trade and have a negative impact on small-scale producers (Sawyer et al., 2008; 
UNCTAD, 2007).  
 
As a matter of fact, there is the perception among exporting countries that behind the interests 
of governments in importing countries to minimize food safety risks and to protect animal and 
plant health as well as environment, there is the interest in these governments to use them as 
protective measures for their local production (Roberts, 1999). Currently, mandatory safety 
and environmental product standards have an ambiguous effects on the size of trade flows, 
but are likely to decrease trade if they create cost disadvantages for producers exporting to  
countries imposing the standard (WTO, 2005). The impact of mandatory process standards 
related to the environment depends on whether they are applied to foreign producers or not. If 
they are applied to foreign producers, trade flows may decrease. Yet such standards raise 
important questions concerning control and enforcement, given that production takes place 
abroad. Standards will affect trade flow if they have a different effect on the demand for and 
supply of varieties produced abroad and varieties produced domestically. This may, for 
instance, be the case if foreign and domestic producers supply different varieties of the 
relevant product, or if standards affect their production costs differently (WTO, 2005). In 
addition to this, public food standards, which are usually taken into account as part of the 
private scheme requirements, are also not harmonized. In the fresh produce sector for 
example, there was a lack of harmonization in the EU about technical definitions and 
treatment, like the case of the maximum residue levels (MRLs) and the number of active 
ingredients allowed for crop produce (UNCTAD, 2007).  Nevertheless, these cases have been 
on the authorities´ agenda and there has been  positive progress so far. 
Moreover, the reason that a large number of private food standards exist is due to their private 
and spontaneous nature and the lack of uniform legislation framework controlling them 
(Fulponi, 2006).  This might consequently create some differences among them in terms of 
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their origin and institutional objectives. Private standards cannot always have a common 
compliance criteria for different production systems and local conditions. For example, 
different technologies used in production may result in the identification of different risk 
levels (e.g. mechanical harvesting vs. manual harvesting) or legal conditions of compliance 
for specific standards may differ or even be absent (e.g. pesticide use, labour, environment 
protection, etc.). Moreover, the certification systems may differ in audit rules and conditions 
for granting certificates (e.g. conformity requirements, compliance coding, auditing rules, 
auditor competency, etc.), and usually these could lead to inconsistent interpretations by both 
certification bodies and producers. On the other hand, the existence of a large number of 
certification programs may have an impact on buyers’ procurement decisions since they may 
face additional transaction costs when searching for certified products that match their 
commercial specifications. This investigation costs them time and money, and if it is too 
expensive, they may look for domestic substitutes (even non-certified products) and/or offer 
lower prices to suppliers. In this way, some of the transaction costs will be absorbed by 
suppliers as well, therefore a reduction in these costs should prove beneficial to both buyers 
and sellers (Sawyer et al., 2008). 
 
In response to the above situation, it is thought that harmonization could reduce potential 
trade barriers linked to food standards and allow the flow of food from other countries 
without jeopardizing the health of consumers (Roberts, 1999; JRC, 2005).  Also it is 
suggested that harmonization could be used as a means of correcting externalities, transaction 
costs and interdependencies between countries while gaining efficiency from economies of 
scale (Fox, 1991/1992; Leebron, 1996). However, achieving harmonization is a complex 
process since it does not assure maximization of welfare and not all parties will necessarily 
benefit economically from it. Harmonization of standards is not always sufficient due to the 
fact that it is not easy to bundle together all product characteristics, different risk conditions 
and consumer preferences in one optimal set of standards (Sawyer et al., 2008). 
Harmonization of standards is also been seen to struggle with countries’ sovereignty on 
domestic industry when they face the decision to take international standards over existing 
national standards (Jackson, 2000). Therefore the perceived benefits of harmonization must 
be large enough to compensate a perceived loss. Furthermore, difference among consumer 
trust in different local markets is considered to be another factor that makes harmonization 
difficult. Consumer perceptions are a key element of harmonization success, since it has a 
significant influence in the development of food standards and acceptance of equivalence 
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(Sawyer et al., 2008). Standards may affect the willingness of consumers to pay for product 
varieties meeting the standard, because they change consumers’ perception or appreciation of 
these varieties. Overall, the introduction of a standard is likely to affect the prices that 
consumers are willing to pay for certain product varieties and the prices at which producers 
are willing to supply those varieties (WTO, 2005). The impression that goods coming from 
third countries are commonly of lower quality and safety guarantees creates a barrier in 
accepting equivalence among standards and thus maximizes welfare. Thus, harmonization 
could generate a false sense of security for producers as it may lead to the reduction of 
transactional costs but may not lead to increased sales due to consumer rejection (Lohr and 
Krissoff, 2002).  One last argument against harmonization is that setting  one single minimum 
standard will not necessarily contribute to the distribution of economic benefits in an 
equitable manner and it may lead to the exclusion of some producers and at the same time 
create more market power for some other suppliers (Marchant and Bellenger, 1994). In the 
same line of thinking, Casella (1996) found that there is no correlation between uniformity of 
standards with trade gain since the difference in productivity levels resulting from trade will 
mainly favour developed countries and suggested that only the convergence of national 
income from trading will cause standards to harmonize. This has an important relationship 
with the fact that developing countries are less prepared for harmonization due to the fact that 
they present lower conformity assessment infrastructures, technical capacity and financial 
resources (World Bank, 2004). However, there is still no consensus on which should be the 
best harmonization approach for the food industry and several strategies have been proposed 
within the public and private sector.  
 
2.5.1 Harmonization Strategies and International Standardization 
According to the economics of harmonization, “mutual recognition” and “unilateral 
recognition” strategies are the main measures used in the public sector as a means to enhance 
product trade flow and to correct market failures such as network externalities (e.g. product 
compatibility), information asymmetries (e.g. product quality) and environmental externalities 
(e.g. pollution) (WTO, 2005). Harmonization strategies have been focused primarily on 
standardisation through setting “de facto “ and “de jure” standards (David and Greenstein, 
1990), which implies that both country policy objectives and technical provisions are 
commonly defined and that standards are then adopted widely by a specific industry. 
Multilateral recognition implies that countries accept each other’s standards and will mainly 
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occur in situations where countries present equivalent policy objectives and presupposes a fair 
amount of trust among trading partners. Unilateral recognition implies that one country 
recognizes the standards of another country if the latter, regardless of its policy objectives, 
adopts the same technical provisions as defined by the former,  e.g. when the exporting 
country adopts the standards of the importing  country to achieve market access. 
 
According to the analysis of the WTO (2005), harmonization has been shown to be more 
desirable in the context of compatibility standards, where the development of the markets of 
mobiles phones, computers and media equipment have benefitted from the reduction of the 
oversupply of input varieties. In the case of standards designed to correct information 
asymmetries, however, consensus for harmonization has been weaker within the public sector 
since there is no clear cut way to identify the improvement of national welfare against the 
gains obtained from trade. Countries may differ to an extent that it would be preferable to 
have separate policy instruments for each country rather than opting for a single one. It would 
also imply higher compliance costs to firms in one country rather than various countries. 
Likewise it could hamper trade in markets where a large variety of products is desired. On the 
other hand, mutual recognition allows any firm to select a standard to sell into a regional 
market, and unless consumers are biased toward domestic specifications, a firm can access a 
market without the additional costs of complying with a specific harmonization standard 
(Baldwin 2000).  
 
It is currently not possible to draw clear conclusions on the benefits of harmonization or 
mutual recognition of standards to facilitate trade, but there is some evidence that indicates 
that mutual recognition has more significant effects in enhancing trade than harmonization 
when it is applied for bilateral recognition of conformity assessment systems.  Arrangements 
concerning conformity assessment can result in key implications in favour of competitiveness 
and market access  (WTO, 2005). Although mutual recognition of conformity assessment 
provides the flexibility for suppliers to select activities, procedures and service providers, 
availability and international confidence of another country’s system is even more relevant for 
reducing transaction costs to foreign suppliers and thus any impact that would hamper trade. 
Improved national technical infrastructures would not necessarily lead to a one-stop control 
system recognized everywhere if confidence in conformity assessment bodies has not been 
established among countries. Currently, confidence in conformity assessment systems is 
facilitated through multilateral cooperation obtained in international organization forums 
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linked to setting harmonization standards and practices of conformity assessment, e.g. 
CASCO26, ILAC27, IAF28. Their main objective is to assist mutual recognition agreements 
between its members in order to reduce duplication of assessments in different countries.  
 
In the same manner, cooperation for the harmonization of national standards has been 
facilitated through the framework of the WTO agreements. Countries should apply policies, 
which are consistent with both SPS and TBT agreements, which at the same time  encourage 
the creation, use and harmonization of international food standards. The SPS agreement for 
example encourages the harmonization of sanitary and phytosanitary measures and prevents 
that standards are used for arbitrary discrimination or as a hidden restriction on international 
trade. Furthermore, international standards chosen as reference will be based “on scientific 
principles and must not be maintained without scientific evidence “( SPS Article 2.2). In the 
case of food safety the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius standard guidelines and 
recommendations have been chosen as the international standard of reference and have 
become an integral part of the legal framework within which international trade is being 
facilitated through harmonization. The Codex standards include specific requirements for 
pesticide residues, food additives, veterinary drugs, contaminants and methods of analysis and 
sampling. These standards are being used as the benchmark in international trade disputes and 
it is expected that they will be used increasingly in this way (Codex Alimentarius, 2007). The 
main function is “to protect the health of consumers, to promote coordination of all food 
standards work undertaken by international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, and to ensure fair trade practices in food trade.”29  However, in practice it is 
difficult for many countries to accept Codex standards in the statutory sense.  Reserachers 
have found that SPS measures could sometimes  involve loss of welfare in importing 
countries (Calvin and Krissoff, 1998; James and Anderson, 1998; and Paarlberg and Lee, 
1998; Henson, et al., 1999; Wilson and Otsuki, 2004; all mentioned in WTO, 2005) and at the 
same time could imply high costs in losses of sale for developing countries when they have 
been denied market access because of sanitary or phytosanitary issues, and in combination 
with institutional weakness and rise of compliance costs it may contribute to marginalizing 
weaker economic players (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000 mentioned by Fulponi, 2006). In 
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contrast, countries are also able to find important niches and improve their position in global 
markets when their producers are adopting higher quality and safety standards (WTO, 2005). 
 
Despite the fact that standardization activities at the international level are clearly defined by 
the WTO agreements, at  regional and national levels such activities are generally more 
complex. In most developed countries, their standardization infrastructures are integrated into 
the network of international standardization. In the EU for example the adoption of EU 
directives are mandatory for its members and European standard organizations transpose 
international standards into their regional standards. Likewise, most East Asian countries have 
aligned with international standards and new developments are increasingly based on 
international criteria. According to the WTO (2005) The World Standards Services Network 
provides comprehensive lists of international and regional standardizing bodies among which 
ISO and the IEC are found to the be the most important and largest developers of standards. 
The expansion of membership in both organization as well as its influencial role in setting 
international standards reflects the increasing importance of such organizations. Even though 
ISO and IEC are non-governmental bodies, they occupy a position between the public and the 
private sector. On the one hand, many ISO members are part of the governmental structure or 
mandated by their individual country’s governments and on the other hand, ISO liaise with 
several other regional organizations that are mainly producers associations like for example 
COELAP representation in the food sector.  
 
Nevertheless, a considerable number of developing countries are not yet following this trend, 
since their national institutions are not part of the international network. As a matter of fact, 
constraints in resources restrict these countries to integrate into the international 
standardization system (WTO, 2005). Improving participation of developing countries in 
international standardization has been recognized as crucial for several decades. However, 
recent evidence implies that these initiatives have not improved as yet. For example ISO only 
has 3 members from developing countries and the majority do not have a formal contact with 
this organization. Also the progress in this aspect will still be difficult for developing 
countries due to the lack of expertise at the technical level on the formulation of standards as 
well as the limited support from their private sectors (WTO, 2005). 
 
The scope of the ISO standards extends to all fields and industry sectors except the electronic 
sector, which is responsibility of IEC. Although all standards set by ISO are known as 
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voluntary standards, some of them are referred into technical regulations and in some cases 
have become “de facto” mandatory requirements of the regulatory framework in some 
countries (e.g. ISO 14000 for environment management). Moreover, some of the ISO 
standards have become market requirements, such as ISO 9000 quality management systems, 
which was intented to be established as a general open certification system for all economic 
sectors (WTO, 2005). Unfortunately, this was proved not to be possible in the food sector, 
where the concept of quality evolves into something more complex and industry specific 
requirements and new schemes have rapidly evolved to cover the gap left by ISO standards 
(Jahn et al., 2005). 
 
The process of establishing international consensus on voluntary standards is regulated by the 
WTO and ISO codes of good practice. Although the process is open and transparent, 
producers usually take the leading role since they are better organized and have clearer 
priorities than consumers. There is in fact the risk that producer and consumer interest will 
diverge in some cases. Producers will set standards in order to maximize their profit by only 
taking into account consumer interest to the extent that these preferences are reflected in 
prices or as a way to achieve artificial competitive advantage over other suppliers (Henson 
and Caswell, 1995). In this case, government intervention would be necessary to ensure that 
consumer interests are taken into the account and that harmonization procedures are not 
hampered by protectionist devices of lobbying groups (WTO, 2005). On the other hand, 
industrial organizations are concerned that the formal standardization process carried out by 
international standard setting organizations may be too slow. The general trend of leaving the 
standardization activities to the private sector and regulatory activities to the public sector is 
getting stronger (Fulponi, 2006), however, there is still not a clear cut separation between 
public and private standard setting as well as of the role that private stakeholder coalitions 
should take for the harmonization of voluntary standards. 
 
2.5.2 Private Harmonization Initiatives and Principles 
As mentioned above, both mandatory and voluntary standards can differ across countries, and 
could potentially be raising barriers to trade. Such barriers can be removed through 
harmonization or mutual recognition, and these strategies have been widely applied for 
solving the negative impact of mandatory standards and have been mainly and actively 
carried out between governments. In the area of international harmonization of voluntary 
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standards, however, it has been suggested that it could either take place through inter-
governmental treaties or be left to the market (WTO, 2005). Nevertheless, there are arguments 
that propose that the harmonization of standards should not be a principal concern of 
governments at all. Casella (2001) built a model demonstrating that when economies open up 
to international competition, coalitions of firms will reorganize standards internationally and 
will exploit economies of scale at a more disaggregated level of economic activity. There will 
be more harmonization initiated by private industry groups (“from the bottom to top”), in 
order to avoid duplication of national standards and a larger number of specialized 
international standard groups.  
 
Consequently if this would be an optimal path, current harmonization strategies of private 
food standards should also take into account efficiency considerations through economising 
on costs of transaction (Williamson, 1996), and the main economic issue to consider at this 
level would be the reduction of coordination and auditing costs (Maze, 2007). In addition, 
Fulponi (2005) mentioned that reduce transaction costs, most retailers of the EU would prefer 
to have one global standard for food safety and harmonize minimum understanding product 
attributes related to labour, environmental protection and animal welfare. She commented that 
this would on the one hand allow retailers to benefit through more efficient global sourcing, 
while suppliers would benefit with lower total certification costs. Furthermore, harmonization 
of private food standards could contribute to facilitate and accelerate agreements on 
requirements which have not yet reached scientific consensus but that are highly valued by 
consumers. Moreover, she foresaw that retailers’ requirements would become even more 
stringent and precise and harmonization could also help to achieve quick consensus across 
private standard organizations. 
 
All these indicate that the industry could take a global approach to managing the food system 
and governing the standard setting arena. It also represents a basis of harmonization efforts to 
promote competitive advantages between member firms, while continuing to compete over 
quality, price, service and variety, and at the same time pursuing common objectives in a non 
competitive manner such as food safety and good agricultural practices (e.g. GFSI, 
GLOBALG.A.P.). On the other hand, producer associations which set technical and 
compatibility standards have long existed, they are corporate led with the power to impose 
decisions on players at different points in the system, which might raise a number of issues 
concerning competition particularly when undertaken by firms who dominate the markets 
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(Fulponi 2005). Therefore, in that case there would still be a need for policy intervention. Yet 
the role of the government would not be that of establishing harmonization through inter-
governmental treaties, but rather setting up the appropriate regulatory framework to prevent 
anti-competitive outcomes (WTO, 2005). 
 
As previously discussed, the standardization activities have been mainly oriented in the 
establishment of  a “de facto” or  “de jure” standard (David and Greenstein, 1990). Foray 
(1995) explains that while “ de facto” standards are established and adopted through market 
competition, “de jure” standards are established by formal institutions through mandatory 
regulations or by international standard setting organizations. According to Mazé (2007), so 
far private harmonization initiatives in the food sector have followed “hybrid arrangements” 
which fall between these two conventional situations, and rather than fully standardizing 
standards, they are trying to harmonize the requirements that are demanded to producers. The 
harmonization strategies include: 
 
1. Mutual Recognition or “equivalence principle”: Where guidelines and standard 
protocols are recognized arbitrarily as equivalent by the demanding party despite the 
existence or not of differences between schemes. This principle  predominantly aims 
for quality product sourcing guarantees rather than focusing on specific technical 
assessment of individual requirements. For example, in Europe distributors and 
manufactures implement this principle to facilitate their procurement policies as well 
as to create incentive mechanisms for farmers  (e.g. global sourcing of different 
certified organic coffee for a manufacturer brand, retailers sourcing conventional 
certified products under different GAP schemes to cover due diligence requirements). 
Although, this harmonization principle is limited to single large firms and does not 
completely solve the coordination problems, it allows more flexibility in acceptance, 
and thus to some extent does not discriminate producers arbitrarily. 
 
2. The common base principle consists of the inclusion of an existing certification 
scheme as a reference for other private quality systems. This principle was 
implemented for example after the BSE crises by the French beef sector where there 
was a general adoption of the Laboul Rouge CCP requirements as a means to facilitate 
the access of a large number of breeders to higher standards regarding traceability and 
quality certifications of beef products. 
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3. Bilateral Recognition or Negotiation where parties try to improve the “articulation” 
of coordination of auditing activities, including external audits, internal audits, 
planning, statutes of auditors, formalisation of the audit report and its use as a 
reference for other audits etc.  
 
4. Benchmarking or one-way recognition principle consists of a formal 
acknowledgment of schemes by a stakeholder coalition. (e.g. GFSI, GLOBALG.A.P., 
ISEAL, IFOAM, etc). This includes a comparitive assessment of the scheme´s 
technical content against a set of minimum requirements. It includes the common base 
principle and is linked to meta-system management and aims to improve coordination 
problems at both the implementation and the procurement level.  
 
As a final remark of this chapter, the proliferation and concentration of a large number of food 
standards generates confusion in the market (jungle of standards) making procurement 
decisions and assurance of fairness of implementation difficult. One way to support decisions 
for food agents is to identify the credible food standards from those that are not. As a matter 
of fact, credibility will become a strong marketing tool for the acceptance of standards. The 
work of Tuncer (2001) suggested that credibility is needed to build a positive reputation on 
food standards and quality assurance schemes. He pointed out several “building blocks” that 
contributed to the building up of credibility for different food standards and that were  used to 
add value and to lead them to stand out from each other. Nevertheless, the sources of 
credibility associated to food standards remain unclear for most stakeholders and deserve an 
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Chapter 3  
3 Credibility Sources for Food Standards  
From the literature review we can classify several structural, technical and marketing sources 
that altogether might have an effect on the credibility of food standards. In this study we 
consider structural sources to be those related to the type of standard governance policies, 
standard setting procedures (Tuncer, 2001). Technical sources instead are focused on the 
effectiveness of conformity assessment rules, i.e. their reliability in assuring quality and 
safety (Albersmeier et al., 2009); these are associated to audit performance (Jahn et. al, 2005; 
Anders et al., 2010),  implementation success (Jahn and Spiller, 2005) as well as traceability 
and information completeness (Theuvsen, 2005). Furthermore, marketing sources have been 
considered to affect the acceptance and  consumer perceptions of food standards (Fearne et.al, 
2001); we associate these with marketing efforts (Nilsson et al., 2004) and  labelling 
reliability (Giannaka, 2002, Amstel et al., 2007), country-of-origin effects (Bilkey and Nes, 
1982) and adoption of benchmarking strategies (Mazé et al.,2007)  like those offered by GFSI 
and GLOBALG.A.P.. The following sections will describe these credibility sources and 
explain how they may influence food standards and quality assurance schemes. 
 
3.1 Structural Sources 
3.1.1 Governance policies of food standards 
Governance of food standards is related to the ownership and administration structure of a 
standard setting organization. Stakeholders behind the organization endorse their credibility to 
the food standard organization just as  a celebrity would with a particular perfume or any 
other product (Tripp et al., 1994). Stakeholders behind the establishment and management of 
food standards become the face of the reputation of the organization and would spark 
different attitudes and perceptions in the industry about the credibility of the food standard. In 
the previous chapter we explained that the ownership could have a public or private nature 
and that it may involve different institutions. Credibility is a key issue in the establishment of 
market-based non-state governance since it will drive an active approval of a broad group of 
stakeholders (Boström, 2006). In fact, the credibility of the governance of a food standard 
would depend on perceptions about their expertise in setting standards and the trustworthiness 
of their controls. The reputation of the standard setting organization is influenced by the 
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reputation of the institutions supporting food standards. Certainly here the media plays an 
important role as well, since the institutional reputation could decrease if they were associated 
to any food scandal, like for example, when the UK government lost credibility after the BSE 
outbreak. The expertise of the stakeholders supporting food standards is usually promoted 
(most of the time unintentionally) through open dialogues, round table discussion, 
conferences etc. In these events one can identify leaders of opinions and learn from 
companies´ experiences about setting and implementing food standards. Concerning the 
trustworthiness of controls, words like transparency, openness and independence are always 
in the stakeholder´s discourse. In this case credibility is judged on the degree in which the 
standard organization implement or promote the implementation of their values in their 
assurance management. Most of the time independency is said to be gained through third 
party certification. Nevertheless, if a certification body owns a food standard, some buyers 
may perceive it as a lack of independence in the assessment process. Furthermore, the 
openness of muti-stakeholder organizations in their consultation process might be perceived 
as better practice than a retailer setting its own protocols. In fact, the standard setting process 
might be considered as another source of credibility for food standards too.  
 
3.1.2 Standard Setting Process 
We have also seen before that the scope of the standards, content varies according to the 
scheme objective (e.g. process or performance, primary or post farm, type of products, etc).  
According to the codex alimentarius, standards must justify that they will protect human, 
plant and animal health and that the regulations must be scientifically supported , international 
agreements, which do not restrict trade. Government delegates participate in the setting of 
codex standards and guidelines. Governments under their own legislation then adopt these 
voluntarily in order to avoid trading disputes. Currently, there are several codes of good 
standard setting processes that are recommended for standard setting organizations 
(governmental and not-governmental) to follow. These codes are the Annex 3 code of the 
TBT agreement “code of good practice for the preparation, adoption and application of 
standards“; the ISO/IEC Guide 59 “Code of good practice for standardization” and the 
ISEAL30 “code of practice for setting social and environmental standards”. These codes make 
recommendations on procedures for developing standards, targeting effectiveness, application 
relevance, international harmonization and participation in standard setting process. 
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According to the ISEAL code, the process of standardization must take into account relevant 
regulatory and market needs as well as scientific and technological developments; they must 
avoid interpretational ambiguities in language and structure.  Nevertheless, taking into 
account the differences of compliance in local conditions must be considered when setting 
standards, otherwise there would be a risk of raising unnecessary competitive advantages, 
even if this is not the main objective of the standard, like favouring any type of production of 
interested groups (ISEAL, 2010). Also the capacities of achieving compliance by food 
producers or manufacturing firms is important for the acceptance of the standards 
(Albersmeier et al. 2009a) and for reaching the amount of products required by the food 
supply chain (Henson and Readon, 2005). In addition, it is recommended that standards 
should include objective and variable criteria indicators and benchmarks (ISEAL, 2010). 
These indicators should reflect how the criteria are measured and the benchmarks should 
show what is in practice acceptable or not. How the “acceptability” is defined is not yet clear 
among the codes, nevertheless in practice there are private benchmarking initiatives of multi-
stakeholders organizations which are setting acceptance processes that aim to improve the 
credibility of food standards. Still, the absence of robust conformity assessment rules will 
develop schemes without substance (Adams et al., 2004). 
 
3.2 Technical Sources 
3.2.1 Conformity Assessment Structure  
While public controls could take the form of standards, inspections, performance tests (ex 
ante regulations) or the mode of product liability (ex post regulations), private standards 
systems include either a self-regulation approach by the individual or trade organizations or 
could also involve the setting of product quality standards and their certification by external 
parties (Henson and Caswell, 1999).  In addition, trust relations in business have influenced 
the changes of the different control approaches, private control systems adopted by buyers 
have evolved over the years from individual self-assessments, to vertical integrated controls 
(or second party), to third party audits. Nowadays, most certification schemes are privately 
organized. Certification procedures tend to be significantly different depending on whether 
the certification is to be used for consumer marketing purposes or should meet the demands of 
institutional buyers (Jahn et. al, 2005).  
 













Figure 3: Basic structure of conformity assessment (Jahn et al., 2005) 
 
Most of the existing private assurance systems present a similar basic operational structure 
(Figure 3), where according to Jahn et. al (2005), the starting point is the flow of goods 
between the suppliers and the customer and the existing demand of certified products. 
Producers or manufacturers are required to provide evidence of compliance with the standards 
and rules set by the standard owner organization. Such evidence could be by means of a 
certificate that can be validated in a central registry (e.g. database). Certificates are commonly 
issued by a neutral third party organization, which could be a certification body or any other 
similar organization approved by the standard owner organization. Participants of the scheme 
are able to extend their certification status during or after the expiration of the certificate 
validity. The frequency of audits may vary according to the food standard rules, usually 
between 1  to 3 years.  In the case of food safety audits, high frequency is preferred, some 
assurance schemes have even introduced unannounced audits. In addition to this, third party 
certification bodies are required to become accredited by an international standard for 
conformity assessment body  (usually ISO 65 or ISO 62), an Accreditation Body, which is 
part of the International Accreditation Forum. In some cases (e.g. organic certification), 
certifiers are monitored by public authorities or are even accredited by the same standard 
owner (e.g. Sustainable Labels). Here credibility is recognized by the quality of the audit, 
which means the way certification bodies deliver their service by following the scheme rules 
and keeping their independence. All in all, it is important to note that private food standards 
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defence (Henson, 2006). Nevertheless, market pressure originated by highly competitive 
environments could lead to dependency of certification bodies and auditors on their clients 
and increase the risk of opportunistic behaviour (Jahn et.al 2005, Anders et.al 2007).   
 
3.2.2 Audit Performance 
Certification bodies play an important role in providing independent and credible signals on 
quality differentiation claims (Hatanaka et al., 2008; Anders et al., 2010). Nevertheless, much 
verification and assurance practices has to date been of questionable reliability and 
consistency (Dando and Swift, 2003). Jahn et.al 2005 pointed out that opportunistic behaviour 
of auditors and inspection bodies could be jeopardizing audit quality in third party private 
schemes. She referred to the phenomenon of “Low balling”, which has been identified in 
finance auditing (DeAngelo, 1981), and could also be occurring in agribusiness audits. 
Inspectors appear to be agents of certification bodies and at the same time agents of scheme 
owners. It cannot be assumed that inspectors pursue the same objective as the certification 
company, neither that the latter pursues the same objectives as the scheme organization. In 
fact all agents are maximizing their own profit. The “low balling” factor generates strong 
dependency of the certification bodies on the clients due to quasi rents that they obtain from 
initial inspection costs and from their reliance on customer loyalty. This opportunistic 
behaviour effect could be even exponentially increased in third party certification markets 
where competition among food standards increases and many certification bodies exist 
(Anders et al., 2010). Still, as business oriented organizations certification bodies have to 
balance between being competent for their customers and not losing customers by being too 
strict or expensive and losing accreditation or credibility by being too lenient (Havinga, 
2006).  
 
Financing theory has proposed several technical practices for enhancing audit quality, 
including intensification of auditor liability (Becker, 1968) increased reputation effects 
(Bauwhede and Wilkens, 2004) or increased independence of auditors (Lennox, 2000). These 
measures could also be implemented for certification quality in agribusiness and could be 
complemented in addition to the rotation of certifiers by improving inspection technology. 
This could have a direct effect in reducing certification costs as well as including mainly 
vocational training and technical support, improvement of data information exchange among 
regulation bodies and risk oriented audits (Jahn et. al 2005). The latter have been well 
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implemented in finance auditing and have been proposed as an alternative practice against the 
use of standardized checklists in private schemes. An empirical analysis on audit results of the 
German QS system revealed that standardized checklists might not be an efficient control 
system approach and could not guarantee the validity and reliability of audits (Schulze et al, 
2006) Risk-oriented audits are theoretically considered to be an “efficient and effective” 
approach in contrast to the fairness of standardized checklists (Albersmeier et al., 2009a). 
Still, the improvement of audit quality due to risk-oriented audits has not been proven. In 
addition, Adams and Evans (2004) mentioned the importance of accountability in social and 
environment reports which links to concerns about audit expectation gaps prompted by the 
lack of completion and credibility in reports. They suggest the involvement of 
multidisciplinary teams in the certification process, and this should be robust and independent 
(Dando and Swift, 2003) in order to add credibility cues to reduce this gap.  
 
3.2.3 Implementation Success 
Due to the high concentration of global retailers in major international food markets and their 
“de facto” demand for private scheme certifications for supplying food in their stores 
(Fulponi, 2005), suppliers to these are under strong economic pressure to become certified 
(Jahn et al. 2005). Several studies have analyzed the implementation of private schemes and 
have provided different arguments about the benefits and problems in adopting these systems. 
These reveal a motivational gap (Jahn and Spiller, 2005) that may vary according to market 
access and geographical position. On the one hand, it has been said that private schemes are 
having an important effect on competitiveness (Caswell et al., 1998) since food standards 
require improvement in internal organization and market linkages between firms. However, 
the competitive advantage is more expected among small-scale producers than larger 
producers who mainly expect effective cost savings (Caswell et al., 1998). In addition, 
compliance with private standards has the potential to enhance product quality, demonstrate 
compliance with regulations and improve responsiveness to customer s given that they could 
serve as a communication mechanism to reduce transaction costs and increase trust in the 
products supplied (Holleran et al., 1999).  
 
Contrary to these expectations, private schemes are often perceived as an unpopular burden 
for suppliers. Management surveys demonstrate that most participating companies are not 
convinced of the economic benefits of third party audits (Jahn and Spiller, 2007) and that 
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external market pressures (i.e. customer or authority demands) holds strong weight in driving 
suppliers to implement quality standards. In addition, there are fears that certification also 
brings bureaucratic burden (Theuvesen and Spiller, 2007) due to record keeping practices and 
direct cost increases associated with staff training, the monitoring process (Fouayzi et al., 
2006 mentioned by Albersmeier, 2000 b.), and infrastructural elements like storage or 
produce handling facilities (Martinez and Banados, 2004) and economic burdens that may 
represent compliance blocks (Barret et al., 2002; Getz and Schreck, 2006) They may also 
generate higher transaction costs for small-farmers when they try to access the right 
information and knowledge (Kleinwechter and Grethe, 2006). Moreover, Jahn et al. (2003) 
pointed out that only 50% of German farmers who have already been certified in the QS 
system claimed that they mentioned extrinsic motives like pressure from customers or price 
reductions (Jahn et al., 2003). However, Walgenbach (2007), argued from a neo-insitutional 
perspective that besides the external pressure, the adoption of the ISO 9000 standards by 
suppliers may also be motivated by a voluntarily interest in enhancing the effectiveness of 
their quality system. Although voluntary motivation seems to be lower in countries like 
Germany where according to Jahn et al. (2003) only 7.7% of certified farmers claimed to 
participate in the system to enhance the overall quality, in market-oriented export sectors like 
in Peru, farmers were less concerned about bureaucratic burden and  imperative requirement. 
Instead they considered the relationship towards customers and the relevance of certification 
systems like EUREPGAP of major importance for entering into new markets  (Lazo et al, 
2007). Likewise Albersmeier et al., (2009) found that the acceptance of organic schemes is 
higher and less controversial in Latin America than in Europe and stressed that farmer 
conviction is necessary in ensuring farmer diligence. 
 
From the above we can speculate that where there is a higher motivational gap, suppliers will 
have an incentive to reduce costs as much a possible by hiring the services of the “easiest” 
auditor or certification body with knowledge about low inspection standards (Pie Pierce & 
Sweeney, 2004). On the other hand, if suppliers have higher voluntary incentives to improve 
quality control, they will search for higher external audit quality services. In that sense, the 
credibility of food standards will be jeopardized due to lack of producer motivation and 
opportunist behaviour, especially if these “lemon growers” or even non-certified farmers are 
not discriminated against regarding market access. To avoid this, food standards might need 
to strengthen traceability requirements and the completeness of this information. 
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3.2.4 Traceability and Information Completeness 
Traceability is the system used to describe the production history of the product and any 
further processes that the food may undergo along the way from the primary producer to the 
consumer (Tuncer, 2001).  The aim is to transfer complete and reliable information to the 
supply chain agents who should have the possibility to verify and trace product information 
related to the origin and characteristics of the production process (Theuvesen, 2005).  Despite 
traceability implemented through modern technology (software and IT systems), the risk of 
coordination problems and principle agent dilemma (Arrow, 1985) in highly interdependent 
supply chains may instigate opportunistic behaviour that motivates actors to reduce their 
effort in sharing accurate information, jeopardizing the identification of assured produce from 
those which are not assured. If we make the assumption that third-party certification systems 
are structured along an information chain (see Figure 4), we could likewise assume that 
information regarding certification flows is distributed through different actors of this chain. 
Each one of these actors has the responsibility to transfer and communicate the certification 
information as adequately and transparently as possible. Failure to do so denotes the reduction 
of both efficiency and effectiveness in the whole certification system. 
 
 
Figure 4: Certification information chain (modified from FoodPLUS GmbH, 2007) 
 
 
Certification information consists in a series of elements, which together build the scope of 
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according to the objectives and structure of each one of the private schemes. In agribusiness, 
food certification is divided into two main areas: pre-farm gate and post farm gate. The 
former gathers the certification of farms and activities related to primary production and 
certification can cover product certification (e.g. product tests), process certification (e.g. 
organic farming) or both (e.g. good agricultural practices). In addition pre-farm gate 
certification could be specific for inputs (e.g. feed, propagation material, etc.) as well as for 
services (e.g. application of pesticides, harvesting etc.). On the other hand, post-farm gate 
certification gathers certification of manufacturers (e.g. packing or processing) transport (e.g. 
ground or marine) or distribution, it includes controls for good manufacturing practices, 
HACCP or process quality (e.g. ISO 9000 series). Certification scope can also be granted  for 
one single product (e.g. tomato, tomato juice) or a group of products (e.g. fruit and 
vegetables, fruit juice, etc.). In addition to this, the scope could cover the certification of 
individual companies or to be granted to a group of companies. 
 
From the above you can expect a quite detailed collection of data, which will reflect the 
information that is behind a scheme certificate and brand. For this reason it is important that 
the data is accurate enough to guarantee that products linked to the certification are really 
coming from sites that have been inspected and have certified compliance with the private 
scheme rules and standards. In addition to this, the relevant information gathered at the audit 
must be transparently transferred through the certification chain and to the food supply chain. 
Some private schemes whose scope covers food safety elements are requiring companies to 
implement basic traceability systems (one step forward - one step backwards) for tracking and 
tracing their certified products. Traceability is meant not only to trace the origin of products 
and identify the certified company but also to transfer complete and reliable information 
about the product and process characteristics throughout the value chain. Furthermore, 
certification bodies are required to collect company data in a centralized database from where 
the scheme owner can validate the certificate content and communicate into the food supply 
chain.  
 
Theuvsen (2005) highlighted the fact that although there is currently modern information 
technology for collecting and transferring certification data, due to coordination and 
motivational problems the correctness and completeness information can still not be granted. 
Most food supply chains present interdependencies between different actors  (Thompson 
1967), and coordination problems in completing and transferring reliable information through 
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the chain raise when the number of these interdependencies increases. On the other hand 
information asymmetries between principles and agents (Eisenhardt, 1989) could potentially 
occur along with opportunistic behaviour by agents known as hidden actions (Arrow, 1985). 
When agents reduce effort and thereby jeopardize the completeness of the information or try 
to disguise actions which are not in the best interest of the principles, the question of 
correctness and the credibility of the information is raised. Likewise within the certification 
chain there are input-output relationships and therefore interdependencies between the actors, 
so it could be assumed that coordination problems and principle-agent dilemmas are also 
present and affect the credibility of the certification information.  
 
In order to improve transparency and traceability,  it is suggested that the food industry should 
strengthen the cultural value of storing and transferring correct and complete information, but 
this would be very difficult without an economic incentive. Theuvsen (2005) also emphasizes 
that to overcome the motivational barriers related to track and tracing, it is important that 
changes in the organization of food production is oriented towards reducing transactions 
either by vertical integration strategies within a food sector, or by strengthening the industry 
culture towards improving transparency and the transfer of information. In addition to 
screening good actors from bad actors through third party certification or by improving 
monitoring systems, there should be investments in signalling devices (e.g. branding), to 
generate responsibilities and trust in the value chain. However, branding strategies do not 
always ensure adequate information provision and could even be insufficient to alleviate 
market failures. 
 
The high number and great variety of existing schemes could imply a lower level of 
transparency and the possibility of confusion for consumers, with a consequent possible loss 
of faith in the system itself (JRC, 2005). Under these conditions, the system could “fail” in the 
objective of communicating quality and valorising products and/or firms (JRC, 2005). For 
example, some studies reveals that eco-labels like “environmental friendly” and “organic” fail 
to communicate adequately, thus could not efficiently diminish information asymmetries 
(Amstel et al., 2007). According to Giannakas (2002), with the introduction of certification 
activities, there are clear incentives for mislabelling and fraudulent behaviour, especially 
when consumers are not able to identify the certified characteristics even after purchase 
experience and use of the products. Incentives of mislabelling will be stronger in markets 
where the certified products are more profitable or generate other attractive commercial 
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benefits to suppliers. Cases of mislabelling have been reported in organic product markets 
where conventional food counted between 15% and 40% of organic labelling produce. 
Consumer deception due to mislabelling affects consumer trust in the labelling process and 
can have detrimental consequences for market acceptance of certified products. When 
extensive mislabelling occurs, the value of labelling is undermined and the certified food 
market fails. 
 
3.3 Marketing Sources 
3.3.1 Marketing Efforts and Labelling Reliability 
Marketing efforts refer to the target markets addressed by the schemes and the promotion 
efforts performed by the food standard owners in order to enhance their acceptance (Nilsson 
et al., 2004).  The target markets could be the private consumer market and potential 
participants in the food standard (Tuncer, 2001). When a food standard initiative is seen as a 
product it will be promoted for adoption and implementation by agents along the food supply 
chain (Tuncer, 2001). These promotional efforts are generally carried out through advertising, 
or through formal means of communication (such as the media) or by the creation of publicity 
at an individual level (such as word-of-mouth). On the other hand, private consumer/customer 
markets could be segments with environmental concerns, buyers and manufactures searching 
for certified companies or the society at large. The most useful way to reach these markets is 
through labelling, which is considered a stakeholder communication tool rather than a 
promotional instrument. 
 
Indeed, the construction of trust and reputation around a visible symbol of a brand arguably 
acts to enhance the credibility of private standards among consumers. (Henson and Northen, 
1998) The reliability of the information behind the labels is a key element to build credible 
cues; unfortunately there is much evidence that some labels fail to communicate adequately 
and do not diminish the information gap between buyers and sellers (Amstel et al., 2007). 
Although food standards have the potential to reduce both perceived product category risk 
(e.g. in meat) and specific product risks (e.g. associated to scheme label, retailer label etc), it 
still remains to improve the communication of their objectives as most of the cases have been 
poorly understood by stakeholders and consumers (Fearne et al., 2001). The high number and 
great variety of existing schemes could imply a lower level of transparency and the possibility 
of confusion for consumers, with a consequent possible loss of faith in the system itself (JRC, 
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2005). Consumer deception due to mislabelling affects consumer trust in the labelling process 
and could have detrimental consequences for the market acceptance of certified products. 
When extensive mislabelling occurs, the value of labelling is undermined and the certified 
food market fails (Giannakas, 2002)  
 
3.3.2 Country-of-Origin Effects 
Country-of-origin has been considered as a product extrinsic cue which has been broadly 
discussed in studies related to consumer purchasing decisions (Bruning, 1997 and Grooves, 
2000) At the same time, it has also been recognized to have effects on buyers perceptions of 
products and consequently in industrial purchasing decisions (Bilkey and Nes, 1982, Verlegh 
and Steenkamp, 1999). It is agreed that the location of production has considerable effects on 
consumers’ beliefs about product quality in the sense that high country specific production 
costs signal high product quality (Haucap and Barmdold, 1997). Lobb and Mazzochi (2006) 
mentioned that consumer perceptions commonly classify country-of-origin in two behavioural 
components. The first one includes country-of-origin as an indicator of the safety or quality of 
the product and the second one is related to the group identity or national pride (Bruning, 
1997). In addition, they state that there are cognitive, affective and normative variables 
influencing country-of-origin effects and perceived risks associated to products. On the one 
hand, socio-psychological variables like political and ethical motives or cultural values 
explain attitudes towards the country image and ethnocentric behaviour includes normative 
concepts that influence purchasing behaviour under the assumption that it is a proper action in 
favour of the home country and its people (Grooves, 2000). Moreover, socio-demographic 
variables such as age, education, gender and income work in conjunction with these socio-
psychological influences on food purchasing behaviour (Bilkey and Nes, 1982; Lobb and 
Mazzochi, 2006).  
 
The motive behind the adoption of quality assurance schemes by agribusiness organizations is 
to reduce consumers perceived risks associated with food purchase which involves reducing 
both product category and product specific risks (Fearne et al. 2001). However, attitudes 
toward products from a country vary by product and there are significant differences between 
general country attitudes and specific product attitudes by country of source. In fact there is a 
hierarchy of biases between developed countries and developing ones, including degree of 
economic development, cultural and political climate and similarity with the country’s belief 
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system  (Berkley and Nes, 1982). Information imperfection may cause consumers to practice 
“statistical discrimination” against imports from developing countries (Chiang and Mansson, 
1988) since there is a particular salient norm to buy domestic (Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999). 
Actually, Verbeke and Roosen (2009) argues that origin labels have the marketing potential to 
mainly disclose product’s healthiness appeal and if consumers are on average correct about 
their perception then a “lemons” effects may emerge (Chiang and Mansson, 1988). The study 
carried out by Hampton (1997) suggested that products sourced in Less Developed Countries 
(LDC) are perceived to be more risky due to price stability, uncertainty regarding delivering 
time, quality etc. In addition, Verlegh and Steenkamp (1999) indicate that beside the 
perception that products from LDCs have a lower quality , these are also associated with high 
risk of bad performance and dissatisfaction. In this regard risk safeguards might include third 
party assurance schemes, laboratory tests and warehousing within importing countries (Bilkey 
and Nes, 1982).  Therefore, when national food standards and quality assurance schemes try 
to differentiate through country identification labels and trademarks (e.g. CanadaGAP, 
ChinaGAP, MexicoGAP, etc.), this may be exposing country-of-origin effects to buyers and 
may have some negative effects on credibility perceptions about the national standards. This 
study aims to analyze the effects of country of origin and benchmarking strategies on 
credibility of food standards. We assume that negative country of origin effects on food 
standard credibility should significantly diminish when the quality assurance schemes owner 
decides to take a benchmark strategy. The following section describes the theoretical 
framework of this research. 
 
3.3.3 Adoption of Benchmarking Strategies 
The economic definition of Benchmarking is “the process of comparing one's business 
processes and performance metrics to industry bests and/or best practices from other 
industries. Dimensions typically measured are quality, time and cost. Improvements from 
learning mean doing things better, faster, and cheaper” (Boxwell, 1994). In the food industry 
so far benchmarking has been taken as a process of equivalence assessment for food 
standards, whose main objective is to improve standards effectiveness and efficiencies by 
reducing redundancy and overlaps in the application fields and in the markets. In the previous 
chapter, we mentioned that benchmarking procedures in food standards is also one of the 
harmonization strategies existing in the private sector, which as in all other strategies is seen 
to have the potential to mitigate trade barriers and allow the flow of food from other countries 
Angelo Enrique Benjamin Lazo Galdos 49 
without jeopardizing the health of consumers (Roberts, 1999; JRC, 2005).  
 
Benchmarking principles consist of a formal acknowledgment of food standards by a 
stakeholder coalition. This includes a comparison assessment of the schemes technical content 
against a set of minimum requirements. The most prominent benchmark procedures are those 
offered by GFSI31 and GLOBALG.A.P. National food standards apply to an independent 
assessment for obtaining formal recognition of equivalence against the GFSI or 
GLOBALG.A.P requirements which are widely accepted by food stakeholders, such as major 
international retailers. The objective of the benchmark is to reduce multiple certification costs 
to producers by recognizing one single audit at the pre and post farm levels.  The differences 
between both alternatives consist of the scope of acceptance for food standards. While the 
GFSI benchmarking process is focused only in the harmonization of food safety key elements, 
GLOBALG.A.P offers, in addition to these food safety elements, benchmarks against 
sustainable production requirements linked to environment protection, occupational health 
and safety and animal welfare. In addition, GLOBALG.A.P provides a close follow up of 
certification bodies performance through an integrity programme as well as certificate 
validation through a database. Also within the processes of equivalence assessment, 
GLOBALG.A.P delivers the service to a third party accreditation body who will evaluate the 
normative documents and carry out a witness audit to verify in practice the compatibility of 
national standards. In GFSI, this role is delivered by an internal technical committee. 
Recently, both organizations have started cooperating to align their benchmark procedures 
and offer a wider scope of harmonization and credibility of national food standards. The 
strongest incompatibility between both organizations still seems to be their different 
governance structure and decision making policies  
 
3.3.3.1  Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) Governance 
GFSI is the food safety programme of the International Committee of Food Retail Chains 
(CIES32). CIES was founded in 1953 in Belgium with the objective of creating a body to 
represent food retail chains. Although membership was initially restricted to retail chains, 
with the evolution of food distribution in larger companies, the dialogue was extended to 
include suppliers and cooperatives during the mid 1960’s. Today the organization is called 
CIES- The Food Business Forum, and has gathered 400 members from the retail and 
                                                 
31
 Global Food Safety Initiatiative 
32 French Abbreviation: Comité International d’Entreprises à Succursales 
  
Angelo Enrique Benjamin Lazo Galdos 
 
50 
manufacturing sector from 150 countries and offices have expanded in key regions like North 
America, Asia/Pacific, China and Japan. Its mission is to provide a platform for leadership, 
debate and networking between retailers and their partners. The main services or programs 
consist of leadership events (Summits) for senior executives for taking new strategic 
perspectives by providing practical information, debate and reflection on the latest trends and 
developments in the social, political and economic context of the global food and retail 
business. 
 
In May 2000, a group of international retailer CEOs identified the need to enhance food 
safety, ensure consumer protection and strengthen consumer confidence. They proposed a 
programme, which would set requirements for food safety schemes and improve cost 
efficiency throughout the food supply chain. Following their lead, CIES – The Food Business 
Forum established the GFSI programme as an instrument of continuous improvement in food 
safety management systems for ensuring confidence in the delivery of safe food to 
consumers: GFSI´s objective is the convergence of food safety standards through maintaining 
a benchmarking process for food safety management schemes, improved cost efficiency 
solutions throughout the food supply chain by way of the common acceptance of GFSI 
recognized standards by retailers around the world and to provide an international stakeholder 
platform for networking, knowledge exchange regarding food safety practices and 
information. 
 
The governance structure of GFSI is coordinated by CIES and it mainly consists of the GFSI 
Foundation Board, a retailer-driven group, with manufacturer advisory members, providing 
strategic direction and overseeing daily management. Membership of the Board is by 
invitation only. The GFSI Technical Committee was formed in September 2006 and is 
composed of retailers, manufacturers, standard owners, certification bodies, accreditation 
bodies, industry association and other technical experts. It provides technical expertise and 
advice for the GFSI Board. Membership of the Technical Committee is by invitation only. 
Industry stakeholders are also invited to participate in the decision-making process of GFSI 
through annual meetings and regular exchange of information.  
 
The GFSI benchmarking process consists of a documentary comparison assessment of 
existing food safety standards against the GFSI Guidance Document (currently in its 5
th
 
version). This reference document contains commonly agreed criteria for food safety 
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standards (key elements) and management schemes, against which any food or farm 
assurance standard can be benchmarked. The technical assessment is carried out by a 
benchmarking committee pointed out by GFSI, who within three months would make a 
recommendation report to the GFSI Board for accepting the compliance and recognition of 
applicant scheme. Once the food safety  scheme is approved, it will be commonly accepted by 
7 major retailers (Carrefour, Tesco, Metro, Migros, Ahold, Wal-Mart and Delhaize) who will 
accept certificates based on the benchmarked standards in order to be able to make an 
assessment of their suppliers of private-label products and fresh products and meat, to ensure 
that production is carried out in a safe manner.  
 
GFSI approval include both pre and post farm gate stages, currently there are 11 private food 
standards recognized, including BRC, IFS, Dutch HACCP, SQF, CanadaGAP, 
GLOBALG.A.P etc. Furthermore GFSI has announced that the technical committee has 
completed a detailed comparison of the ISO 22000 as part of their harmonization activities to 
reduce duplication in the manufacturer sector.  
 
3.3.3.2  GLOBALG.A.P. Governance 
GLOBALG.A.P. (formerly known as EUREPGAP) is a private voluntary scheme for good 
agricultural practices which was founded in 1997 by the Euro Retailer Produce Working 
Group. It was primarily designed to reassure consumers about how food is produced on the 
farm by minimising detrimental environmental impacts of farming operations, reducing the 
use of chemical inputs and ensuring a responsible approach to worker health and safety as 
well as animal welfare. The EUREPGAP certification scheme and standard was first launched 
in 2001 for the fruit and vegetable sector and since then acceptance of the standard has been 
growing.  In 2007 the programme changed it´s name to become GLOBALG.A.P., in order to 
represent the achievements reached leading up to that date. These included more than 90,000 
participants in 80 different countries, with a certification capacity of 130 Certification Bodies 
operating worldwide. Its certification activities have also since expanded to other product 
lines such as flowers and ornamentals, combinable crops etc, as well as introducing other pre-
farm sectors such as livestock and aquaculture.  
 
The governance structure of GLOBALG.A.P. is coordinated by the GLOBALG.A.P. 
secretariat and involves voluntary membership participation of different stakeholders within 
the food industry. This organization is known for its strong  representation of retailers and 
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suppliers in the GLOBALG.A.P.'s Board and the Sector Committees. While the former decide 
on policies and strategies, the latter establishes and designs the standard content and 
compliance criteria. This work is supported by National Technical Working groups where 
regional stakeholders have their local voice and provide input to the standard setting process. 
Likewise, agricultural service companies are associated members who participate in a 
consultancy role. 
 
In addition, GLOBALG.A.P. as a non-profit organization is also involved in providing 
harmonization solutions to the industry by reducing duplication costs to producers. 
Harmonization takes place not only vertically by the consolidation of several retailers’ 
requirements in one set of normative documents recognized worldwide, but also horizontally 
by the recognition of national schemes, through a process of benchmarking. This process 
consists of the technical comparison of the normative documents of the applicant schemes 
against the GLOBALG.A.P. documents, i.e. the applicant scheme’s Certification System 
Rules will be compared against the GLOBALG.A.P. General Regulations and the applicant 
scheme’s standard will be compared against the GLOBALG.A.P. Control Points and 
Compliance Criteria. This technical assessment is carried out by either one of the two 
independent organizations approved by GLOBALG.A.P., the Joint Accreditation System for 
Australia and New Zealand (JAS ANZ) or the Deutsches Akkreditieriungssystem Prüfwesen 
(DAP). The process also contemplates the involvement of industry stakeholders through a 
Peer Review process of GLOBALG.A.P. members, as well as a Witnessed Assessment to 
audit the implementation and interpretation of the applicant scheme in practice. Finally, the 
Independent Organization will send a recommendation report to the GLOBALG.A.P. 
Secretariat for approval or rejection of the recognition. After this period, certification bodies 
seeking to participate in benchmark audits must achieve ISO 65 accreditation to the scope of 
the benchmark scheme. 
 
Currently there are 20 different GLOBALG.A.P. benchmarked foods. These represent 
countries like Austria, Colombia, Chile, China, Germany, Kenya, Mexico, Japan, New 
Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The Netherlands, Uruguay and the UK. Not 
all of these schemes represent the fruit and vegetable sectors but include those of flower and 
ornamentals as well as cattle and sheep meat products.  
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4 Conceptual Framework 
In this research I attempt to prove if national food standards’ credibility is susceptible to 
country-of origin effects and at the same time explore which credibility sources may have an 
influence on stakeholders’ perceptions. We base our investigation on the literature review, 
making the associating quality assurance theory, the trust theory and marketing research 
concerning credibility sources.  
 
4.1 Empirical Approach 
As mentioned previously, the focus of food standards has adapted over time to changes in 
consumers’ perceptions about the risks associated with food consumption originating from 
quality inconsistencies and information asymmetries that appeared along the supply chain 
(Akerlof, 1970, Nelson 1970, Fearne et al., 2001). To solve these problems, food standards 
have not only remained to standardize product specifications but also to standardize 
production and distribution practices. While official control systems have been strong, the 
food supply chains have been governed by private assurance schemes that have centralized 
quality in all operations (Morris and Young, 2000). At the same time, these have shaped 
supply chains into food networks that are characterized by strategic vertical linkages between 
the different agents (Hanf and Pieniadz, 2006).  These networks are normally driven by “focal 
companies” such as retailers or manufacturers, who use their buying power to manage vertical 
relationships with their suppliers by imposing upon them specific compliance with food 
standards that have been designed either by industry coalitions (Fulponi, 2005) or  by their 
own quality department. 
 
From an economic point of view, Fritz (2006) argued that any variations of the supply and 
demand of food could easily force food network agents to look for new buyers and suppliers 
outside their existing supply chain. This decision coould make agents experience new 
uncertainties and risks caused again by information asymmetries that exist with the first 
transaction with a new trading partner. As a matter of fact, as in the case of consumers, 
buyers’ perceptions of potential risks in a given transaction are socially constructed and 
psychological elements, available information influences individual perceptions, decisions 
and behaviour (Bauer, 1967; Lobb, 2005).  As a consequence, the individual perception of 
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information communicating trust signals and control mechanisms is the key to the transaction 
decision. To influence  decisions and transaction behaviour, the existence and communication 
of trust and control is necessary (Hunt & Frewer, 2001). Therefore, quality assurance schemes 
again turn into a safeguard mechanism as a communication device for the information 
required to diminish the pre-purchase risk perception and consequently establish the desirable 
trust to initiate business-to-business relationships (Fearne et.al, 2001). 
 
Coincidentally, it is quite interesting to note that “Trust” has been revealed as the most 
important and frequent dimension used in empirical models to measure business-to-business 
relationships (Wilson and Moller, 1991 mentioned by Fynes et. al, 2001). Anderson and 
Narus (1990), defined trust as “the firm’s belief that another company will perform actions 
that will result in positive actions for the firm, as well as not taking unexpected actions that 
would result in negative outcomes for the firm”. Trust in transactions is often considered to be 
an economic asset creating value (Fritz, 2006) by reducing transaction costs, enhancing 
commitment and cooperative behaviour and establishing a safe environment for critical 
transfers of information, performances, goods and resources (Doney and Canon, 1997; Galizzi 
and Venturini, 1999; Büssing, 2000 and Pelzmannm 2005 mentioned by Bahlmann et al, 
2007). According to Heffernan (2004) trust emerged as a critical component of successful 
cross-cultural business-to-business relationships developing in different forms in the different 
lifecycle of the relationship. In the pre-relationship stage, trust was primarily generated by the 
reputation of the partner. In the early interaction stage total trust was produced by the trust 
generated in the pre-relationship stage, the level of contractual trust and the level of 
competency trust. In the relationship growth stage, total trust was developed from the transfer 
of trust developed in the early interaction stage, coupled with levels of goodwill and trust in 
competency. 
 
At the same time, credibility has been identified as an important component of trust. Doney 
and Cannon (1997) defined trust as: “the perceived credibility and benevolence of a target of 
trust, where credibility is the expectancy that the partner's word or written statement can be 
relied on (Lindskold, 1978), and whether the partner has the capability and expertise to 
undertake the purpose of the partnership (Ganesan, 1994). On the other hand, benevolence is 
the extent to which one partner is genuinely interested in the other partner's welfare and 
motivated to seek joint gain. And whether the partner will be accommodating and act with 
equity when new conditions relating to the relationship arise (Ganesan, 1994).” Furthermore, 
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Scott (2000) considered that trust can be classified as a rational cognition perspective by 
gathering credibility with other elements such as integrity, reliability, competence etc.  
Furthermore, Hunt & Frewer, (2001) holds the theory that the credibility of a piece of 
information source is determined by two types of expectations about possible biases in its 
information. The first is a “reporting bias'', which refers to the degree to which the 
information source can be expected to be truthful about a particular issue. The second is a 
“knowledge bias'' (hereafter “degree of knowledge''), which refers to the degree of expertise 
or knowledge a source is assumed to have about a particular issue. These expectations are also 
determinants of the degree of trust associated with an information source, and both feature as 
important constituent elements in several distinct accounts of trust. 
 
Taking into account the above theoretical background, we could assume then that credibility 
of information sources of food standards are related with the trust building process in 
business-to-business relationships. As matter of fact, food standards have been recognized as 
a de facto condition for local and international trade (Fulponi, 2005) and it would make sense 
to explore which determinants might be affecting the credibility of these food standards. In 
that sense, this research uses cognitive methods to capture the attitudes of stakeholders 
towards the credibility of food standards and identify which sources of credibility might have 
a major influence.  
 
The first objective of this experiment is to test the main hypothesis that benchmarking 
strategies have a positive influence on the credibility of national food standards in the 
presence of country-of-origin effects.  The second objective is to attempt to design a structural 
model that identifies credibility sources associated with food standards and tests the effects of 
each one of these against the overall credibility of different national standards. Finally, this 
research provides suggestions for standard owners considering some aspects of credibility that 
may work in their favour to improve their administration and acceptance in international food 
markets.   
 
4.2 Proposed Model: Determinants of Food Standards’ Credibility 
The following empirical model is proposed for the analysis of credibility of national food 
standards. As this is a primary stage of an empirical investigation about food standards 
credibility, most of the items and variables of the model have been selected based on the 
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technical requirements of GFSI and GLOBALG.A.P. benchmarking processes and the ISEAL 
code for setting sustainable standards, since these guidance are considered an important 
industry reference for credibility.  
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Figure 5: Empirical Model: determinants of food standard’s credibility 
 
With this model I try to capture the overall credibility of a food standard by measuring 
certification system reliability and confidence on the standard setting process since both 
components are the main elements to develop within any quality assurance system. Also we 
use two variables to detect the origin effects (Bilckey and Nes, 1982), one based on the 
economic aspects and trust on the auditing process. The effectiveness of standards is added 
since this item has always been mentioned and discussed in stakeholders dialogues. Finally 
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4.2.1 Definition of Concepts 
Credibility of National Food Standards  
The term “food standards” denotes the colloquial term used in the food industry to refer to a 
quality assurance scheme or programme.  This consists of developments and management of a 
conformity assessment system and standards or requirements that the product has complied 
with. This construct is designed to capture the general perception about the credibility of 
national food standards for different countries. The countries selected were 4 developed 
countries (Australia, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) and 4 
developing countries (China, Ghana, India and Mexico). 
 
Certification System Reliability 
“Certification Systems” are rules, procedures and management systems for carrying out 
certification (ISO 17000:2005). This construct is designed in such a way as to capture the 
perception about the reliability of national certification systems for different countries. The 
countries selected were 4 developed countries (Australia, Italy, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America) and 4 developing countries (China, Ghana, India and Mexico). 
 
Standard Setting Confidence  
This construct refers to the process for developing a  “standard”,  “which is a document that 
provides for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characterises for products or 
related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory” 
(ISEAL, 2010). This construct is designed to capture the perception about the confidence on 
the standard setting process held in different countries. The countries selected were 4 
developed countries (Australia, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) 
and 4 developing countries (China, Ghana, India and Mexico). 
 
Audit Rules  
An “audit” is a systematic and functionally independent examination of a production site to 
determine whether activities and results comply with planned procedures established in a 
certification system and whether these procedures are implemented effectively (ISO 19011,  
GFSI Guidance Document and GlobalG.A.P. General Regulations v3.1 Annex 1). For this 
construct we explore the perception about the confidence and reliability of the certification 
systems based on their audit rules such as the audit frequency requirements, (annual vs. every 
3 years); certification options (individual or group certification) and if the audit rules 
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contemplate or not unannounced visits to the production facilities. 
 
Audit Information  
This construct intends to identify the opinion about the confidence or reliability of the 
information provided by food standards concerning  audit results such as: certification status, 
production site information (e.g. area of the farm), and traceability. 
 
Standard Requirements 
This construct evaluates the confidence and reliability of the content of a food standard. This 
includes items like scope of standards concerning stage of the supply chain at which the 
criteria are set to cover (e.g. pre-farm or post-farm vs. pre-farm and post-farm); integration of 
principles (food safety or/and social and/or environmental). 
 
Governance Structure  
This construct assesses the confidence and reliability towards the organizations who develop 
and manage the food standards, these organizations take different types or forms like producer 
associations, certification bodies, NGOs, international organizations like ISO, FAO/WHO, 
governments or multi-stakeholder organizations, etc. 
 
Food Standards Effectiveness  
This construct measures the reliability on the food standards’ success in reaching their 
objectives in assuring the control or prevention of risks associated to food production, such as 
food safety risks or environmental impact risks.  
 
Benchmarking Signals 
This construct intends to capture the effect of benchmarking signals (i.e. the adoption of GFSI 




This construct intends to identify the influence of the promotion of food standards and 
preferences of stakeholders based on what they would recommend others to select as 
components of credible of food standards 
 
Angelo Enrique Benjamin Lazo Galdos 59 
Degree of Economic Development. 
This variable associates the effects of the country consideration of the respondence regarding 
food standards and the degree of economic development (Barkley and Nes, 1982): more 
developed countries (Major Advanced and Advanced Economies) and less developed 
countries (Developing Countries). 
 
4.2.2 Hypothesis 
As mentioned previously, the main hypothesis of this research is: 
 
H1: Benchmarking signals have a positive influence on the credibility of national food 
standards in the presence of country-of-origin effects 
 
In addition, based on the proposed empirical model, we will test the following secondary 
hypotheses: 
 
H2: The national food standard’s credibility is highly correlated to their certification system 
reliability and the confidence on their standard setting process.  
 
H3: The higher the confidence in the audit rules, the higher the credibility of the national food 
standard. 
 
H4: The higher the audit information reliability, the higher the credibility of the national food 
standard. 
 
H5: The higher the confidence in the standard requirements, the higher the credibility of the 
national standard. 
 
H6: The higher the confidence in the governance structure, the higher the credibility of the 
national standard. 
 
H7: The lower the degree of economic development, the lower the credibility of national 
standards. 
 
H8: The stronger the impact of the standards’ marketing efforts on stakeholders, the higher 
the credibility of national standards. 
 
H9: The higher the reliability of the effectiveness of food standards, the higher the credibility 
of national standards. 
 
H0: There is no significant relationship between credibility sources and the overall credibility 










4.3.1 Research design  
A structured survey was designed for the collection of the data required for this research. To 
assess stakeholders’ perception about the credibility of food standards, I constructed a set of 
statements using adjectives (e.g. reliability, confidence, trustworthiness) and dimensions (e.g. 
trustworthiness, expertise, attractiveness) that have been proposed in source credibility theory, 
(Hoveland and Kelley, 1953; Berlo, Lemert and Mertz, 1960/70; Withehead, 1968; Harmon 
and Corney, 1982; Roobina, 1990.) These statements are shown in Annex 1, and were 
evaluated using a 5 point Likert-scale (from I strongly agree to I strongly disagree). For each 
respondent, business and socio-demographic information was also recorded. The instrument 
was designed in the English language. Statements used in the questionnaire were formulated  
based on the experience of the author who worked for 5 years in a standard setting 
organization, combined with samples of credibility and country of origin statements used for 
other types of research. Also additional suggestions to the statements were obtained from a 
pilot test carried out with 13 respondents during the Fruit Logistica fair in Berlin held 
between the 3rd and  5th of February 2010. Some other outcomes of the pilot helped to 
improve the questions to make them more understandable and specific when required. One of 
the major changes made was to include specific country names when referring to “developed” 
or “developing countries”. Another important improvement was to separate the perceptions 
towards national certification systems and national standards setting process besides asking 
about the credibility of food standards to avoid generalities and capture specific beliefs about 
the two components. Also new questions were incorporated in the survey to reflect the other 
interests of stakeholders in credibility. The amendments and improvements which resulted 
from the pilot were incorporated into the final instrument which was formatted so as to launch 
it as an online survey.  The online survey was created using the GlobalPark software 
Enterprise Feedback Suite 7.0 (EFS Survey). An email inviting recipients to participate in the 
survey was sent out randomly to the info-mail contacts of GLOBALG.A.P on 26th March 
2009. 
 
4.3.2 Data Analysis 
The data analysis was divided in different stages. The first phase corresponds to the 
preparation of the database to proceed with the analysis. The second phase involved a 
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univariate analysis to obtain a statistical description of the sample. The third phase consists of 
a bivariate analysis for corroborating correlations between the different statements. In the 
fourth stage, a factor analysis was run to test and build up the different constructs included in 
the model. Finally a regression analysis was carried out to test the different hypotheses. All 
computations were performed using SPSS statistical software. 
 
The data was collected into a SPSS file obtained from the EFS survey. Filters available in the 
EFS software were used to capture the data from only those responses where the whole 
survey was completed. In addition, consistency checks and extreme case checks were carried 
out to further clean the data. Afterwards, the descriptive statistics, frequencies and 
percentages were extracted for the demographic and business questions and additionally 
parameters such as mean () and standard deviation () were calculated for the statements of 
the model.  
 
Based on information from these preliminary results, a principal component factor analysis 
was carried out in order to obtain a success factor, which included both qualitative and 
quantitative statements. This factor was then split into three different success groups. Next, 
the distribution of the active and descriptive variables among the groups was analyzed. 
Afterwards, the author compared the variance distribution of success factors quoted by the 
respondents with the passive success factors extrapolated during the investigation. For each 
construct of the above-mentioned framework, the variables with the highest variance among 
the groups were then used as independent variables in a regression analysis towards the 
success groups (dependent variable). 
Using the items assessed on the Likert scales, the underlying variables of the research model 
were captured. The relationships between the items were first tested through bivariate analysis 
as Pearson correlations and F-test mean comparisons. Then an explorative factor analysis 
using the principal component algorithm was carried out to test the level of fit and reliability 
of these statements. Varimax rotation was implemented to assure the independence of factors. 
Those items with double loading, those with loading below 0.5, and items loading on 
improper factors were excluded from the final analysis. Bartlett's test of sphericity and Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) as a Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) were used to determine the 
matrix suitability for factor analysis. The internal consistency or reliability of the statements 
composing a construct was achieved with the Cronbach’s Alpha test (Cronbach 1951). The 
chosen standardized factors were saved for subsequent analysis according to the Bartlett’s 
method.  
  




Finally, a linear regression analysis with the method stepwise was carried out to measure the 
impact of the identified factors and individual statements on the attitudes of the producers 
towards the reliability of the organic standard. The goodness of fit was checked with the R
2
, 
and through the analysis of residuals and hypothesis testing. Statistical significance was 
checked by an F-test of the overall fit, followed by t-tests of the individual parameters. 
Additionally, an item-to-item correlation analysis was calculated for excluding any problem 
of multicollinearity, and the Durbin Watson test was calculated to check the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals. Finally, the proposed original model was modified to reflect 
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5 Results 
The online questionnaire reached a sample of 835 contacts, there was a net response rate of 
85.15% and a completion rate of 44.11% of respondents. The highest participation was 
observed during week 12 and 13 of 2010. During the whole period when the questionnaire 
was available online, there was an average participation of 24 respondents per day and 119 
respondents per week. The questionnaire was completed in an average of 19 minutes. After 
checking each completed questionnaire and verifying consistency matters, there were 310 
questionnaires considered as valid and useful for the analysis. 
 
5.1 Sample Description 
5.1.1 Profile of Respondents 
Table 1 shows some characteristics about the sample as well as the demographic distribution 
of the respondents. From this table we can observe that over half of the respondents were 
male (74%) and approximately a quarter were female. Both of these groups ranged between 
25 years and 65 years of age, the largest concentration of participants being between the ages 
of 36 to 55 years old. Most of the respondents had a managerial position in their company 
(approx. 32%) but there was also a significant participation of executives (15.8%), technical 
personnel (25.2%) and auditors (18.1%).  The majority (approx. 60%) of the sample had 11 
years or more experience in the food sector.  In addition, almost one third of the respondents 
stated that they were quite involved with food standards. Altogether these general statistics 
show that the respondents are considered to be a good source of information for this research. 
 
Concerning the origin of the respondents, the survey captured respondents who were born in 
60 different countries. Almost half of them indicated that they were from a European country 
(51%), 14.8% were born in a Latin American country and 10% in an African country. The 
other 8.7% respondents stated their birth origin to be North America33 and another 8.1% from 
Asia. Detailed information about country of birth is shown in Annex 2; here the frequency 
response highlights that the largest concentration of respondents came from countries such as 
Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States of America and Australia. 
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 Canada and the United States 
  




Table 1: Demographic profile of respondents 
Variable Category Frequency % 
Gender Female 76 24.52 
 
Male 229 73.87 
 No response 5 1.61 
Age 25-35 61 19.68 
 
36-45 89 28.71 
 
46-55 89 28.71 
 
56-65 47 15.16 
 
more than 65 12 3.87 
 No response 12 3.87 
Position in the Company Executive Director 49 15.81 
 
Manager 98 31.61 
 
Technical 78 25.16 
 
Auditor 56 18.06 
 
Other 17 5.48 
 No response 12 3.87 
Years in the Food Industry 10 or fewer 130 41.94 
 
11-20 69 22.26 
 
21-30 58 18.71 
 
more than 30 26 8.39 
 No response 27 8.71 
Involvement with Food Standards Very involved 175 56.45 
 
Involved 86 27.74 
 
Partially Involved 36 11.61 
 
Little involved 8 2.58 
 
Not involved 5 1.61 
 No response 0 0 
Country of Birth (by Region)  Africa 31 10.00 
 
Asia 26 8.39 
 
Australasia 13 4.19 
 
Central and South America 46 14.84 
 
Europe 158 50.97 
 
North America 27 8.71 
 No response 9 2.90 
Source: Author's elaboration 
    
In order to have an economic and cultural perspective of the country of birth distribution, the 
different countries obtained from the survey were grouped according to the classification 
given by the International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook Report, October 200934 
which divides countries by their economic situation and another categorization was built up 
based on the languages spoken in each of the countries. 
                                                 
34
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/groups.htm#oem  
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Source: Author’s Elaboration 
Figure 6:  Country-of-birth distribution according to economic group  
 
The first pie diagramme above (Figure 6) shows the country-of-birth distribution according to 
the economic groups. Here we can observe that countries are almost evenly distributed among 
the different groups. Nevertheless, 29% of respondents belonging to the group of advanced 
economies are distributed only in 6 countries including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America. The group of major advanced economies 
contains 33% of the net sample and includes 22 countries such as the Netherlands, Australia, 
Spain as well as new growing economies like Taiwan, Singapore or the Czech Republic. 32 
developing countries were the country of birth of 35% of the respondents, of which Egypt and 
Brazil had the highest number of respondents. (For more information see Annex 2).  
 
The second pie diagramme below (Figure 7) shows the country of birth distribution according 
to language groups. 30% of the respondents were born in an English-speaking countries, 28% 
of the respondent’s mother tongue is of Latin origin (Spanish, French, Portuguese and Italian), 
22% are from countries with Germanic languages (including about 8 different European 
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languages), 7% speak an Asian language and 6% speak Arabic. 4% speak other languages 
including Greek, Turkish, Russian, etc. (for more information see Annex 4). 









Source: Author’s Elaboration 
Figure 7:  Country of birth distribution according to language  
 
5.1.2 Company Characteristics 
Table 2 illustrates the professional backgrounds of the respondents from different sorts of 
companies, with different business types, covering not only activities at different stages of the 
food supply chain (from supplying to retailing) but also includes various service providers, 
developing agencies (private and public), input suppliers, researchers etc. The largest group of 
respondents work in service supplier companies (46.1%) that offer services like certification, 
laboratory analysis, food safety consultancy, accreditation, etc. A second group of 
respondents (42.9%)  represent food supply chain agents and are distributed as follows: 
Retailer/food Service (8.7%), Manufacturer/Packer (9.7%), Trader (11.9%) and Food Supplier 
(12.6%). A third group of respondents (9%) work in companies dedicated to other activities in 
relation to the food industry, here the most representative are public/private development 
agencies (3.2%), input supplying companies (2.6%) and research organizations (1.9%). 
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In terms of annual sales, almost 70% of respondents indicated that they work in medium or 
small companies with an annual turnover that ranges between less than 1 million Euros up to 
less than 500 million Euros. Around 25% of the sample work in large companies where 
annual sales range between 500 million Euros to more than 1 billion Euros. Concerning the 
location of the companies’ headquarters, Table 2 also shows the distribution of the countries 
grouping the companies according to their geographical regions. Here more than half of the 
sample indicated that their headquarter location is a European country, meanwhile 12% of the 
respondents answered that they were located in a country in Central/ South America and 10% 
in North America. The rest of respondents (22%) said that the location of their headquarter 
office is either in Asia (9%), Australasia (6.8%) or Africa (6.5%). 
Table 2: Companies’ main features 
Variable Category Frequency % 
Business Type Retailer/Food Service 27 8.7 
 
Manufacturer/Packer 30 9.7 
 
Trader 37 11.9 
 
Food Supplier 39 12.6 
 
Service Provider 143 46.1 
 
Input Supplier 8 2.6 
 
Public/Private Agencies 10 3.2 
 
Research Organization 6 1.9 
  Other 4 1.3 
Annual Sales (EUR) Less than 1 million 75 24.2 
 
1 million  to less 50 million 99 31.9 
 
50 million to less 100 million 39 12.6 
 
100 million to less 500 million 19 6.1 
 
500 million to less 1 billion 14 4.5 
  1 billion or more 37 11.9 
Headquarters Location (Region) Africa 20 6.5 
 
Asia 28 9.0 
 
Australasia 21 6.8 
 
Central and South America 38 12.3 
 
Europe 163 52.6 
  North America 32 10.3 
Source: Author's elaboration 
    
It should be noted that there is a strong correlation between the location of the company 
headquarters and the country of birth of the respondents (Pearson 0.575** at 0.001 
significance). Therefore we can assume that perceptions of respondents about food standards 
might not differ even though some of the respondents work outside their country of birth. 
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5.1.3 Certified Food Purchase 
Figure 8 illustrates the buyer’s demand of different food standards. In this figure the x axis 
shows the food standards demanded by the buyers while the y axis shows both the number of 
buyers demanding each one of the food standards (light blue bar) and the average percentage 
of the certified product purchased (red bars). For this question the survey has identified a total 
of 110 buyers, of which most demand several standard certifications at the same time. Out of 
these 110 buyers, 85 demand GLOBALG.A.P. in an average of 52% of their total product 
purchased. Likewise, 63 out of the 110 buyers demand ORGANIC products in an average of 
45% of their total purchase, and 42 buyers purchase FAIR TRADE products in an average of 
35% of total products purchase. RAIN FOREST ALLIANCE labelled food is demanded by 
33 buyers in an average of 36% of their total purchase. 51 buyers also demand BRC certified 
food, representing an average of 44% of their total product purchase. Meanwhile, 37 buyers 
also demand ISO 22000 certification for an average of 42% of their total food purchased and 
47 request IFS certifications representing in 38% of their total product purchase. SQF 2000 
standards is demanded by 30 buyers who on average represented 34% of the total purchase. 
Moreover, other standards like TESCO NATURE, FIELD TO FORK, HACCP etc, were also 



































Source: Author’s elaboration 
Figure 8: Demand by buyers of food standards 
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When buyers were asked about the reason why they require food standards from their 
suppliers, they give priority to satisfying customer demand and maintaining market access, 
followed by the ensuring due diligence and maintaining the company reputation. 
 
5.2 Construct Measurement 
In total, twelve variables were proposed in the theoretical model and presented to the 
respondents. The following section presents the results of the assessment of these constructs. 
To that end, mean () and standard deviation () are mixed with answers to open-ended 
questions (Annex 1), as well as further comments of the farmers, and information from the 
additional interviews, all in order to provide a valid explanation for the obtained results. 
 
5.2.1 Credibility of National Food Standards  
The credibility of national food standards was evaluated for eight different countries. The 
results show mean values ranging between 1.60 and 3.40 and standard deviation levels 
between 0.85 and 1.55 indicating a high variance of responses about the credibility of food 
standards in the different countries (Table 3). Overall we observe that food standards from 
developed countries have higher credibility than those from developing countries.  
                                                                                                                               
Table 3: Credibility of national food standards 









    1 2 3 4 5 
Country μ σ Frequency (%) 
Australia 1.77 0.91 23.9 51.0 12.6 2.9 0.3 
China 3.36 1.50 1.9 11.6 24.2 25.8 27.1 
Ghana 3.20 1.54 1.3 9.4 29.0 26.1 21.6 
India 3.01 1.46 2.3 12.3 32.9 26.5 13.9 
Italy 2.35 1.16 9.0 39.7 27.7 11.9 3.2 
Mexico 2.73 1.34 2.9 20.0 37.4 21.0 6.8 
United Kingdom 1.63 0.84 43.5 42.6 5.8 3.9 0.3 
United States 1.99 1.07 22.9 43.9 16.5 7.7 1.6 
Source: Online survey 2010       
 
The food standards in the United Kingdom appear to have the highest credibility (=1.63) 
where 43.5% of the respondents consider them very credible, followed by those from 
Australia (=1.77) and the United States (=1.99) and Italy (=2.35). Those food standards 
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from China were considered to be the less credible (=3.63); here the largest group of 
respondents (27.1%) considered that these standards are not credible.  On the other hand, 
countries like Mexico (=2.73), India (=3.01) and Ghana (=3.20) fall in an intermediate 
level of credibility. 
 
Table 4: Reliability of national certification systems 







    1 2 3 4 5 
Country μ σ Frequency (%) 
Australia 1.44 0.93 49.7 25.5 11.6 1.3 0.6 
China 3.11 1.64 3.9 13.2 22.9 22.3 24.5 
Ghana 3.00 1.54 3.5 11.0 32.3 22.6 17.4 
India 2.83 1.49 4.2 16.5 31.3 22.6 12.3 
Italy 2.02 1.24 22.6 31.0 24.2 6.8 3.5 
Mexico 2.53 1.45 6.1 20.6 32.9 17.7 7.1 
United Kingdom 1.31 0.80 63.5 20.0 6.5 1.6 0.3 
United States 1.63 1.13 43.5 24.5 14.2 4.2 2.3 
Source: Online survey 2010       
 
 
Moreover, the reliability of national certification systems in the eight countries was also 
evaluated. The results show mean values ranging between 1.30 and 3.10 and standard 
deviation levels between 0.80 and 1.65, indicating a high variance of responses about the 
reliability of certification systems in the different countries (Table 4). Overall, we observe 
that certification systems from developed countries have higher reliability than those from 
developing countries. The certification systems of the United Kingdom appear to have the 
highest reliability (=1.31) where 63.5% of the respondents consider them very reliable, 
followed by those from Australia (=1.44), the United States (=1.63) and Italy (=2.02). 
Those certification systems from China were considered to be the least reliable (=3.11); here 
the largest group of respondents, 24.5%, considered that these standards are unreliable.  On 
the other hand, countries like Mexico (=2.53), India (=2.83) and Ghana (=3.00) were 
most frequently ranked intermediate (neither/nor). 
 
Furthermore, the confidence in national standard setting of the eight countries was evaluated. 
The results show mean values ranging between 1.40 and 3.05 and standard deviation levels 
between 0.85 and 1.60 indicating a high variance of responses about the confidence in the 
standard setting process in the different countries (Table 5). Overall we observe that there 
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Table 5: Confidence in national standard setting 








I have slight 
no 
confidence 
I have no 
confidence 
      1 2 3 4 5 
Country μ σ Frequency (%) 
Australia 1.48 .95 50.3 22.6 14.5 1.9 .3 
China 3.04 1.58 4.5 19.4 19.7 23.9 21.3 
Ghana 2.93 1.51 5.5 16.1 30.3 20.0 16.8 
India 2.75 1.41 5.5 23.5 29.7 20.0 10.6 
Italy 2.04 1.18 21.9 34.5 23.2 8.1 2.3 
Mexico 2.49 1.37 8.4 25.5 29.7 18.7 5.2 
United Kingdom 1.38 .86 60.6 20.6 8.4 2.3 .3 
United States 1.69 1.08 40.6 30.0 12.9 5.8 1.3 
Source: Online survey 2010       
 
is more confidence in the standard setting processes held in developed countries than those 
held in developing countries. The standard setting held in the United Kingdom appear to have 
the highest confidence (=1.38) where 60.6% of the respondents have confidence, followed 
by those held in Australia (=1.48), the United States (=1.69) and Italy (=2.04). The largest 
group of respondents (23.9%) also had slight /no confidence on the standard setting process in 
China (=3.11).  On the other hand, respondents considered having intermediate confidence 
in the standard setting process held in countries like Mexico (=2.49), India (=2.75) and 
Ghana (=2.93). 
 
5.2.2 Credibility Improvement through Benchmarking Systems 
Respondents’ opinions were evaluated on how likely it would be that the credibility of the 
food standards of the eight countries could be improved if they would become benchmarked 
under the benchmark systems offered by GFSI and GLOBALG.A.P. The results show mean 
values ranging between 1.90 and 2.15 and standard deviation levels between 1.14 and 1.40, 
indicating a high variance of responses about this specific issue (Table 5). Overall, it seems 
that adopting a benchmark system would be likely to improve the credibility of the national 
food standards. In fact, Italy (=1.90) was noted to have greater benefit from the benchmark 
outcome where 45% of the respondents expected that an improvement in credibility would be 
likely. On other hand, China appears to be slightly less likely to improve credibility of their 
food standards (=1.38) than the rest of the countries whose credibility is shown to improve 
in a more even tendency. 
  




Table 6: Likelihood of credibility improvement through benchmark systems 







      1 2 3 4 5 
Country μ σ Frequency (%) 
Australia 1.97 1.21 23.5 34.8 18.4 9.4 2.3 
China 2.15 1.39 23.5 29.0 15.5 14.8 5.5 
Ghana 2.04 1.32 24.5 30.6 15.8 13.5 3.2 
India 2.07 1.27 22.6 35.5 15.5 12.3 3.5 
Italy 1.90 1.14 21.0 45.2 12.3 7.7 2.3 
Mexico 1.96 1.23 23.9 34.2 18.7 8.4 2.9 
United Kingdom 1.98 1.22 26.5 32.9 17.4 10.6 2.3 
United States 1.98 1.18 23.2 36.8 18.1 9.4 1.9 
Source: Online survey 2010       
 
5.2.3 Expectations about Credibility of Food Standards 
The expectations about credibility of food standards was evaluated using the concepts of 
reliability, confidence, and trustworthiness towards different credibility sources such as food 
standards effectiveness; audit rules, information and economic development; standard 
requirements, governance structure and stakeholder trust.  
 
The food standards effectiveness was measured with statements concerning the expectation of 
the general reliability among food standards to more specific aspects such as the effectiveness 
of food standards in minimizing food safety risks and environmental impact. The results show 
mean values ranging between 2.02 and 3.37 with high levels of standard deviation ranging 
from 0.83 to 1.19, indicating high variance of opinions about the expectations on the 
effectiveness of food standards (Table 7). While 37.1% of the respondents disagree that most 
food standards have the same level of reliability, 25.2% agreed with this statement. Around 
half of the respondents believed in the effectiveness of food standards. 60% of the 
respondents agreed that food standards are reliable in minimizing food safety risks and 50% 
thought that food standards can help to minimize environmental impacts. 
In the case of the reliability of the audit rules, means varied from 1.90 and 3.60. The levels of 
standard deviation are high, indicating that contrasting opinions are held on this topic (Table 
8). In the first place, it seems that the type of certification implemented in the food standard 
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Table 7: Results of the statements assessing the reliability of the food standards effectiveness 
      
I 
strongly 
agree I agree 
Neither / 
nor I disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Statements μ σ Frequency (%) 
Most food standards have the same 
level of reliability  
3.25 1.19 4.5 25.2 18.4 37.1 13.2 
Food standards are reliable in 
minimizing food safety risks  
2.02 0.83 21.9 59.4 11.0 5.8 1.0 
Food standards cannot help to 
minimize environmental impacts 
3.37 1.12 6.1 17.1 16.1 50.0 9.7 
Source: Online survey 2010        
 
would not make it more or less reliable, but looking closely at the data it seems that individual 
certification is preferred over group certification. While clearly more than half of the 
respondents considered that individual certification requirements make food standards more 
credible, they are divided in 30% agreement and disagreement when asked if group 
certification makes food standards less reliable. Secondly, the data shows that food standard 
audits are considered to be more reliable when they are required in a higher frequency. On the 
one hand, more than half of the respondents agreed with the statement that food standards are 
more reliable when they require annual inspections of producers.  
 
Table 8: Results of the statements assessing the reliability of  audit rules 
      
I 
strongly 
agree I agree 
Neither / 
nor I disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Statements μ Σ Frequency (%) 
Food standards are more credible 
when they require an  audit of each 
individual producer 
2.16 1.13 30.6 41.6 8.4 16.1 2.6 
Certification of producers groups 
makes food standards less reliable 
3.03 1.20 10.0 29.0 18.1 32.6 10.0 
A food standard is more reliable 
when it requires producers to be 
inspected every year.   
1.93 1.04 37.1 42.9 7.7 8.1 2.9 
I do not have a problem if food 
standards require producers to be 
inspected every 3 years.    
3.57 1.28 7.7 17.4 7.7 41.3 25.2 
I prefer food standards that require at 
least one announced audit of 
producers per year. 
2.13 1.03 26.5 46.1 13.5 10.6 2.3 
I would still have confidence in food 
standards that do not require 
announced audits of producers.    
3.24 1.27 6.5 27.1 13.5 35.2 16.5 
Source: Online survey 2010        
 
On the other hand, another 65% of the sample were shown to have a problem when food 
standards required inspections of producers every 3 years. Furthermore, respondents also 
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showed high preference for the implementation of audit requirements: more than 70% agreed 
to this statement and nearly 50% stated that they would not have confidence in food standards 
that do not require announced audits. 
 
Concerning the answers referring to reliability of the audit information, the means varied from 
1.55 to almost 4.00, and the levels of standard deviations ranged from 0.75 up to nearly 1.20 
demonstrating the existence of less consensus towards some statements than others (Table 9). 
Despite the fact that there is the indication that most respondents (around 70%) believe the 
information provided by food standards, they considered it necessary that this information 
should always be precise and accurate. These positions are reflected when more than 65% 
disagree with the statement that it is not necessary to have precise information about the 
certified area; and also when almost 75% of the respondents agreed they do not rely on 
certification systems that cannot provide accurate information about the certified products.  
Table 9: Results of the statements assessing the reliability of the audit information 
      
I 
strongly 
agree I agree 
Neither / 
nor I disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Statement μ σ Frequency (%) 
I believe in the information provided 
by food standards (e.g. current 
certification status of products)  
2.20 1.17 13.5 59.4 19.0 6.5 1.0 
It is not necessary to have the precise 
information about the area of a 
certified farm   
3.65 1.18 4.2 17.1 11.0 42.3 24.8 
I do not  rely on food certification 
systems which cannot provide 
accurate information about the 
certified products    
2.08 0.99 25.8 49.0 11.3 11.0 1.3 
Food standards which cannot trace 
products back into the supply chain 
are not trustworthy    
1.87 0.97 39.0 42.9 8.4 6.8 1.9 
It should be always possible to 
identify the origin of the certified 
products    
1.55 0.74 53.2 39.0 3.5 2.9 .3 
I have confidence that certified 
products are not mixed with non 
certified products  
2.91 1.13 9.4 31.3 24.5 27.1 7.4 
A credible food certification system 
does not have to provide full 
traceability  
3.99 1.08 3.9 8.1 4.8 48.4 34.2 
Source: Online survey 2010        
 
Moreover, despite the fact that many respondents have confidence in the segregation between 
certified products and non certified products (around 40%) there appears to be an  lack of 
consensus since the same proportion of respondents did not have confidence in the 
segregation of products. The latter position could be corroborated when nearly 90% of the 
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respondents agreed that it should always be possible to identify the origin of the certified 
product and another 90% considered that in order to be a credible food certification system 
this should provide full traceability. 
 
With respect to the confidence in the degree of economic development, the means varied from 
2.70 to almost 3.40, with high standard deviation levels indicating variance of options towards 
the several statements (Table 10).  In first place, there is a higher confidence in certification 
systems from developed countries than those from developing countries. This is also reflected 
in the greater confidence that respondents demonstrated for certified food coming from 
developed countries than those coming from developing countries. In this respect, around 
40% of the sample disagree that certified food products coming from developing countries are 
more trustworthy than similar products available in developed countries; and almost 50% 
recommended buying certified food products from developed countries rather than from 
developing countries.  
 
Table 10: Results of the statements assessing the confidence in degree of economic development 
      
I 
strongly 
agree I agree 
Neither / 
nor I disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Statement μ σ Frequency (%) 
Food certification systems 
established in developed countries 
are always carefully designed by 
trustworthy technical experts 
2.81 1.11 8.1 32.3 29.7 22.3 6.1 
Certified food products coming from 
developing countries are more 
trustworthy than similar products 
available in developed countries 
3.30 1.02 3.9 15.8 31.6 39.4 8.4 
Whenever possible, I would 
recommend buying certified food 
products from developed countries 
2.70 1.23 14.5 32.9 22.9 19.4 8.7 
Auditors in developed countries are 
more reliable than auditors in 
developing countries  
3.11 1.26 9.4 22.9 21.6 31.3 13.2 
I have less confidence in certification 
bodies in developing countries than 
those in developed countries 
2.83 1.22 11.3 34.8 19.4 24.2 9.4 
I would not suggest buying food 
products certified by a food standard 
of a developing country   
3.39 1.13 3.9 12.3 26.5 42.9 11.9 
Source: Online survey 2010        
 
On the other hand, 46% of the respondents showed they have less confidence in certification 
bodies from developing countries than those from developed countries. However, another 
45% disagree that auditors in developed countries are more reliable than auditors from 
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developing countries. Except for the latter, the results confirms the cultural affinity of the 
sample towards developed countries than to developing countries (Berkley and Nes, 1982)  
 
Regarding the reliability of standard requirements, survey results show that the means range 
from 2.07 to 3.65, with high standard deviation levels indicating variance of options towards 
the several statements (Table 11).  In first place, it seems that there is no significant consensus 
about the coverage of the food standards requirements along the supply chain since there are 
similar proportions of respondents (29%) who agree and disagree that food standards that are 
focused on a single stage of the supply chain are trustworthy. But, on the other hand, there is 
clear disagreement when more than 50% of the sample consider those food standards 
covering a wide range of the supply chain unreliable. A similar situation occurs when we 
observe that respondents are equally divided when they asked about the specificity of the type 
of requirements in food standards. Again proportions between disagreement and agreement  
 
Table 11: Results of the statements assessing the reliability of the standard requirements 
      
I 
strongly 
agree I agree 
Neither / 
nor I disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Statement μ σ Frequency (%) 
Food standards that focus on one 
single stage of the supply chain (e.g. 
pre or post farm) are trustworthy   
2.82 1.14 8.7 29.7 26.1 28.7 4.2 
Food standards that cover a wide 
range of the supply chain (e.g. pre 
and post farm) are not reliable 
3.50 1.16 5.5 10.6 17.1 50.6 13.9 
Food standards are more reliable 
when they are focused on only one 
type of requirements (e.g. food 
safety)   
2.86 1.24 12.9 26.1 20.6 31.6 6.5 
Credible food standards will not 
integrate food safety, environment 
and social requirements  
2.24 1.22 29.0 35.8 12.9 15.2 4.8 
Food standards which could have 
several interpretations among 
auditors are reliable  
3.65 1.19 2.6 14.5 12.6 44.2 23.9 
Food standards are more credible 
when they can be adopted in 
different local conditions  
2.07 1.00 23.5 51.9 9.0 11.6 1.3 
Source: Online survey 2010        
 
appear the same about considering a food standard more reliable when it is focused on only 
one specific type of requirement.  On the other hand, there are expectations among 60% of the 
respondents that credible food standards can integrate different types of requirements. 
However, more than 50% of the respondents considered that reliable food standards should 
not have several interpretations and should be able to be adopted in different local conditions. 
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Furthermore, results about the confidence in the type of governance structure leading food 
standards show means ranging from about 2.20 to nearly 3.70, with high standard deviation 
levels indicating high variance among responses towards the several statements (Table 12).  
Respondents have significant confidence in food standards that are developed by producer 
organizations, international organizations and certification bodies, and the majority of the 
respondents disagree that governments should be the only responsible agent in establishing 
food standards, and that NGOs are the right organizations to develop standards. 
 
Table 12: Results of the statements assessing confidence in governance structure 
      
I 
strongly 
agree I agree 
Neither / 
nor I disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Statement μ σ Frequency (%) 
Governments should be the only 
responsible parties in establishing food 
standards 
3.66 1.17 4.2 9.0 16.8 45.5 22.3 
I have confidence in food standards 
developed by producer organizations  
2.73 1.06 7.1 34.5 31.9 20.3 3.9 
Food standards are more credible 
when they are developed by 
international organizations (e.g. ISO)  
2.23 1.11 23.9 41.0 18.4 11.0 3.5 
I have confidence in food standards 
developed by certification bodies 
(auditing companies)   
2.68 1.18 8.7 39.7 21.3 20.6 6.8 
Non Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) are the right organizations to 
develop food standards  
3.15 1.24 6.1 23.5 25.5 27.7 14.8 
Source: Online survey 2010        
 
Finally, results of the assessment about the influence of stakeholders experience show means 
ranging from about 1.90 to nearly 3.15, with standard deviations levels ranging between 1.00 
and 1.10 indicating variance among responses towards the various statements (Table 13).  In 
most statements, responses neither agreed or disagreed with suggesting buying certified 
products under very popular food standards or those that were very well advertised in the 
media. They strongly agreed that they will only recommend food standards which are based 
on 3
rd
 party certification, however, proving the relevance and importance of third party 
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Table 13: Results of the statements assessing the influence of stakeholder trust 
      
I 
strongly 
agree I agree 
Neither / 
nor I disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Statement μ σ Frequency (%) 
I would suggest buying certified fresh 
products under food standards that are 
well advertised in the media   
3.13 1.08 2.6 18.4 37.1 31.6 7.1 
I would advise others to have 
confidence in food standards that are 
very popular 
3.01 1.10 3.9 25.8 32.3 28.7 6.8 
I would not propose that others rely on 
food standards which I am not 
interested in    
3.15 1.09 2.9 17.4 34.8 34.8 6.8 
I would only recommend food 
standards which are based on 3rd 
party certification 
1.90 1.03 34.5 43.2 8.4 9.0 1.6 
Source: Online survey 2010        
 
5.3 Determinants of Credibility 
The determinants of credibility were identified through an exploratory factor analysis. 
Construct loading was examined for both dependent and independent variables. For the 
endogenous variables, the countries selected were separated into two groups, developed and 
developing countries, to analyze the factor loadings related to the overall credibility of 
national food standards. In the case of exogenous variables, the loadings of statements 
selected for each construct were analyzed. The reliability of the individual items was checked 
in each construct, and only items with loading above 0.5 were taken into account. On the 
other hand, the consistencies of the constructs were indicated by Cronbach’s alpha (CRA) 
values greater or equal to 0.6.  Furthermore, the average variance shared between the items 
and the construct was controlled by cumulative values higher than 0.5 of the average variance 
extracted (AVE), thus meaning that at least 50 percent of measurement variance is captured 
by the constructs (Chin, 1998). 
 
5.4 National Food Standards Credibility 
The results of the factor analysis carried out for the dependent variable proves that the overall 
credibility of  national food standards is composed of the credibility of the food standard, the 
reliability in the certification system and the confidence in the standard setting process. 
Loadings of the variables for each country can be seen in Annex 4.  In the case of  developing 
countries, the outcome of the factor analysis showed one construct that itself accounts for 
66% of the total variance. This construct is composed of 12 variables referring to the 
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credibility of the food standards, reliability on the certification system and confidence in the 
standard setting process for each one of the four developing countries (i.e. China, Ghana, 
India and Mexico). Also this construct showed a reliability consistency CRA of 0.95. In the 
case of the developed countries, 2 constructs resulted from the factor analysis. The first of 
these factors has a reliability CRA of 0.91; accounting for 40.3% of the total variance and 
included 9 variables related to the credibility of the food standards, reliability of the 
certification system and the confidence about the standard setting process for each one of the 
following countries: Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The second factor 
has a reliability CRA of 0.85; accounting for 24.4% of the total variance and included 3 
variables corresponding to the credibility of the food standards, the reliability on the 
certification system and the confidence about the standard setting process for just one country, 
in this case Italy. The curious issue is that we could not identify any scientific background 
that could explain this separation within the developed countries but it could be assumed that 
there is a cultural factor such as the locally spoken language and country’s media reputation 
that could be influencing these results (Beckley and Nes, 1982). These 3 constructs were 
called “Less Developed Countries (LDC)National Food Standards Credibility”, “Developed 
Countries (DC) National Food Standards Credibility” and “Italy’s National Food Standards 
Credibility” (see Table 14). In the factor analysis for the dependent variables factor, loadings 
for all statements were greater than 0.50, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value (KMO for developing 
countries  was 0.883 and for the developed countries 0.842. 
 
5.4.1 Indicators Associated with Food Standards Credibility 
For this study, a total of 40 statements were used to measure the perception of credibility. Out 
of these, only 22 statements were considered in the factor analysis with loadings above 0.50,. 
Moreover, a bivariate analysis showed no correlation between these factors, proving a 
complete degree of independency between the constructs. The KMO was 0.7, indicating 
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Table 14:  Results of the factor analysis for credibility of national food standards 
 
CONSTRUCT N° of Items CRA AVE (%) 
 LDC National Food Sandards 
Credibility  
12 0.953 66.1 
DC National Food Standards 
Credibility  
9 0.914 40.3 
Italy's National Food Standards 
Credibility 
3 0.855 24.4 




Table 15 shows the eight factors which resulted from the analysis, each one having an 
acceptable level of reliability and altogether amounting to 66% of the cumulative total 
variance explained.  A general name was given to describe the statements loaded in each 
factor. The following is a description of the meaning of each: 
 
Factor 1 – Certification Preference: The meaning of this factor is related to the respective 
reliability, confidence and preference showed for auditors, certification bodies and certified 
food in regard to the country’s degree of economic development. It reflects the respondents’ 
preferences towards certifications carried out in developed countries compare to those in 
developing countries. This factor shows an acceptable reliability with a Cronbach alpha value 
of 0.74 and  explains 9.49% of the cumulative variance. 
 
Factor 2 – Stakeholder Trust. The meaning of this construct is associated to the preference  
and confidence stakeholders may have towards standards that are well promoted or which are 
of interest for the stakeholder himself. This factor shows an acceptable internal consistency 
with a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.70 and explains 9.41% of the cumulative variance. 
 
Factor 3 – Standard Adoption: This factor refers to the preference of food standards adoption 
concerning the coverage of the standards within the supply chain (e.g. pre and/or post farm) 
and the credibility related to their adaptability in different regions and consistent 
interpretations. This factor has an acceptable reliability with a Cronbach alpha value of 0.64 
and a varince that explains 8.83% of the cumulative variance.  
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Factor 4 – Audit Frequency: This factor suggests that the reliability of food standards could 
also be subject to provide a higher frequency of audits. Higher audit frequencies (e.g. once 
yearly) are preferred over lower frequencies (e.g. every 3 years). This construct has a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.62 and explains 8.35% of the cumulative variance.  
 
Factor 5 – System Effectiveness: This factor is composed of statements related to the 
reliability of the compliance of food standards to objectives such as minimizing food safety 
risks and credibility of the information they provided concerning the certification status of the 
products. This construct has a Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.60 and represents 7.88% of the 
cummulative variance explained. 
Factor 6 – Information Gap: The meaning of this factor is related to the traceability and 
identification of certified products credibility perceptions are based on the fact how successful 
are food standards communicating the information associated to cetified products. The 
Cronbach value of this factor is 0.56 and thevariance explained is of 7.68% 
 
 
Factor 7 - Audit Type: This factor is associated to the preference of individual or group 
certification options. This factor has a CRA reliability of 0.72 and explains 7.57% of the total 
variance. The results in table 8 suggest that group certification may not make food standards 
less reliable, but also that there is a trend showing that individual certification could be a 
signal of higher credibility. 
 
Factor 8 – Standard Scope: This factor describes the coverage of the food standards regarding 
the content coverage or length of their requirements. It reflects the confidence towards specfic 
food standard requirements (e.g. to only cover food safety issues) over integrated food 
standard requirements (e.g. include  food safety, environmental and social requirements). This 
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Table 15:  Results of the factor analysis for food standard credibility indicators 
Factors /Staments Loadings 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Variance N° of Items 
Certification Preference         
Auditors in developed countries are 
more reliable than auditors in 
developing countries 
0.835 0.741 9.487 3 
Whenever possible, I would 
recommend to buy certified food 
products from developed countries 
0.757 
   
I have less confidence in certification 
bodies in developing countries than 
those in developed countries 
0.742 
   
Stakeholder Trust         
I would suggest buying certified fresh 
products under food standards that are 
well advertised in the media  
0.856 0.7 9.408 3 
I would advise others to have 
confidence in food standards that are 
very popular 
0.767   
  
  
I would not propose others to rely on 
food standards which I am not 
interested in   
0.66   
  
  
Standard Adoption         
Food standards that cover a wide range 
of the supply chain (e.g. pre and post 
farm) are not reliable 
0.742 0.642 8.834 4 
Food standards are more credible when 
they can be adopted in different local 
conditions 
0.703   
  
  
Food standards which could have 
several interpretations among auditors 
are reliable 
0.557   
  
  
Food standards that focus on one single 
stage of the supply chain (e.g. pre or 
post farm) are trustworthy   
0.551   
  
  
Audit Frequency         
A food standard is more reliable when 
it requires producers to be inspected 
every year  
0.802 0.618 8.348 3 
I do have a problem if food standards 
require producers to be inspected every 
3 years 
0.718   
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I prefer food standards that requires at 
least one unannounced audit to 
producers per year 




    
Food standards are reliable in 
minimizing food safety risks 
0.815 0.604 7.883 2 
I believe in the information provided 
by food standards (e.g. current 
certification status of products) 
0.791 
   
Information gap         
Food standards that cannot trace 
products back into the supply chain are 
not trustworthy   
0.766 0.556 7.682 3 
It should be always possible to identify 
the origin of the certified products   
0.676 
   
I do not  rely on food certification 
systems which cannot provide an 
accurate information about the certfied 
products   
0.675 
   
Audit Type 
    
Certification of producers groups 
makes food standards less reliable 
0.888 0.736 7.565 2 
Food standards are more credible when 
they require to audit each individual 
producer 
0.765 
   
Standard Scope 
    
Credible food standards should not 
integrate food safety, environment and 
social requirements 
0.81 0.5 6.756 2 
Food standards are more reliable when 
they are focused on only one type of 
requirements (e.g. food safety)  
0.726 
   
 
.  
5.4.2 Adoption of Benchmarking Signals by National Food Standards 
In addition, a factor analysis was carried out to determine the construct that could represent 
the implications of benchmarking signals on the credibility of food standards (see Table 16). 
The results of the analysis showed a KMO close to 0.9 and a cumulative variance explained 
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of 88%. Two constructs were extracted from the factor analysis. These represent the 
likelihood of improvement in credibility of the national food standards when they decide to go 
through a benchmarking system (either GFSI or GLOBALG.A.P.). The first factor includes 
single loadings over 0.5 from four developing country variables such as Ghana, China, India 
and Mexico. The reliability of this factor had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.94, implying its 
suitability for the analysis of this study.  
Table 16:  Results of the factor analysis for adoption of benchmarking signals by national food 
standards 
CONSTRUCT N° of Items Variables CRA 
Adoption of Benchmarking Signals by 
Developing Countries (LDC) 
4 
China,Ghana, 
India and Mexico 
0.94 
 
   
Adoption of Benchmarking Signals by 






Source: Author's elaboration 
   
 
The second factor includes single loadings over 0.50 of country variables representing 
developed countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
Cronbach’s alpha measurement of 0.95 corroborates the reliability of this factor. Both 
variables show a country of origin effect concerning cultural affinities associated to local 
language. Here we can observe that English-speaking countries are highly correlated and were 
gathered in one construct. These countries coincidently had higher credibility perception 
among stakeholders about their national food standards.  The second construct represents non 
English-speaking countries that coincidently obtained a lower rate of stakeholders’ credibility 
perception about their national food standards. It is important to note that the variable Italy 
was not considered in this analysis because cross loading appears under 0.50 in both 
constructs. These constructs will be considered as exogenous variables for our analysis. 
5.5 Resulting Model: Determinants of Credibility 
Using the results of the factor analysis we re-structured the empirical model as shown below 
in the Figure 9. Here the overall credibility of national food standards is a variable constructed 
by the three elements proposed in Hypothesis 2, i.e. Food Standards Credibility, Certification 
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System Reliability and Standard Setting Confidence. This variable represents the dependent 



















Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
 
Figure 9: Resulting empirical model 
Furthermore, the constructs affecting credibility of food standards  differs significantly from 
those hypothesized in the proposed model, while some constructs remain in the model (e.g. 
benchmarking signals, stakeholder trust), others were proved not to be part of the analysis 
(e.g. gorvenance structure, degree of economic developement).  As a result eight  constructs 
became   considered as exogenous variables that will be tested to explain the following re-
formulated hypothesis (RH): 
 
RH0: There is no significant relationship between an exogenous variable and the dependent 
variable (applies for all) 
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RH2: The higher the confidence in the audit type, the higher the credibility of national food 
standards. 
 
RH3: The higher audit frequency, the higher the credibility of  national food standards. 
 
RH4: The more specific the standard scope, the higher the credibility of national food 
standards. 
 
RH5: The higher the reliability of the standard adoption, the higher the credibility of  national 
food standards. 
 
RH6: The adoption of benchmarking signals improves the credibility of  national food 
standards. 
 
RH7: The higher the reliability of the system effectiveness, the higher credibility of national 
food standards. 
 
RH8: The smaller the information gap, the higher the credibility of national food standards. 
 
RH9: The higher the reliability of food standards effectiveness, the higher the credibility of 
national schemes. 
5.6 Sources of Credibility Influencing National Food Standards 
Table 17 shows the relationship between the dependent variable  “the credibility of national 
food standards of developing countries” and the independent variables (extracted factors and 
individual statements). These results were obtained by performing a linear regression 
analysis, using the Stepwise method.  Here we observed a significantly positive influence of 
“Certification Affinity”, “System Effectiveness” and “Benchmarking Signals LDC”, but the 
R
2
 value of the regression was 0.26, indicating that these factors could altogether explain only 
26% of the credibility of the national food standard in countries such as Mexico, China, 
Ghana and India.   
 
The beta values indicate the way these sources affect the credibility of national food 
standards. Table 17 shows that there is an inverse relationship between “certification affinity” 
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and “LDC national food standards credibility” (ß= -0.135, p= 0.007). This reflects the higher 
confidence respondents have in the certification practices in developed countries, hence 
negatively affecting the credibility of LDC national food standards. In this case, RH1 is 
rejected. This once again confirms Barrets et al. (2009) assumption about the disadvantages of 
certification bodies in LDC, explained this time by the lack of auditor expertise and local 
certification capacity. 
 
Table 17:  Sources of credibility affecting food standards in developing countries (LDC) 





** -0.135 -2.709 0.007 
System Effectiveness
1
** 0.131 2.626 0.009 




0.437 8.709 0.000 
1
Scale from 1 = Strongly Agree to 5 = Strongly Disagree 
2
Scale from 1= extremely likely to 5= 
extremely unlikely, R² = 0.26; F = 11.73**.     *** = p < 0.001 ** = p < 0.01 * = p < 0.05 
Dependent variable = LDC National Food Standards Credibility  
Independent variables:  Certification Affinity, Stakeholder Trust, Standard Adoption, Audit 
Frequency, System Effectiveness, Information Gap, Standard Scope, Audit Type, Adoption of 
Benchmarking Signals by Developing Countries 
 
On the other hand, the regression shows that there is a direct relationship between “System 
effectiveness” and the LDC national food standards credibility (ß= 0.131, p= 0.009). This 
confirms RH7, implying that the higher the reliability of the standard effectiveness in 
preventing food safety (or any other food hazard), the better the perception will be of the 
overall credibility of national food standards. Finally, the third variable that has the strongest 
influence is “the adoption of benchmarking signals” which has a positive relationship with the 
LDC national food standards credibility (ß= 0.437, p= 0.000).  This result confirms RH6, 
implying that the adoption of benchmarking signals may improve the credibility of national 
food standards. For all other variables, RH0 applies. 
 
Next, Table 18 shows the relationship between the dependent variable  “DC National Food 
Standards credibility” and the independent variables (extracted factors and individual 
statements). These results were obtained by performing a linear regression analysis, using the 
Stepwise method.  Here we observe that there is a significant influence of “Audit Frequency”, 
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“System Effectiveness” and “Benchmarking Signals DC” but the R2 value of the regression 
was of only 0.11, indicating that these factors only could altogether explain 11% of the 
credibility of the national food standard in countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia 
and the United States. 
 
Table 18:  Sources of credibility affecting food standards in developed countries (DC) 
Independent Variables Beta value 
T 
p Value 
Audit Frequency1** 0.155 2.821 0.005 
System Effectiveness1** 0.177 3.19 0.002 
Adoption of Benchmarking Signals 
by Developed Countries 2**  
0.164 2.795 0.006 
1
Scale from 1 = Strongly Agree to 5 = Strongly Disagree 
2
Scale from 1= extremely likely to 5= 
extremely unlikely, R² = 0.11; F = 4.00.      *** = p < 0.001 ** = p < 0.01 * = p < 0.05 
Dependent variable = DC National Food Standards Credibility 
Independent variables:  Certification Affinity, Stakeholder Trust, Standard Adoption, Audit 
Frequency, System Effectiveness, Information Gap, Standard Scope, Audit Type, Adoption of 
Benchmarking Systems by Developed Countries 
 
 
The beta values indicate the way these sources affect the credibility of national food 
standards. From Table 18 we observe that there is a significant direct relationship between 
“Audit Frequency” and “DC national food standards credibility” (ß= 0.155, p=0,005). This 
confirms RH3, implying that a higher audit frequency requirement has positive effects on the 
overall credibility of national food standards. Although higher audit frequency is desired, an 
increase in costs for the auditees is undesirable, especially if these are delivered to third party 
agents. Most national standards in DC require a minimum frequency of 12 months between 
audits. 
 
Furthermore, the regression shows that there is a direct relationship between “System 
effectiveness” and the credibility of DC national food standards (ß= 0.177, p= 0,002). This 
confirms RH7, implying that a high reliability on the standard effectiveness in assuring food 
safety (or preventing any other food hazard), the better the perception will be of the overall 
credibility of national food standards. In the case of DC food standards, this variable has 
higher significant effects on the overall credibility, indicating that this variable might have a 
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strong influence on the perception about these food standards. Finally, although there is an 
influence of “the adoption of benchmarking signals” on the credibility of LDC national food 
standards (ß= 0.437, p= 0.000) this is not as strong as for developing countries. However, this 
result also confirms RH6, implying that the adoption of benchmarking signals may improve 



















6 Conclusions  
This research demonstrates that industrial products such as national food standards are also 
affected by country-of-origin effects and at the same time, this can be significantly diminished 
by implementing benchmarking signals such as GFSI and /or GLOBALG.A.P. endorsements. 
This type of harmonization strategy is recommended mainly for national standard owners 
from developing countries as an initial step towards improving their credibility and to reduce 
negative cultural perceptions prompted by the disclosure of country-of-origin labels. 
However, 100% credibility is not automatically gained since the contribution of 
benchmarking signals seems to be significantly low. In that sense, further marketing strategies 
using other credibility sources need to be explored.  
 
This research has also contributed to developing a model tool to explain (in an empirical way) 
which factors can be associated with improving the credibility of national food standards and 
what the effects these factors have on it. Although this model will require improvement, based 
on the results presented here standard owners should pay attention to their “system 
effectiveness” i.e. to enforce communication about achievements concerning the quality and 
safety aspects they intend to ensure. For example, in the case of food safety assurance 
programs the periodical progress in the reduction of the detection of food hazards should be 
published. In addition, developing countries should pay attention to improving their 
certification and metric infrastructure as well as building human capacity in order to increase 
the credibility of their national food standards assurance. In this case, efficiency can be 
obtained through encouraging the establishment of credible services such as certification, 
laboratory tests and local assurance know-how.  
 
On the other hand, national food standards from developed countries like the UK, Australia 
and the US seem to have reached a higher level of confidence. However, we could not 
confirm from this research if this is due to their technical expertise or it is just the perception 
that on average high production costs are associated with higher quality delivery as suggested 
Barret et al. (2002) Haucap and Barmbold (1997) and Chiang and Mansson (1988). It is 
important to note that the existence of a significant influence of benchmarking signals on the 
credibility of national food standards from developed countries is an indication that they still 
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have room for improving their credibility already achieved. This might not necessary imply  
forcing them into strict multi-stakeholder platform requirements, but might serve as a way to 
build up synergies for other standard owners to share and update their own know-how in 
assurance and standards developing management. 
 
Notwithstanding the achievements of the multivariate analysis, I consider it important to 
highlight the trends that the factor and univariate analyses disclosed. On the one hand, the 
effects of the rest of the variables detected should not be neglected, especially those 
concerning the “information gap” and the “Standard Adoption”. Although these variables do 
not appear to have an influence on the credibility of national food standards, I still believe that 
the practice of providing more information about what is behind a certificate could probably 
improve the understanding of the objectives of the food standards. Transparent access to data 
associated with certified products may help to analyze the real impact on food assurance as 
well as supporting food producers and manufactures to differentiate in the market and reduce 
the “lemons” effect. In this way, they could spark stronger motivation to take more 
responsibility in preventing negative impacts associated with food production. In other words, 
improving the credibility of national food standards implies also the improvement of the 
acceptability  not only from the demand side but also from the implementation side. 
 
Finally, it is important to recognize that the results of this research are not conclusive, and due 
to the characteristics of the sample, there might be bias on particular aggregated answers. 
Although here we attempt to demonstrate an overall impression within the global arena,  
further investigations should corroborate the stakeholders’ perceptions about national food 
standards credibility in restricted geographical locations, in order to attain more practical 
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Annex 2: Distribution of Country of Birth by Region 
LATIN AMERICA  
 Frequency % 
Argentina 6 1.9 
Brazil 8 2.6 
Chile 7 2.3 
Colombia 6 1.9 
Costa Rica 1 0.3 
Ecuador 6 1.9 
Guatemala 1 0.3 
Mexico 2 0.6 
Paraguay 1 0.3 
Peru 3 1 
Uruguay 5 1.6 
 46 14.7 
   
EUROPE   
 Frequency % 
Austria 5 1.6 
Belgium 2 0.6 
Czech Republic 1 0.3 
Cyprus 1 0.3 
Denmark 1 0.3 
Faroe Islands 1 0.3 
Finland 2 0.6 
France 9 2.9 
Germany 30 9.7 
Greece 1 0.3 
Ireland 2 0.6 
Italy 9 2.9 
Luxembourg 1 0.3 
Malta 1 0.3 
Norway 3 1 
Poland 1 0.3 
Portugal 4 1.3 
Russia 1 0.3 
Serbia 2 0.6 
Slovakia 1 0.3 
Spain 17 5.5 
Suriname 1 0.3 
Sweden 2 0.6 
Switzerland 5 1.6 
Netherlands 23 7.4 
Turkey 5 1.6 
United Kingdom 27 8.7 
 158 48.9 
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AUSTRALASIA   
 Frequency % 
Australia 10 3.2 
New Zealand 3 1 
 13 4.2 
  
NORTH AMERICA  
 Frequency % 
Canada 5 1.6 
United States 22 7.1 
 27 8.7 
   
AFRICA   
 Frequency % 
Algeria 1 0.3 
Cameroon 1 0.3 
Egypt 11 3.5 
Ghana 5 1.6 
Kenya 5 1.6 
Libya 1 0.3 
Morocco 1 0.3 
South Africa 6 1.9 
 31 9.8 
ASIAN   
 Frequency % 
China 4 1.3 
India 6 1.9 
Indonesia 1 0.3 
Palestine 1 0.3 
Pakistan 2 0.6 
Singapore 1 0.3 
Syria 1 0.3 
Taiwan 2 0.6 
Thailand 3 1 
Vietnam 5 1.6 
 26 8.2 
   
   
Missing 9 2.9 
TOTAL 310 100 
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Annex 3: Distribution of Country of Birth by Economic Group 
MAJOR ADVANCED ECONOMIES  
 Frequency % 
Canada 5 1.6 
France 9 2.9 
Germany 30 9.7 
Italy 9 2.9 
United Kingdom 27 8.7 
United States 22 7.1 
n=6 countries 102 32.9 
   
ADVANCED ECONOMIES   
 Frequency % 
Australia 10 3.2 
Austria 5 1.6 
Belgium 2 0.6 
Cyprus 1 0.3 
Czech Republic 1 0.3 
Denmark 1 0.3 
Faroe Islands 1 0.3 
Finland 2 0.6 
Greece 1 0.3 
Ireland 2 0.6 
Luxembourg 1 0.3 
Malta 1 0.3 
New Zealand 3 1 
Norway 3 1 
Portugal 4 1.3 
Singapore 1 0.3 
Slovakia 1 0.3 
Spain 17 5.5 
Sweden 2 0.6 
Switzerland 5 1.6 
Taiwan 2 0.6 
Netherlands 23 7.4 
n=22 countries 89 28.3 
   
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES   
 Frequency % 
Algeria 1 0.3 
Argentina 6 1.9 
Brazil 8 2.6 
Cameroon 1 0.3 
Chile 7 2.3 
China 4 1.3 
Colombia 6 1.9 
Costa Rica 1 0.3 
Ecuador 6 1.9 
Egypt 11 3.5 
Ghana 5 1.6 
Guatemala 1 0.3 
India 6 1.9 
Indonesia 1 0.3 
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Kenya 5 1.6 
Libya 1 0.3 
Mexico 2 0.6 
Morocco 1 0.3 
Pakistan 2 0.6 
Palestine 1 0.3 
Paraguay 1 0.3 
Peru 3 1 
Poland 1 0.3 
Russia 1 0.3 
Serbia 2 0.6 
South Africa 6 1.9 
Suriname 1 0.3 
Syria 1 0.3 
Thailand 3 1 
Turkey 5 1.6 
Uruguay 5 1.6 
Vietnam 5 1.6 
n=32 countries 110 34.9 
   
Missing values 9 2.9 
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Annex 4: Distribution of Country of Birth by Language Group 
LATIN   
 Frequency % 
Argentina 6 1.9 
Belgium 2 0.6 
Brazil 8 2.6 
Chile 7 2.3 
Colombia 6 1.9 
Costa Rica 1 0.3 
Ecuador 6 1.9 
France 9 2.9 
Guatemala 1 0.3 
Italy 9 2.9 
Mexico 2 0.6 
Paraguay 1 0.3 
Peru 3 1 
Portugal 4 1.3 
Spain 17 5.5 
Uruguay 5 1.6 
 87 27.9 
   
ENGLISH   
 Frequency % 
Australia 10 3.2 
Cameroon 1 0.3 
Canada 5 1.6 
Ghana 5 1.6 
India 6 1.9 
Ireland 2 0.6 
Kenya 5 1.6 
Malta 1 0.3 
New Zealand 3 1 
Pakistan 2 0.6 
South Africa 6 1.9 
United Kingdom 27 8.7 
United States 22 7.1 
 95 30.4 
   
GERMANIC   
 Frequency % 
Austria 5 1.6 
Denmark 1 0.3 
Faroe Islands 1 0.3 
Finland 2 0.6 
Germany 30 9.7 
Luxembourg 1 0.3 
Norway 3 1 
Netherlands 23 7.4 
Suriname 1 0.3 
Sweden 2 0.6 
 69 22.1 
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ARABIC   
 Frequency % 
Algeria 1 0.3 
Egypt 11 3.5 
Libya 1 0.3 
Morocco 1 0.3 
Palestine 1 0.3 
Syria 1 0.3 
 16 5 
   
ASIAN   
 Frequency % 
China 4 1.3 
Indonesia 1 0.3 
Singapore 1 0.3 
Taiwan 2 0.6 
Thailand 3 1 
Turkey 5 1.6 
Vietnam 5 1.6 
 21 6.7 
   
OTHERS   
 Frequency % 
Cyprus 1 0.3 
Czech Republic 1 0.3 
Greece 1 0.3 
Poland 1 0.3 
Serbia 2 0.6 
Slovakia 1 0.3 
Russia 1 0.3 
Turkey 5 1.6 
 13 4 
   
Missing 9 2.9 
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Annex 5:  Factor Analysis of Credibility of National Food Standards 
1. Credibility of National Food Sandards from Developing Countries 
      Component   
   LDC KMO 
 CertGhana 0.86 0.883 
 CertMexico 0.859   
 CertChina 0.835   
 CertIndia 0.835   
 StandGhana 0.83   
 StandChina 0.824   
 StandMexico 0.82   
 StandIndia 0.818   
 CredMexico 0.796   
 CredGhana 0.762   
 CredIndia 0.755   
 CredChina 0.754   
 AVE (%) 66.1 
  CRA 0.953 
  N° of Items 12 
   
2. Credibility of National Food Standards from Developed Countries 
      Componenst   
  English Italian KMO 
CertUnited Kingdom 0.811   0.842 
StandUnited Kingdom 0.8     
StandAustralia 0.765     
CertAustralia 0.757     
StandUnited States 0.692     
CertUnited States 0.684     
CredAustralia 0.664     
CredUnited Kingdom 0.635     
CredUnited States 0.587     
CredItaly   0.841   
StandItaly   0.817   
CertItaly   0.812   
AVE (%) 40.3 24.4   
CRA 0.914 0.855   
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Annex 6: Factor Analysis for Adoption of Benchmarking Systems by National Food 
Standards 
 
Factors /Staments Loadings 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N°of Items Variance 
Benchmarking Developing Countries         
Ghana    0.919 0.941 4 47.955 
China    0.892       
India    0.886       
Mexico   0.852       
Benchmarking Developed Countries         
United Kingdom   0.94 0.951 3 40.06 
Australia    0.917       
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Annex 7: Frequencies results from online questionnaire. 










1 3 1.0 1.0 1.0 
2 5 1.6 1.6 2.6 
3 11 3.5 3.5 6.1 
4 4 1.3 1.3 7.4 
5 12 3.9 3.9 11.3 
6 16 5.2 5.2 16.5 
7 19 6.1 6.1 22.6 
8 10 3.2 3.2 25.8 
9 7 2.3 2.3 28.1 
10 43 13.9 13.9 41.9 
11 8 2.6 2.6 44.5 
12 17 5.5 5.5 50.0 
13 3 1.0 1.0 51.0 
14 10 3.2 3.2 54.2 
15 25 8.1 8.1 62.3 
16 2 0.6 0.6 62.9 
17 2 0.6 0.6 63.5 
18 8 2.6 2.6 66.1 
19 1 0.3 0.3 66.5 
20 20 6.5 6.5 72.9 
21 6 1.9 1.9 74.8 
22 6 1.9 1.9 76.8 
23 3 1.0 1.0 77.7 
24 1 0.3 0.3 78.1 
25 18 5.8 5.8 83.9 
26 5 1.6 1.6 85.5 
27 4 1.3 1.3 86.8 
28 3 1.0 1.0 87.7 
29 2 0.6 0.6 88.4 
30 10 3.2 3.2 91.6 
32 1 0.3 0.3 91.9 
33 2 0.6 0.6 92.6 
34 1 0.3 0.3 92.9 
35 7 2.3 2.3 95.2 
36 1 0.3 0.3 95.5 
37 2 0.6 0.6 96.1 
39 1 0.3 0.3 96.5 
40 5 1.6 1.6 98.1 
41 3 1.0 1.0 99.0 
42 1 0.3 0.3 99.4 
46 2 0.6 0.6 100.0 
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Q2. Involvement with Food Standards    
 










Percent      
(%) 
Very Involved 175 56.5 56.5 56.5 
 
Involved 86 27.7 27.7 84.2 
Partially Involved 36 11.6 11.6 95.8 
Little Involved 8 2.6 2.6 98.4 
Not Involved at all 5 1.6 1.6 100 
Total 310 100 100   
 
 
Q3.Certified Fresh Food Demand    
 












Yes 105 33.9 34.3 34.3 
No 201 64.8 65.7 100 
n Total 306 98.7 100   
Misssing values 4 1.3     
N Total 310 100 100   
 
 
Q4. Reasons to request certified fresh food to suppliers    
 










Percent      
(%) 
0   23 7.4 20.9 20.9 
Rank 1 13 4.2 11.8 32.7 
Rank 2   15 4.8 13.6 46.4 
Rank 3   22 7.1 20 66.4 
Rank 4   24 7.7 21.8 88.2 
Rank 5   13 4.2 11.8 100 
n Total   110 35.5 100   
Missing   200 64.5     
N Total   310 100     
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Percent      
(%) 
Valid   20 6.5 18.2 18.2 
Rank 1 20 6.5 18.2 36.4 
Rank 2   20 6.5 18.2 54.5 
Rank 3   19 6.1 17.3 71.8 
Rank 4   17 5.5 15.5 87.3 
Rank 5   14 4.5 12.7 100 
n Total   110 35.5 100   
Missing   200 64.5     
N Total   310 100     
 










Percent      
(%) 
0   17 5.5 15.5 15.5 
Rank 1 41 13.2 37.3 52.7 
Rank 2   32 10.3 29.1 81.8 
Rank 3   15 4.8 13.6 95.5 
Rank 4   4 1.3 3.6 99.1 
Rank 5   1 0.3 0.9 100 
n Total   110 35.5 100   
Missing   200 64.5     
N Total   310 100     
 










Percent      
(%) 
0 22 7.1 20 20 
Rank 1 22 7.1 20 40 
Rank 2   19 6.1 17.3 57.3 
Rank 3   17 5.5 15.5 72.7 
Rank 4   12 3.9 10.9 83.6 
Rank 5   18 5.8 16.4 100 
n Total   110 35.5 100   
Missing   200 64.5     
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Percent      
(%) 
0 28 9 25.5 25.5 
Rank 1 2 0.6 1.8 27.3 
Rank 2   8 2.6 7.3 34.5 
Rank 3   16 5.2 14.5 49.1 
Rank 4   25 8.1 22.7 71.8 
Rank 5   31 10 28.2 100 
n Total   110 35.5 100   
Missing   200 64.5     
N Total   310 100     
 
 
Q5. Type of certifications mostly demanded 
 











Percent      
(%) 
1 2 0.6 0.6 0.6 
5 4 1.3 1.3 1.9 
10 4 1.3 1.3 3.2 
15 1 0.3 0.3 3.5 
50 2 0.6 0.6 4.1 
60 1 0.3 0.3 4.4 
80 1 0.3 0.3 4.7 
98 200 64.5 64.5 69.2 
99 77 24.8 24.8 94 
100 1 0.3 0.3 100 
Valid 17 5.5 5.5 5.5 
N Total 310 100 100   
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SQF 2000                               










Percent      
(%) 
0 17 5.5 5.5 5.5 
4 1 0.3 0.3 5.8 
5 2 0.6 0.6 6.4 
10 3 1 1 7.4 
20 1 0.3 0.3 7.7 
25 1 0.3 0.3 8 
35 1 0.3 0.3 8.3 
40 1 0.3 0.3 8.6 
50 1 0.3 0.3 8.9 
80 1 0.3 0.3 9.2 
98 200 64.5 64.5 73.7 
99 80 25.8 25.8 99.5 
100 1 0.3 0.3 100 
N Total 310 100 100   
      
Organic                                










Percent      
(%) 
0 8 2.6 2.6 2.6 
1 1 0.3 0.3 2.9 
3 1 0.3 0.3 3.2 
5 16 5.2 5.2 8.4 
8 1 0.3 0.3 8.7 
10 9 2.9 2.9 11.6 
15 3 1 1 12.6 
20 4 1.3 1.3 13.9 
30 4 1.3 1.3 15.2 
40 2 0.6 0.6 15.8 
50 2 0.6 0.6 16.4 
55 1 0.3 0.3 16.7 
60 2 0.6 0.6 17.3 
70 1 0.3 0.3 17.6 
75 1 0.3 0.3 17.9 
90 2 0.6 0.6 18.5 
95 1 0.3 0.3 18.8 
98 200 64.5 64.5 83.3 
99 47 15.2 15.2 98.5 
100 4 1.3 1.3 100 
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IFS                                         










Percent      
(%) 
0 13 4.2 4.2 4.2 
1 2 0.6 0.6 4.8 
5 1 0.3 0.3 5.1 
10 2 0.6 0.6 5.7 
15 1 0.3 0.3 6 
20 6 1.9 1.9 7.9 
25 1 0.3 0.3 8.2 
50 6 1.9 1.9 10.1 
60 1 0.3 0.3 10.4 
75 1 0.3 0.3 10.7 
90 1 0.3 0.3 11 
98 200 64.5 64.5 75.5 
99 63 20.3 20.3 95.8 
100 12 3.9 3.9 100 
N Total 310 100 100   
      
Fair Trade                                        









Percent      
(%) 
0 11 3.5 3.5 3.5 
1 2 0.6 0.6 4.1 
2 3 1 1 5.1 
4 1 0.3 0.3 5.4 
5 5 1.6 1.6 7 
10 2 0.6 0.6 7.6 
15 3 1 1 8.6 
20 4 1.3 1.3 9.9 
25 2 0.6 0.6 10.5 
30 1 0.3 0.3 10.8 
50 4 1.3 1.3 12.1 
70 1 0.3 0.3 12.4 
95 1 0.3 0.3 12.7 
98 200 64.5 64.5 77.2 
99 68 21.9 21.9 99.1 
100 2 0.6 0.6 100 
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GLOBALG.A.P                                        









Percent      
(%) 
2 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
10 4 1.3 1.3 1.6 
20 4 1.3 1.3 2.9 
25 1 0.3 0.3 2.2 
30 4 1.3 1.3 3.5 
35 2 0.6 0.6 4.1 
40 5 1.6 1.6 5.7 
50 5 1.6 1.6 7.3 
55 1 0.3 0.3 7.6 
60 2 0.6 0.6 8.2 
70 1 0.3 0.3 8.5 
75 1 0.3 0.3 8.8 
80 7 2.3 2.3 11.1 
90 3 1 1 12.1 
93 1 0.3 0.3 12.4 
95 5 1.6 1.6 14 
98 200 64.5 64.5 78.5 
99 25 8.1 8.1 86.6 
100 38 12.3 12.3 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
      









Percent      
(%) 
0 7 2.3 2.3 2.3 
5 6 1.9 1.9 4.2 
10 6 1.9 1.9 6.1 
20 3 1 1 7.1 
25 4 1.3 1.3 8.4 
30 1 0.3 0.3 8.7 
35 1 0.3 0.3 9 
50 6 1.9 1.9 10.9 
60 1 0.3 0.3 11.2 
70 2 0.6 0.6 11.8 
75 1 0.3 0.3 12.1 
90 1 0.3 0.3 12.4 
98 200 64.5 64.5 76.9 
99 59 19 19 95.9 
100 12 3.9 3.9 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
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ISO 22000                                        









Percent      
(%) 
0 11 3.5 3.5 3.5 
1 2 0.6 0.6 4.1 
5 1 0.3 0.3 4.4 
6 1 0.3 0.3 4.7 
10 3 1 1 5.7 
15 1 0.3 0.3 6 
20 1 0.3 0.3 6.3 
30 3 1 1 7.3 
50 2 0.6 0.6 7.9 
70 2 0.6 0.6 10.5 
75 1 0.3 0.3 10.8 
80 4 1.3 1.3 12.1 
90 1 0.3 0.3 12.4 
98 200 64.5 64.5 76.9 
99 73 23.5 23.5 100 
100 4 1.3 1.3 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
      
Other Standards*                                       









Percent      
(%) 
0 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
5 2 0.6 0.6 0.9 
10 2 0.6 0.6 1.5 
20 8 2.6 2.6 4.1 
26 1 0.3 0.3 4.4 
30 3 1 1 5.4 
40 3 1 1 6.4 
50 2 0.6 0.6 7 
70 2 0.6 0.6 7.6 
75 1 0.3 0.3 7.9 
80 2 0.6 0.6 8.5 
98 200 64.5 64.5 73 
99 69 22.3 22.3 95.3 
100 14 4.5 4.5 100 
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Percent      
(%) 
Agriconfiance 2 0.6 0.6 0.6 
BSCI 1 0.3 0.3 0.9 
CAFE practices 1 0.3 0.3 1.2 
Export license. BIS. PFA 1 0.3 0.3 1.5 
LEAF 2 0.6 0.6 2.1 
Field to Fork 3 1 1 3.1 
Freshcare 2 0.6 0.6 3.7 
GFSI Benchmarked 2 0.6 0.6 4.3 
GMP 2 0.6 0.6 4.9 
Green Food 1 0.3 0.3 5.2 
HACCP 5 1.6 1.6 6.8 
IGP 1 0.3 0.3 7.1 
ISO 9001 2 0.6 0.6 7.7 
ISO14000 1 0.3 0.3 8 
Kosher & Halal 1 0.3 0.3 8.3 
LGMA 1 0.3 0.3 8.6 
MSC 2 0.6 0.6 9.2 
PRIMUS 2 0.6 0.6 9.8 
Retailer 1 0.3 0.3 10.1 
TESCO NURTURE 4 1.3 1.3 11.4 
AH-protocol 1 0.3 0.3 11.7 
USDA GAP 1 0.3 0.3 12 
UTZ CERTIFIED 1 0.3 0.3 12.3 
N Total 40 12.3 12.3   
 
 















38 12.3 12.3 12.3 
Very Credible 7 2.3 2.3 14.5 
Credible 
 
  38 12.3 12.3 26.8 
Neither/ nor 
 
  102 32.9 32.9 59.7 
Slightly Credible   82 26.5 26.5 86.1 
Not Credible   43 13.9 13.9 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
  

















29 9.4 9.4 9.4 
Very Credible 74 23.9 23.9 33.2 
Credible 
 
  158 51 51 84.2 
Neither/ nor 
 
  39 12.6 12.6 96.8 
Slightly Credible   9 2.9 2.9 99.7 
Not Credible   1 0.3 0.3 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 














12 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Very Credible 135 43.5 43.5 47.4 
Credible 
 
  132 42.6 42.6 90 
Neither/ nor 
 
  18 5.8 5.8 95.8 
Slightly Credible   12 3.9 3.9 99.7 
Not Credible   1 0.3 0.3 100 
















39 12.6 12.6 12.6 
Very Credible 4 1.3 1.3 13.9 
Credible 
 
  29 9.4 9.4 23.2 
Neither/ nor 
 
  90 29 29 52.3 
Slightly Credible   81 26.1 26.1 78.4 
Not Credible   67 21.6 21.6 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 















29 9.4 9.4 9.4 
Very Credible 6 1.9 1.9 11.3 
Credible 
 
  36 11.6 11.6 22.9 
Neither/ nor 
 
  75 24.2 24.2 47.1 
Slightly Credible   80 25.8 25.8 72.9 
Not Credible   84 27.1 27.1 100 
















37 11.9 11.9 11.9 
Very Credible 9 2.9 2.9 14.8 
Credible 
 
  62 20 20 34.8 
Neither/ nor 
 
  116 37.4 37.4 72.3 
Slightly Credible   65 21 21 93.2 
Not Credible   21 6.8 6.8 100 
















26 8.4 8.4 8.4 
Very Credible 28 9 9 17.4 
Credible 
 
  123 39.7 39.7 57.1 
Neither/ nor 
 
  86 27.7 27.7 84.8 
Slightly Credible   37 11.9 11.9 96.8 
Not Credible   10 3.2 3.2 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
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23 7.4 7.4 7.4 
Very Credible 71 22.9 22.9 30.3 
Credible 
 
  136 43.9 43.9 74.2 
Neither/ nor 
 
  51 16.5 16.5 90.6 
Slightly Credible   24 7.7 7.7 98.4 
Not Credible   5 1.6 1.6 100 




Q7. Effectiveness of Food Standards 
 
Food standards are reliable in 














3 1 1 1 
I strongly agree 68 21.9 21.9 22.9 
I agree 
 
  184 59.4 59.4 82.3 
Neither/ nor 
 
  34 11 11 93.2 
I disagree 
 
  18 5.8 5.8 99 
I strongly disagree   3 1 1 100 
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Food standards which cannot trace 
products back into the supply chain 














3 1 1 1 
I strongly agree 121 39 39 40 
I agree 
 
  133 42.9 42.9 82.9 
Neither/ nor 
 
  26 8.4 8.4 91.3 
I disagree 
 
  21 6.8 6.8 98.1 
I strongly disagree   6 1.9 1.9 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
I believe in the information 
provided by food standards (e.g. 
current certification status of 














2 0.6 0.6 0.6 
I strongly agree 42 13.5 13.5 14.2 
I agree 
 
  184 59.4 59.4 73.5 
Neither/ nor 
 
  59 19 19 92.6 
I disagree 
 
  20 6.5 6.5 99 
I strongly disagree   3 1 1 100 
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Food standards cannot help to 














3 1 1 1 
I strongly agree 19 6.1 6.1 7.1 
I agree 
 
  53 17.1 17.1 24.2 
Neither/ nor 
 
  50 16.1 16.1 40.3 
I disagree 
 
  155 50 50 90.3 
I strongly disagree   30 9.7 9.7 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
 
Q8. Traceability of Certified Food 
 
It should be always possible to 
identify the origin of the certified 














3 1 1 1 
I strongly agree 165 53.2 53.2 54.2 
I agree 
 
  121 39 39 93.2 
Neither/ nor 
 
  11 3.5 3.5 96.8 
I disagree 
 
  9 2.9 2.9 99.7 
I strongly disagree   1 0.3 0.3 100 
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I have confidence that certified 















1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
I strongly agree 29 9.4 9.4 9.7 
I agree 
 
  97 31.3 31.3 41 
Neither/ nor 
 
  76 24.5 24.5 65.5 
I disagree 
 
  84 27.1 27.1 92.6 
I strongly disagree   23 7.4 7.4 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
It is not necessary to have the 
precise information about the area 














2 0.6 0.6 0.6 
I strongly agree 13 4.2 4.2 4.8 
I agree 
 
  53 17.1 17.1 21.9 
Neither/ nor 
 
  34 11 11 32.9 
I disagree 
 
  131 42.3 42.3 75.2 
I strongly disagree   77 24.8 24.8 100 
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I do not rely on food certification 
systems which cannot provide 
accurate information about the 














5 1.6 1.6 1.6 
I strongly agree 80 25.8 25.8 27.4 
I agree 
 
  152 49 49 76.5 
Neither/ nor 
 
  35 11.3 11.3 87.7 
I disagree 
 
  34 11 11 98.7 
I strongly disagree   4 1.3 1.3 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
A credible food certification system 















2 0.6 0.6 0.6 
I strongly agree 12 3.9 3.9 4.5 
I agree 
 
  25 8.1 8.1 12.6 
Neither/ nor 
 
  15 4.8 4.8 17.4 
I disagree 
 
  150 48.4 48.4 65.8 
I strongly disagree   106 34.2 34.2 100 
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Q9. Certification Systems Reliability per Country 
 














25 8.1 8.1 8.1 
Reliable 
 
  197 63.5 63.5 71.6 
Slightly Reliable   62 20 20 91.6 
Neither/ nor 
 
  20 6.5 6.5 98.1 
Slightly Unreliable   5 1.6 1.6 99.7 
Unreliable   1 0.3 0.3 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 














48 15.5 15.5 15.5 
Reliable 
 
  19 6.1 6.1 21.6 
Slightly Reliable   64 20.6 20.6 42.3 
Neither/ nor 
 
  102 32.9 32.9 75.2 
Slightly Unreliable   55 17.7 17.7 92.9 
Unreliable   22 7.1 7.1 100 
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35 11.3 11.3 11.3 
Reliable 
 
  135 43.5 43.5 54.8 
Slightly Reliable   76 24.5 24.5 79.4 
Neither/ nor 
 
  44 14.2 14.2 93.5 
Slightly Unreliable   13 4.2 4.2 97.7 
Unreliable   7 2.3 2.3 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 














37 11.9 11.9 11.9 
Reliable 
 
  70 22.6 22.6 34.5 
Slightly Reliable   96 31 31 65.5 
Neither/ nor 
 
  75 24.2 24.2 89.7 
Slightly Unreliable   21 6.8 6.8 96.5 
Unreliable   11 3.5 3.5 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 














41 13.2 13.2 13.2 
Reliable 
 
  12 3.9 3.9 17.1 
Slightly Reliable   41 13.2 13.2 30.3 
Neither/ nor 
 
  71 22.9 22.9 53.2 
Slightly Unreliable   69 22.3 22.3 75.5 
Unreliable   76 24.5 24.5 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
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41 13.2 13.2 13.2 
Reliable 
 
  11 3.5 3.5 16.8 
Slightly Reliable   34 11 11 27.7 
Neither/ nor 
 
  100 32.3 32.3 60 
Slightly Unreliable   70 22.6 22.6 82.6 
Unreliable   54 17.4 17.4 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 














35 11.3 11.3 11.3 
Reliable 
 
  154 49.7 49.7 61 
Slightly Reliable   79 25.5 25.5 86.5 
Neither/ nor 
 
  36 11.6 11.6 98.1 
Slightly Unreliable   4 1.3 1.3 99.4 
Unreliable   2 0.6 0.6 100 
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Q10. Auditing options 
 
Food standards are more credible 















2 0.6 0.6 0.6 
I strongly agree 95 30.6 30.6 31.3 
I agree 
 
  129 41.6 41.6 72.9 
Neither/ nor 
 
  26 8.4 8.4 81.3 
I disagree 
 
  50 16.1 16.1 97.4 
I strongly disagree   8 2.6 2.6 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
Certification of producer groups 














1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
I strongly agree 31 10 10 10.3 
I agree 
 
  90 29 29 39.4 
Neither/ nor 
 
  56 18.1 18.1 57.4 
I disagree 
 
  101 32.6 32.6 90 
I strongly disagree   31 10 10 100 









Angelo Enrique Benjamin Lazo Galdos 137 
I would still have confidence in food 
standards that do not require 














4 1.3 1.3 1.3 
I strongly agree 20 6.5 6.5 7.7 
I agree 
 
  84 27.1 27.1 34.8 
Neither/ nor 
  
  42 13.5 13.5 48.4 
I disagree 
 
  109 35.2 35.2 83.5 
I strongly disagree   51 16.5 16.5 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
 
Q11. Origin of food certification systems 
 
Food certification systems 
established in developed countries 
are always carefully designed by 














5 1.6 1.6 1.6 
I strongly agree 25 8.1 8.1 9.7 
I agree 
 
  100 32.3 32.3 41.9 
Neither/ nor 
 
  92 29.7 29.7 71.6 
I disagree 
 
  69 22.3 22.3 93.9 
I strongly disagree   19 6.1 6.1 100 
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Certified food coming from 
developing countries are more 
trustworthy than similar products 














3 1 1 1 
I strongly agree 12 3.9 3.9 4.8 
I agree 
 
  49 15.8 15.8 20.6 
Neither/ nor 
 
  98 31.6 31.6 52.3 
I disagree 
 
  122 39.4 39.4 91.6 
I strongly disagree   26 8.4 8.4 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
Whenever possible. I would 
recommend to buy certified food 














5 1.6 1.6 1.6 
I strongly agree 45 14.5 14.5 16.1 
I agree 
 
  102 32.9 32.9 49 
Neither/ nor 
 
  71 22.9 22.9 71.9 
I disagree 
 
  60 19.4 19.4 91.3 
I strongly disagree   27 8.7 8.7 100 
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Auditors in developed countries are 
more reliable than auditors in 














5 1.6 1.6 1.6 
I strongly agree 29 9.4 9.4 11 
I agree 
 
  71 22.9 22.9 33.9 
Neither/ nor 
 
  67 21.6 21.6 55.5 
I disagree 
 
  97 31.3 31.3 86.8 
I strongly disagree   41 13.2 13.2 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
I have less confidence in 
certification bodies in developing 















3 1 1 1 
I strongly agree 35 11.3 11.3 12.3 
I agree 
 
  108 34.8 34.8 47.1 
Neither/ nor 
 
  60 19.4 19.4 66.5 
I disagree 
 
  75 24.2 24.2 90.6 
I strongly disagree   29 9.4 9.4 100 
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35 11.3 11.3 11.3 
I have confidence 14 4.5 4.5 15.8 
I have slight confidence 60 19.4 19.4 35.2 
Neither / nor 
 
61 19.7 19.7 54.8 
I have slight no confidence 74 23.9 23.9 78.7 
I have no confidence 66 21.3 21.3 100 
















35 11.3 11.3 11.3 
I have confidence 17 5.5 5.5 16.8 
I have slight confidence 50 16.1 16.1 32.9 
Neither / nor 
 
94 30.3 30.3 63.2 
I have slight no confidence 62 20 20 83.2 
I have no confidence 52 16.8 16.8 100 

























31 10 10 10 
I have confidence 68 21.9 21.9 31.9 
I have slight confidence 107 34.5 34.5 66.5 
Neither / nor 
 
72 23.2 23.2 89.7 
I have slight no confidence 25 8.1 8.1 97.7 
I have no confidence 7 2.3 2.3 100 
















32 10.3 10.3 10.3 
I have confidence 156 50.3 50.3 60.6 
I have slight confidence 70 22.6 22.6 83.2 
Neither / nor 
 
45 14.5 14.5 97.7 
I have slight no confidence 6 1.9 1.9 99.7 
I have no confidence 1 0.3 0.3 100 
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29 9.4 9.4 9.4 
I have confidence 126 40.6 40.6 50 
I have slight confidence 93 30 30 80 
Neither / nor 
 
40 12.9 12.9 92.9 
I have slight no confidence 18 5.8 5.8 98.7 
I have no confidence 4 1.3 1.3 100 
















33 10.6 10.6 10.6 
I have confidence 17 5.5 5.5 16.1 
I have slight confidence 73 23.5 23.5 39.7 
Neither / nor 
 
92 29.7 29.7 69.4 
I have slight no confidence 62 20 20 89.4 
I have no confidence 33 10.6 10.6 100 
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24 7.7 7.7 7.7 
I have confidence 188 60.6 60.6 68.4 
I have slight confidence 64 20.6 20.6 89 
Neither / nor 
 
26 8.4 8.4 97.4 
I have slight no confidence 7 2.3 2.3 99.7 
I have no confidence 1 0.3 0.3 100 
















39 12.6 12.6 12.6 
I have confidence 26 8.4 8.4 21 
I have slight confidence 79 25.5 25.5 46.5 
Neither / nor 
 
92 29.7 29.7 76.1 
I have slight no confidence 58 18.7 18.7 94.8 
I have no confidence 16 5.2 5.2 100 
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Q13. Requirements of food standards  
 
Food standards that focus on one 
single stage of the supply chain (e.g. 














8 2.6 2.6 2.6 
I strongly agree 27 8.7 8.7 11.3 
I agree 
 
  92 29.7 29.7 41 
Neither/ nor 
 
  81 26.1 26.1 67.1 
I disagree 
 
  89 28.7 28.7 95.8 
I strongly disagree   13 4.2 4.2 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
Food standards are more reliable 
when they are focused on only one 















7 2.3 2.3 2.3 
I strongly agree 40 12.9 12.9 15.2 
I agree 
 
  81 26.1 26.1 41.3 
Neither/ nor 
 
  64 20.6 20.6 61.9 
I disagree 
 
  98 31.6 31.6 93.5 
I strongly disagree   20 6.5 6.5 100 
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Credible food standards should 
integrate food safety, environmental 














7 2.3 2.3 2.3 
I strongly agree 90 29 29 31.3 
I agree 
 
  111 35.8 35.8 67.1 
Neither/ nor 
 
  40 12.9 12.9 80 
I disagree 
 
  47 15.2 15.2 95.2 
I strongly disagree   15 4.8 4.8 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
Food standards that cover a wide 
range of the supply chain (e.g. pre 














7 2.3 2.3 2.3 
I strongly agree 17 5.5 5.5 7.7 
I agree 
 
  33 10.6 10.6 18.4 
Neither/ nor 
 
  53 17.1 17.1 35.5 
I disagree 
 
  157 50.6 50.6 86.1 
I strongly disagree   43 13.9 13.9 100 
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Food standards are more credible 
when they can be adopted in 














8 2.6 2.6 2.6 
I strongly agree 73 23.5 23.5 26.1 
I agree 
 
  161 51.9 51.9 78.1 
Neither/ nor 
 
  28 9 9 87.1 
I disagree 
 
  36 11.6 11.6 98.7 
I strongly disagree   4 1.3 1.3 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
Q14. Confidence in standard setting organizations 
 
Governments should be the only 
responsible parties in establishing 














7 2.3 2.3 2.3 
I strongly agree 13 4.2 4.2 6.5 
I agree 
 
  28 9 9 15.5 
Neither/ nor 
 
  52 16.8 16.8 32.3 
I disagree 
 
  141 45.5 45.5 77.7 
I strongly disagree   69 22.3 22.3 100 
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I have confidence in food standards 
developed by producer 














7 2.3 2.3 2.3 
I strongly agree 22 7.1 7.1 9.4 
I agree 
 
  107 34.5 34.5 43.9 
Neither/ nor 
 
  99 31.9 31.9 75.8 
I disagree 
 
  63 20.3 20.3 96.1 
I strongly disagree   12 3.9 3.9 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
Food standards are more credible 
when they are developed by 















7 2.3 2.3 2.3 
I strongly agree 74 23.9 23.9 26.1 
I agree 
 
  127 41 41 67.1 
Neither/ nor 
 
  57 18.4 18.4 85.5 
I disagree 
 
  34 11 11 96.5 
I strongly disagree   11 3.5 3.5 100 
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I have confidence in food standards 
developed by certification bodies 














9 2.9 2.9 2.9 
I strongly agree 27 8.7 8.7 11.6 
I agree 
 
  123 39.7 39.7 51.3 
Neither/ nor 
 
  66 21.3 21.3 72.6 
I disagree  
 
  64 20.6 20.6 93.2 
I strongly disagree   21 6.8 6.8 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
Non Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) are the right organizations 














7 2.3 2.3 2.3 
I strongly agree 19 6.1 6.1 8.4 
I agree 
 
  73 23.5 23.5 31.9 
Neither/ nor 
 
  79 25.5 25.5 57.4 
I disagree 
 
  86 27.7 27.7 85.2 
I strongly disagree   46 14.8 14.8 100 
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Q15. Recommendations about Food Standards 
 
I would suggest buying certified 
fresh products under food standards 














10 3.2 3.2 3.2 
I strongly agree 8 2.6 2.6 5.8 
I agree 
 
  57 18.4 18.4 24.2 
Neither/ nor 
 
  115 37.1 37.1 61.3 
I disagree 
 
  98 31.6 31.6 92.9 
I strongly disagree   22 7.1 7.1 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
I would advise others to have 
confidence in food standards that 














8 2.6 2.6 2.6 
I strongly agree 12 3.9 3.9 6.5 
I agree 
 
  80 25.8 25.8 32.3 
Neither/ nor 
 
  100 32.3 32.3 64.5 
I disagree 
 
  89 28.7 28.7 93.2 
I strongly disagree   21 6.8 6.8 100 
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I would not propose others to rely 















10 3.2 3.2 3.2 
I strongly agree 9 2.9 2.9 6.1 
I agree 
 
  54 17.4 17.4 23.5 
Neither/ nor 
 
  108 34.8 34.8 58.4 
I disagree 
 
  108 34.8 34.8 93.2 
I strongly disagree   21 6.8 6.8 100 
N Total   310 100 100   
 
I would only recommend food 















10 3.2 3.2 3.2 
I strongly agree 107 34.5 34.5 37.7 
I agree 
 
  134 43.2 43.2 81 
Neither/ nor 
 
  26 8.4 8.4 89.4 
I disagree 
 
  28 9 9 98.4 
I strongly disagree   5 1.6 1.6 100 
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I would not suggest buying food 
products certified by a food 














8 2.6 2.6 2.6 
I strongly agree 12 3.9 3.9 6.5 
I agree 
 
  38 12.3 12.3 18.7 
Neither/ nor 
 
  82 26.5 26.5 45.2 
I disagree 
 
  133 42.9 42.9 88.1 
I strongly disagree   37 11.9 11.9 100 




















38 12.3 12.3 12.3 
Extremely likely 
 
76 24.5 24.5 36.8 
Likely 
 
95 30.6 30.6 67.4 
Neither / nor 
 
49 15.8 15.8 83.2 
Unlikely 
 
42 13.5 13.5 96.8 
Extremely unlikely 10 3.2 3.2 100 
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32 10.3 10.3 10.3 
Extremely likely 82 26.5 26.5 36.8 
Likely 
 
102 32.9 32.9 69.7 
Neither / nor 
 
54 17.4 17.4 87.1 
Unlikely 
 
33 10.6 10.6 97.7 
Extremely unlikely 7 2.3 2.3 100 
















33 10.6 10.6 10.6 
Extremely likely 70 22.6 22.6 33.2 
Likely 
 
110 35.5 35.5 68.7 
Neither / nor 
 
48 15.5 15.5 84.2 
Unlikely 
 
38 12.3 12.3 96.5 
Extremely unlikely 11 3.5 3.5 100 
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33 10.6 10.6 10.6 
Extremely likely 
 
72 23.2 23.2 33.9 
likely 114 36.8 36.8 70.6 
Neither / nor 
 
56 18.1 18.1 88.7 
Unlikely 
 
29 9.4 9.4 98.1 
Extremely unlikely 
 
6 1.9 1.9 100 

















37 11.9 11.9 11.9 
Extremely likely 74 23.9 23.9 35.8 
Likely 
 
106 34.2 34.2 70 
Neither / nor 
 
58 18.7 18.7 88.7 
Unlikely 
 
26 8.4 8.4 97.1 
Extremely unlikely 9 2.9 2.9 100 


































36 11.6 11.6 11.6 
Extremely likely 73 23.5 23.5 35.2 
Likely 
 
108 34.8 34.8 70 
Neither / nor 
 
57 18.4 18.4 88.4 
Unlikely 
 
29 9.4 9.4 97.7 
Extremely unlikely 7 2.3 2.3 100 

















36 11.6 11.6 11.6 
Extremely likely 73 23.5 23.5 35.2 
Likely 
 
90 29 29 64.2 
Neither / nor 
 
48 15.5 15.5 79.7 
Unlikely 
 
46 14.8 14.8 94.5 
Extremely unlikely 17 5.5 5.5 100 































36 11.6 11.6 11.6 
Extremely likely 65 21 21 32.6 
Likely 
 
140 45.2 45.2 77.7 
Neither / nor 
 
38 12.3 12.3 90 
Unlikely 
 
24 7.7 7.7 97.7 
Extremely unlikely 7 2.3 2.3 100 















Percent      
(%) 
99 8 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Argentina 7 2.3 2.3 4.8 
Australia 17 5.5 5.5 10.3 
Austria 6 1.9 1.9 12.3 
Belgium 5 1.6 1.6 13.9 
Brazil 9 2.9 2.9 16.8 
Canada 4 1.3 1.3 18.1 
Chile 4 1.3 1.3 19.4 
China 3 1 1 20.3 
Colombia 6 1.9 1.9 22.3 
Costa Rica 1 0.3 0.3 22.6 
Czech Republic 1 0.3 0.3 22.9 
Denmark 1 0.3 0.3 23.2 
Ecuador 4 1.3 1.3 24.5 
Egypt 7 2.3 2.3 26.8 
Faroe Islands 1 0.3 0.3 27.1 
Finland 1 0.3 0.3 27.4 
France 17 5.5 5.5 32.9 
Germany 25 8.1 8.1 41 
Ghana 4 1.3 1.3 42.3 
Greece 1 0.3 0.3 42.6 
Guatemala 1 0.3 0.3 42.9 
India 6 1.9 1.9 44.8 
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Indonesia 1 0.3 0.3 45.2 
Ireland 4 1.3 1.3 46.5 
Italy 10 3.2 3.2 49.7 
Kenya 5 1.6 1.6 51.3 
Luxembourg 1 0.3 0.3 51.6 
Malta 1 0.3 0.3 51.9 
Mexico 2 0.6 0.6 52.6 
New Zealand 4 1.3 1.3 53.9 
Norway 6 1.9 1.9 55.8 
Pakistan 2 0.6 0.6 56.5 
Palestine 1 0.3 0.3 56.8 
Peru 1 0.3 0.3 57.1 
Poland 1 0.3 0.3 57.4 
Portugal 3 1 1 58.4 
Republican Dominican 1 0.3 0.3 58.7 
Russia 1 0.3 0.3 59 
Saudi Arabia 2 0.6 0.6 59.7 
Serbia 1 0.3 0.3 60 
Slovakia 1 0.3 0.3 60.3 
South Africa 4 1.3 1.3 61.6 
Spain 13 4.2 4.2 65.8 
Suriname 2 0.6 0.6 66.5 
Sweden 2 0.6 0.6 67.1 
Switzerland 13 4.2 4.2 71.3 
Syria 1 0.3 0.3 71.6 
Taiwan 2 0.6 0.6 72.3 
Thailand 3 1 1 73.2 
The Netherlands 18 5.8 5.8 79 
Turkey 4 1.3 1.3 80.3 
United Arab Emirates 2 0.6 0.6 81 
United Kingdom 24 7.7 7.7 88.7 
United States 28 9 9 97.7 
Uruguay 2 0.6 0.6 98.4 
Vietnam 4 1.3 1.3 99.7 
Yemen 1 0.3 0.3 100 
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4 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Retail 
 
23 7.4 7.4 8.7 
Food Service / Restaurant 
 
4 1.3 1.3 10 
Manufacturing / Packing 
 
28 9 9 19 
Trading (Imports / Exports) 
 
28 9 9 28.1 
Supplier  
 
28 9 9 37.1 
Service Provider  
 
131 42.3 42.3 79.4 
Other (please indicate) 64 20.6 20.6 100 






















27 8.7 8.7 8.7 
Less than 1 million 
 
75 24.2 24.2 32.9 
1 million EUR to less than 50 million 
 
99 31.9 31.9 64.8 
50 million EUR to less than 100 million 
 
39 12.6 12.6 77.4 
100 million EUR to less than 500 million 
  
19 6.1 6.1 83.5 
500 million EUR to less than 1 billion 
 
14 4.5 4.5 88.1 
More than 1 billion  
 
37 11.9 11.9 100 






Angelo Enrique Benjamin Lazo Galdos 
 
158 
Q20. Type of food products 
 














14 4.5 12.8 12.8 
Quoted 
 
95 30.6 87.2 100 
Total 
 




 201 64.8 
    

















90 29 82.6 82.6 
Quoted 
 
19 6.1 17.4 100 
Total 
 




 201 64.8 
    
















92 29.7 84.4 84.4 
Quoted 
 
17 5.5 15.6 100 
Total 
 




 201 64.8 
    
























97 31.3 89 89 
Quoted 
 
12 3.9 11 100 
Total 
 




 201 64.8 
    
















98 31.6 89.9 89.9 
Quoted 
 
11 3.5 10.1 100 
Total 
 




 201 64.8 
    





































Percent      
(%) 
 201 64.8 64.8 64.8 
 100 32.3 32.3 97.1 
and various others 1 0.3 0.3 97.4 
Cereals 
 
1 0.3 0.3 97.7 
Cocoa 
 
1 0.3 0.3 98.1 
Dairy Products 1 0.3 0.3 98.4 
Dairy Products. Infant Formulas 1 0.3 0.3 98.7 
General Grocery+Non Foods 1 0.3 0.3 99 
Native Products 1 0.3 0.3 99.4 
Nuts  
 
1 0.3 0.3 99.7 
Processed Food 1 0.3 0.3 100 






















92 29.7 84.4 84.4 
Quoted 
 
17 5.5 15.6 100 
Total 
 




97 201 64.8 
    






















53 17.1 48.6 48.6 
Quoted 
 
56 18.1 51.4 100 
Total 
 




97 201 64.8 
    

















60 19.4 55 55 
Quoted 
 
49 15.8 45 100 
Total 
 




97 201 64.8 
    
















70 22.6 64.2 64.2 
Quoted 
 
39 12.6 35.8 100 
Total 
 




97 201 64.8 
    





























84 27.1 77.1 77.1 
Quoted 
 
25 8.1 22.9 100 
Total 
 




97 201 64.8 
    
















100 32.3 91.7 91.7 
Quoted 
 
9 2.9 8.3 100 
Total 
 




97 201 64.8 
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Percent      
(%) 
0 5 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Sales Manager 13 4.2 4.2 5.8 
Quality Manager 53 17.1 17.1 22.9 
Buyer 1 0.3 0.3 23.2 
Technical Expert 72 23.2 23.2 46.5 
Auditor / Inspector 51 16.5 16.5 62.9 
Other (please indicate) 115 37.1 37.1 100 













Percent      
(%) 
99 201 64.8 64.8 64.8 
Accreditation Manager 1 0.3 0.3 65.2 
Advisor 1 0.3 0.3 65.5 
Advisor of the board 1 0.3 0.3 65.8 
Ag Global Leader 1 0.3 0.3 66.1 
all of the above 1 0.3 0.3 66.5 
Auditor 1 0.3 0.3 66.8 
Business Development Manager 1 0.3 0.3 67.1 
C.E.O. 10 3.2 3.2 70.3 
Certification Officer 1 0.3 0.3 70.6 
Company Owner 1 0.3 0.3 71 
Company Owner 8 2.6 2.6 73.5 
Consultant 2 0.6 0.6 74.2 
Country General Manager 1 0.3 0.3 74.5 
Country Manager 1 0.3 0.3 74.8 
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CEO 1 0.3 0.3 75.2 
Deputy Managing Director 1 0.3 0.3 75.5 
Director of Compliance 1 0.3 0.3 75.8 
Director of Sourcing 1 0.3 0.3 76.1 
Economics Professor 1 0.3 0.3 76.5 
Editor 1 0.3 0.3 76.8 
Executive 1 0.3 0.3 77.1 
Executive/owner 1 0.3 0.3 77.4 
F&B 1 0.3 0.3 77.7 
Food Certification Manager 1 0.3 0.3 78.1 
Food Chain Manager 3 1 1 79 
General Director 11 3.5 3.5 82.6 
General Manager 9 2.9 2.9 85.5 
Global Food Market Analyst 1 0.3 0.3 85.8 
Grower Services/Food Safety 1 0.3 0.3 86.1 
Head of Section 1 0.3 0.3 86.5 
HSEQ Manager 1 0.3 0.3 86.8 
Import Food Safety Manager 1 0.3 0.3 87.1 
Inspection Director 1 0.3 0.3 87.4 
Inspector 1 0.3 0.3 87.7 
International Coordinator 1 0.3 0.3 88.1 
Journalist 1 0.3 0.3 88.4 
Managing Director 4 1.3 1.3 89.7 
Marketing Manager 2 0.6 0.6 90.3 
MD 3 1 1 91.3 
Operations Manager 1 0.3 0.3 91.6 
Operations/ Coordinator 1 0.3 0.3 91.9 
Policy Adviser 1 0.3 0.3 92.3 
President 1 0.3 0.3 92.6 
President of Company 1 0.3 0.3 92.9 
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Procurement and Quality Manager 
South America 
1 0.3 0.3 93.2 
Product Manager 1 0.3 0.3 93.5 
Professional (agronomist) 1 0.3 0.3 93.9 
Project Manager 2 0.6 0.6 94.5 
     
Raw Product Food Safety Manager 1 0.3 0.3 95.2 
Research Associate 1 0.3 0.3 95.5 
Scheme Manager 1 0.3 0.3 95.8 
Senior Program Director Accreditation 1 0.3 0.3 96.1 
Teacher 1 0.3 0.3 96.5 
Team Leader 1 0.3 0.3 96.8 
Technical and Sales Support 1 0.3 0.3 97.1 
Technical Director 3 1 1 98.1 
Technical Food Safety Manager and 
Internal Auditor 
1 0.3 0.3 98.4 
Technical Manager 3 1 1 99.4 
Trainer for auditors. coordination of 
controls 
1 0.3 0.3 99.7 
VP of Operations 1 0.3 0.3 100 
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Q23. Country of Birth 
 










Percent      
(%) 
99 9 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Algeria 1 0.3 0.3 3.2 
Argentina 6 1.9 1.9 5.2 
Australia 10 3.2 3.2 8.4 
Austria 5 1.6 1.6 10 
Belgium 2 0.6 0.6 10.6 
Brazil 8 2.6 2.6 13.2 
Cameroon 1 0.3 0.3 13.5 
Canada 5 1.6 1.6 15.2 
Chile 7 2.3 2.3 17.4 
China 4 1.3 1.3 18.7 
Colombia 6 1.9 1.9 20.6 
Costa Rica 1 0.3 0.3 21 
Cyprus 1 0.3 0.3 21.3 
Czech Republic 1 0.3 0.3 21.6 
Denmark 1 0.3 0.3 21.9 
Ecuador 6 1.9 1.9 23.9 
Egypt 11 3.5 3.5 27.4 
Faroe Islands 1 0.3 0.3 27.7 
Finland 1 0.3 0.3 28.1 
Finland 1 0.3 0.3 28.4 
France 9 2.9 2.9 31.3 
Germany 30 9.7 9.7 41 
Ghana 5 1.6 1.6 42.6 
Greece 1 0.3 0.3 42.9 
Guatemala 1 0.3 0.3 43.2 
India 6 1.9 1.9 45.2 
Indonesia 1 0.3 0.3 45.5 
Ireland 2 0.6 0.6 46.1 
Italy 9 2.9 2.9 49 
Kenya 5 1.6 1.6 50.6 
Libya 1 0.3 0.3 51 
Luxembourg 1 0.3 0.3 51.3 
Malta 1 0.3 0.3 51.6 
Mexico 2 0.6 0.6 52.3 
Morocco 1 0.3 0.3 52.6 
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New Zealand 3 1 1 53.5 
Norway 3 1 1 54.5 
Pakistan 2 0.6 0.6 55.2 
Palestine 1 0.3 0.3 55.5 
Paraguay 1 0.3 0.3 55.8 
Peru 3 1 1 56.8 
Poland 1 0.3 0.3 57.1 
Portugal 4 1.3 1.3 58.4 
Russia 1 0.3 0.3 58.7 
Serbia 2 0.6 0.6 59.4 
Singapore 1 0.3 0.3 59.7 
Slovakia 1 0.3 0.3 60 
South Africa 6 1.9 1.9 61.9 
Spain 17 5.5 5.5 67.4 
Suriname 1 0.3 0.3 67.7 
Sweden 2 0.6 0.6 68.4 
Switzerland 5 1.6 1.6 70 
Syria 1 0.3 0.3 70.3 
Taiwan 2 0.6 0.6 71 
Thailand 3 1 1 71.9 
The Netherlands 23 7.4 7.4 79.4 
Turkey 5 1.6 1.6 81 
UK 27 8.7 8.7 89.7 
Uruguay 5 1.6 1.6 91.3 
USA 22 7.1 7.1 98.4 
Vietnam 5 1.6 1.6 100 
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Q24. Year of Birth 
 











Percent      
(%) 
19 5 1.6 1.6 1.6 
36 1 0.3 0.3 1.9 
38 1 0.3 0.3 2.3 
41 1 0.3 0.3 2.6 
42 1 0.3 0.3 2.9 
43 2 0.6 0.6 3.5 
44 1 0.3 0.3 3.9 
45 1 0.3 0.3 4.2 
46 4 1.3 1.3 5.5 
47 3 1 1 6.5 
48 3 1 1 7.4 
49 2 0.6 0.6 8.1 
50 8 2.6 2.6 10.6 
51 6 1.9 1.9 12.6 
52 5 1.6 1.6 14.2 
53 6 1.9 1.9 16.1 
54 9 2.9 2.9 19 
55 6 1.9 1.9 21 
56 9 2.9 2.9 23.9 
57 11 3.5 3.5 27.4 
58 5 1.6 1.6 29 
59 10 3.2 3.2 32.3 
60 9 2.9 2.9 35.2 
61 12 3.9 3.9 39 
62 7 2.3 2.3 41.3 
63 13 4.2 4.2 45.5 
64 7 2.3 2.3 47.7 
65 2 0.6 0.6 48.4 
66 12 3.9 3.9 52.3 
67 9 2.9 2.9 55.2 
68 7 2.3 2.3 57.4 
69 6 1.9 1.9 59.4 
70 11 3.5 3.5 62.9 
71 8 2.6 2.6 65.5 
72 15 4.8 4.8 70.3 
73 6 1.9 1.9 72.3 
74 13 4.2 4.2 76.5 
75 9 2.9 2.9 79.4 
76 10 3.2 3.2 82.6 
77 8 2.6 2.6 85.2 
78 12 3.9 3.9 89 
79 5 1.6 1.6 90.6 
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80 4 1.3 1.3 91.9 
81 2 0.6 0.6 92.6 
82 7 2.3 2.3 94.8 
83 1 0.3 0.3 95.2 
85 3 1 1 96.1 
99 12 3.9 3.9 100 





















5 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Female 
 
76 24.5 24.5 26.1 
Male 
 
229 73.9 73.9 100 
Total 310 100 100   
 
 
